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The chapters in this book were first presented as papers in November 
2016 at the Association for Public Policy and Management’s Fall Research 
Conference.  The papers were then revised based on the excellent comments 
from two discussants, Gary Burtless and Rich Hobbie, and from questions 
and comments received from the audience during the session. 
The most important contribution to this book comes from the authors, 
all of whom have been students of the Unemployment Insurance program for 
many years. They share a common belief in the importance of unemployment 
insurance as a critical component of the American social insurance system, 
as well as the need for comprehensive reform of the system to assure its 






Why the Unemployment Insurance 
Program Needs to Be Reformed
Stephen A. Wandner
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
and The Urban Institute
This book examines the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program in 
the United States from a research and policy perspective. It finds that 
there is consensus among experts and researchers that the program 
is broken and needs to be fixed to function as an adequate source 
of temporary income support to individuals and as a reliable auto-
matic stabilizer in the twenty-first century economy. The chapters are 
written by experts who review the program as it is supposed to work 
under federal law and, by contrast, how it actually has been operating 
in recent years. Based on research evidence, the authors offer pre-
scriptions for restoring the UI program. Chapters 2 and 5 consider a 
number of different proposals for UI reform proposed by the federal 
government, private institutions, and individual researchers. In addi-
tion, Chapter 5 compares recent reform proposals and presents and 
analyzes the authors’ plan for comprehensive reform.
UI is a form of social insurance that was first enacted in 1935 as 
a part of the Social Security Act. The program is a federal-state part-
nership, with the federal government setting a national institutional 
framework, and the states establishing most of the program specifica-
tions through state law and administering day-to-day program opera-
tions. For eight decades, the UI program has paid temporary income 
support to experienced American workers who lose their jobs through 
no fault of their own. The basic (or “regular”) UI program1 generally 
pays up to 26 weeks 2 of benefits to eligible workers. Benefit payments 
usually replace approximately half of a worker’s prior wages up to 
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a state determined maximum benefit amount. Compensation is paid 
weekly and is considered to be adequate if it provides a reasonable 
level of wage replacement while the unemployed seek reemployment. 
Unemployment benefits are paid for by insurance premiums 
(called “contributions,” but in fact, they are a tax) paid by employers 
on payrolls. Unemployment benefits are designed to be fully paid by 
employer taxes over time, although the amounts of unemployment 
benefits paid and unemployment taxes collected are not expected to 
balance every year because the level of unemployment—and, there-
fore, benefit payments—is much greater in recessionary times than in 
more prosperous times. Rather, UI benefit payments and tax revenues 
are intended to balance over the business cycle.
The UI program’s three main goals are to provide:
 1) adequate, temporary income support to experienced, unem-
ployed individuals while they search for new employment;
 2) a countercyclical stimulus to the American economy when 
large numbers of workers become unemployed during 
recessionary periods; and
 3) stabilization of employment through the UI experience rat-
ing system, which discourages employer layoffs.
Thus, UI is both a social insurance program for individuals and 
part of the larger macroeconomic policy to limit the harmful effects of 
economic downturns for individual states and for the United States as 
a whole. As we will see in this book, it is a complex policy challenge 
to achieve each of these goals separately and an even more difficult 
one to achieve them together.
The complexity of the challenge is derived from the number of 
components of the program that must be in balance. Specifically, if 
the UI program is to be a self-sustaining, self-adjusting social insur-
ance program, the following must occur:
• The overall level of benefits and revenues must balance over 
time as a result of the financing provisions in state and federal 
laws (in a static sense).
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• Benefits and revenues must both be indexed to wage increases 
(in a dynamic sense).
• The UI state and federal tax structures need to be structured to 
adjust automatically so that revenues equal benefit payments 
over the business cycle.
A number of things must be implemented to create a UI program 
that remains in balance.
On the benefit side:
• Unemployment benefit levels and durations must be set to en-
sure an adequate level of wage replacement. 
• Unemployment benefits must be adjusted annually to reflect 
changes in wages that occur in the labor market—to enable 
UI to provide the same level of wage replacement over time.
On the revenue side:
• The two components of the UI tax system, tax rates and the 
taxable wage base, must be adequate.
• The taxable wage base must increase annually to accommo-
date annual increases in UI benefits that reflect increases in 
wages.
• Tax contributions must vary over the business cycle, in-
creasing after a recession to build up reserves and declining 
when reserves reach an adequate level to anticipate the next 
recession.
A SYSTEM OUT OF BALANCE
Balancing the components of the UI program is like keeping all 
the parts of a clock in working order to make sure it always keeps the 
right time. Things can go wrong, however, and in recent years, many 
things have gone wrong with the UI system. On the benefit side, ben-
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efits in many states are set below an adequate level and also do not 
increase as wages increase. On the revenue side, the federal UI wage 
base has not been increased since 1983, and many states have not 
increased their state wage bases sufficiently above the federal wage 
base. Also, state tax rates frequently have not been set high enough to 
enable states to get through the next recession without running out of 
reserves, and during economic recoveries, many states resist raising 
taxes and some lower UI benefits instead. 
Thus, the UI program is seriously out of balance in large part 
because neither unemployment benefits nor UI taxes are indexed to 
provide adequate benefits or revenues over time. By contrast, the 
Social Security pension system indexes both benefit levels and the 
taxable wage base, such that payouts and revenues would be in far 
better balance than the UI program, if it were not for the drain on 
program resources from the aging of the U.S. population. Dramatic 
differences have developed between these two social insurance pro-
grams over time despite the fact that both programs started with the 
same taxable wage base of $3,000. In essence, Social Security has 
adjusted to changing economic conditions over time, while UI has 
not.
In response to concerns about the health of the UI system, a num-
ber of major UI reform proposals have been released in the past two 
years. This book reviews and compares several of these proposals.
The authors offer their analyses in the hope that the next serious 
review of the UI program will consider a wide range of reforms to 
strengthen the UI program so that it can become more effective and 
efficient. Given the dramatic changes over the last two decades in the 
demographics of the U.S. workforce and in work arrangements, it is 
past time to reform the UI program before the next recession. This 
evidence-based discussion of reforms will enable federal and state 
officials to weigh policies so they can provide practical solutions to 
prevent a recurrence of the problems the program experienced during 
and after the Great Recession.
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PUBLIC POLICY: NOT 
KEEPING UP WITH THE TIMES
The UI program is over 80 years old. When it was enacted in 
1935, the United States was in the middle of the Great Depression. As 
a result, because of concern about potentially overwhelming short-
term expenditures, the program that was established was modest in its 
design—with states paying low weekly benefits for short periods of 
time—and benefit payments were delayed until 1938 to allow tax col-
lections to build up state reserves in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
(UTF) in the U.S. Treasury.
With nearly full employment, virtually no unemployment ben-
efits were paid during World War II. In the years after the war, it 
became clear that the strength of the U.S. economy was such that the 
UI program could pay more generous benefits for longer periods of 
unemployment. As a result, states changed their UI laws to increase 
maximum benefit amounts and lengthen potential durations.
Since the 1970s, however, the federal government has done little 
to adapt and modernize the UI program through reforms of the federal 
UI law. In response to most of the postwar recessions, Congress has 
continued to enact temporary federal extensions of benefits. A per-
manent Extended Benefit (EB) program was enacted in 1970, but it 
soon proved to be ineffective because the automatic (“trigger”) mech-
anism to turn the program on and off did not work, and the program 
has never been fixed. Instead, in response to the ensuing recessions, 
Congress enacted temporary emergency programs that added to the 
potential duration of UI benefits. 
A major reform of the program was enacted in 1976, but that 
reform was only partial and it left much undone. Congress authorized 
two UI study commissions that issued reports in the 1980s and 1990s, 
but their reform recommendations were ignored.
Under the Social Security Act, individual states are given consid-
erable freedom to determine UI benefit payments eligibility and lev-
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els, tax rates, and tax bases. The states have varied widely in the gen-
erosity of their unemployment benefit payments and the soundness of 
their state accounts in the UTF, but over many decades, benefits have 
generally declined in real terms and benefit financing systems have 
remained inadequate.
As a result, a general consensus has developed among UI policy 
experts that the UI system should be reformed for several reasons. 
These include changing economic conditions, outdated federal stat-
utes that no longer work well, and dysfunction in state programs, 
which are both underfunded and pay inadequate benefits.
Nevertheless, even though there are serious weaknesses in the 
UI program, the state UI administrative systems have responded well 
to recessions. State UI agencies have paid benefits in a reasonably 
timely and accurate manner, despite the fact that recessionary benefit 
payments have tended to increase exponentially, and Congress gener-
ally has required the states to implement temporary emergency UI 
programs effective upon enactment. 
However, the federal and state UI tax structures have not worked 
well. Most states have not accumulated adequate reserves to pay ben-
efits during recessions. After recessions, they have only slowly repaid 
their federal loans and built up their state accounts in the UTF, fre-
quently facing the next recession in a weak fiscal condition. Also, 
after a recession, many states have reduced benefit levels and dura-
tions rather than raised taxes, choosing to lower costs rather than 
raise revenues. At the same time, federal funding from the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) accounts has declined, providing 
inadequate funding for UI administration, EBs, Employment Service 
(ES) administration of the UI work test, and provision of reemploy-
ment services.
As a result, the current UI system faces a reduced ability to serve 
individual covered workers who become unemployed through no 
fault of their own. The percentage of unemployed workers receiv-
ing UI benefits has declined to a historic low. In the next recession, 
a weakened UI system will have a reduced ability to provide a coun-
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tercyclical stimulus, and the states will not be ready to fund new 
demands on the system.
The UI program has been extensively studied and evaluated. 
Public policy analysts have identified problems in the UI system and 
ways to fix them. The purpose of this book is to highlight what has 
been learned from the UI research and evaluations and to analyze pro-
posals for the program’s reform. This book also includes an update of 
portions of a two-decade-old UI policy book by O’Leary and Wand-
ner (1997). 
FAILURE TO HELP UI RECIPIENTS RETURN  
TO WORK
The UI system’s provision of temporary income support is based 
on the expectation that UI recipients will receive help to rapidly return 
to work by receiving information about and referral to job openings, 
job finding and placement services, and labor market information to 
assist in their job search. This exposure to job openings is known as 
the UI Work Test, and it is crucial to assuring that UI recipients are 
seeking new work as a condition for receipt of weekly unemploy-
ment benefits. Historically, ES has provided these services, and the 
decline of the ES has meant that these functions have badly eroded. 
The evolution of the relationship between ES and UI is discussed at 
length in Chapter 3.
In recent decades, UI recipients’ need for reemployment services 
has increased sharply because a large percentage of recipients are per-
manently laid off, rather than temporarily separated from their previ-
ous jobs, and most of them do not have the skills needed to search for 
work. The provision of Job Search Assistance (also called Reemploy-
ment Services) is crucial to facilitating the return to work. Unfortu-
nately, the federal government has provided little new funding for this 
activity except for a short period during the Great Recession under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, despite the 
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fact that Reemployment Services have been found to be highly cost 
effective.
WHAT HAS CHANGED? WHY IT IS TIME TO  
REFORM UI NOW
Above we discussed some systemic problems with the UI pro-
gram, but part of the reason that UI reform is needed is simply that 
times have changed, while the UI program has not. The key evolu-
tionary changes that have occurred are changes in the U.S. labor mar-
ket and in economic conditions. In addition, past program initiatives 
have not been successful and some current UI rules are outdated, and 
the previously strong federal-state relationship has deteriorated. 
Changing Labor Market and Economic Conditions
From temporary to permanent layoffs 
In 1935, the UI program was envisioned as a countercyclical pro-
gram, providing benefits during the temporary layoff of workers who 
were expected to be recalled when the economy improved. Since the 
1970s, however, temporary layoffs have declined sharply, and per-
manently laid off workers are likely to need to find new jobs, pos-
sibly in new industries or occupations. The UI and ES programs have 
not fully adapted to the demands of structural, rather than temporary 
unemployment.
Needs of dislocated workers
As larger numbers of laid off workers have become permanently 
dislocated, most need reemployment services to help them return to 
work. The availability of reemployment services, however, has been 
inadequate. The Workforce Investment Act (and now the Workforce 
Innovation and Opportunity Act) have a Dislocated Worker program, 
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but funding has been modest. Similarly, the Worker Profiling and 
Reemployment Services initiative was enacted in 1993 to help dis-
located workers but was not funded. Most recently, a Reemployment 
Services and Eligibility Assessment initiative has been launched, but 
it too has received inadequate funding. 
Long unemployment durations
There has been an upward trend in the duration of unemploy-
ment. Dislocated workers are having increasing difficulty finding 
employment. As a result, UI recipients are in need of income support 
for longer periods of time. Since the end of the Great Recession, how-
ever, a number of states have reduced potential durations of regular 
benefits below the standard level of 26 weeks. As a result, in times of 
recession, many unemployed workers will exhaust their entitlement 
to UI benefits well before they are able to find new jobs.
Changing U.S. labor force
The UI program has not successfully adapted to two major demo-
graphic changes in the labor force—the increased labor force partici-
pation of women from the end of World War II to the mid-1990s and 
the increased participation of older workers since the mid-1990s. For 
example, when a multi-earner family moves when one member finds 
new employment, the spouse or partner often does not have a job in 
the new location. In many states, the UI system does not consider the 
“following” spouse to be eligible for UI benefits. Women and older 
workers are more likely to work part time, but many states make it 
difficult for part-time workers to receive UI benefits. The UI and ES 
programs also have not accommodated the expanding participation of 
older workers. Their unemployment benefits are sometimes limited, 
and they are not likely to receive the special types of reemployment 
services they may require.
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Unemployment Insurance Program Failures and Lack  
of Adaptation
Failure of past provisions and lack of updating 
Because UI reform occurs so infrequently, any mistakes made in 
program design take a long time to correct. For example, the perma-
nent EB trigger mechanism was revealed as faulty—it doesn’t turn 
the program on and off properly—soon after implementation in the 
1970s, but it has never been permanently improved. 
Many program benefit and taxation provisions also have not 
adapted well to change. In many cases, the problem is that program 
parameters have been set using absolute numbers and have not been 
adjusted to account for wage and price increases. For example, the 
federal taxable wage base was last increased to $7,000 in 1983 and 
is now completely inadequate to fund the program in a manner that 
treats employers and employees equitably. Similarly, many states set 
their maximum weekly benefit amounts and state taxable wage bases 
in fixed dollar amounts, and these levels become inadequate over 
time.
Failure of the federal-state partnership
UI is supposed to be a federal-state partnership, but the partner-
ship has failed in recent decades, both on the federal and state sides. 
In the Executive Branch, the federal government has gradually given 
less direction and guidance to the states. For example, in 1950, 1962, 
1970, and 1976, the U.S. Department of Labor issued detailed federal 
guidance regarding conforming state UI legislation, but no similar 
comprehensive guidance has been issued since 1976. The Congress, 
too, has declined to enact legislation that helps the UI system adapt to 
a changing U.S. economy.
With the federal government stepping into the background, 
in recent decades, the states have been mostly on their own with 
respect to a wide variety of benefit, financing, and administrative 
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issues. While some states have chosen to adapt to the changing labor- 
force environment, many have not. States have also been reluctant 
to respond to the strains of recessions, often reducing benefits after 
downturns, rather than rebuilding their state UI trust fund accounts by 
increasing UI taxes to prepare for the next recession. The result has 
been increasing variation in UI programs among states and a decline 
in financial resilience and the quality of many program components.
The failure of the federal government and of many states to adapt 
the program has been a result of political pressures on the UI sys-
tem resulting in a lack of public policy consensus. Employee groups 
and public policy analysts typically have called for reform, while 
employer groups have resisted. It has been employers’ organizations 
that generally have held sway at both the federal and state levels. 
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON UI REFORM
Employers have a strong incentive to use their political leverage 
to oppose UI reform because, in almost all states, they pay the entire 
UI tax. As a result of employer political leverage, many states have 
resisted both UI tax increases and increases in benefits that would 
lead to tax increases. Organized labor generally has not been an effec-
tive advocate for legislative efforts to improve UI benefits or provide 
sufficient tax revenues to pay for the increased benefits.
At the federal level, employers have been successful in resisting 
increases to the UI taxable wage base and tax rates. As a result, fed-
eral UI trust fund accounts frequently have been inadequate to fund 
federal responsibilities regarding payments for UI and ES administra-
tion and EBs. Employers also have resisted federal benefit standards 
that would provide reasonable qualifying requirements and adequate 
benefit levels and durations.
Employers also have sought to constrain UI at the state level. 
They have opposed increases in both taxes and benefits. When state 
UI revenues have been inadequate to fund benefits in recent reces-
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sions, they have pressed for benefit reductions while resisting tax 
increases.
Today, the federal-state UI system lacks an effective employee 
constituency in large part because employers pay UI taxes. In order 
to provide additional state UI revenue to fund the program and to 
rebalance the political influence between employers and employees in 
state legislatures, an employee payroll tax would have to be enacted 
as part of all state UI laws. Because employer resistance to UI reform 
is likely to continue in the future, one recommendation made in Chap-
ter 5 is that Congress should consider partially or fully funding the UI 
program with an employee tax. Comprehensive UI reform is unlikely 
to occur without employee funding of the UI program.
UI REFORM: PAST REFORMS AND  
STUDY COMMISSIONS
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976
The last comprehensive reform of the UI program was in 1976, 
following the severe 1974–1975 recession. The Unemployment Com-
pensation Amendments of 1976 made fundamental changes in the UI 
program, including increasing the kinds and number of workers cov-
ered by the program, such that virtually all wage and salary workers 
in the United States were covered by the program.
However, the 1976 amendments did not address many other ben-
efit and tax issues, so Congress authorized the creation of the National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) to examine 
and recommend further changes to the UI program.
The Commission was composed of representatives from business, 
labor, and the public. It made a large number of reform recommenda-
tions in its final report to Congress (NCUC 1980a) and produced three 
volumes of sponsored research (NCUC 1980b). No legislation was 
enacted based on these recommendations.
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1981 Amendments
In 1981, a number of changes in federal law were made to reduce 
federal UI costs. Federal statutory changes included making it more 
difficult to pay EBs (e.g., eliminating the national trigger, raising the 
state trigger rate, and adding a minimum work requirement), disquali-
fying some ex-service members, and tightening child support inter-
cept, federal loan, and Trade Adjustment Assistance provisions.
Advisory Council for Unemployment Compensation
The 1990–1991 recession again revealed weakness in the UI pro-
gram. In response, as part of the Emergency Unemployment Com-
pensation Act of 1991, Congress established the Advisory Council 
for Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) to examine approaches 
to UI reform precipitated by the economic downturn during the 1991 
recession. The ACUC sponsored many empirical studies of the UI 
program—gathered in four volumes of background papers (ACUC 
1995b, 1996b), and its three-part final report (ACUC 1994, 1995a, 
1996a) recommended numerous reforms to the system. Among the 
major recommendations were reforms to EB triggers, increasing the 
UI taxable wage base, encouraging state forward funding of UI bene-
fits, increasing UI-covered employment, increasing UI eligibility, and 
increasing UI administrative funding. The ACUC recommendations 
were never considered by the Congress.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA): UI Provisions
The ARRA was enacted in February 2009, over a year into the 
Great Recession. Congress had already enacted a new Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program in June 2008. ARRA 
extended EUC and temporarily increased unemployment benefit 
levels.
ARRA also tried to improve the availability of UI benefits to 
unemployed workers by enacting UI Modernization provisions. 
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States were given a financial incentive to increase initial UI eligibility 
by enacting alternative base periods, paying benefits to unemployed 
part-time workers searching for new part-time work, and paying 
workers leaving work for compelling personal reasons. It also encour-
aged states to pay an allowance for children and extended regular UI 
benefits for UI claimants engaged in training. The UI Modernization 
initiative had modest but uneven success in encouraging expansion of 
UI eligibility (see Chapter 5).
RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS
There has been a growing realization that the Great Recession 
has caused continuing problems for the UI program. Some states 
responded negatively to the recession by cutting benefits in a manner 
that undermines the purpose of the program to act as both a support to 
unemployed workers during temporary periods of unemployment and 
a countercyclical economic stimulus during periods of high unem-
ployment. As a result, a number of organizations have examined the 
UI program, analyzed its current problems, and recommended new 
approaches to restore UI to fulfilling its historical programmatic goals.
Obama FY 2017 Budget Proposal
As part of the FY 2017 Presidential Budget request, then Presi-
dent Obama proposed a modest range of reforms to the UI program 
(White House 2016). These proposals were not considered by the 
Congress, but they were a recognition that the UI program had not 
fully recovered from the Great Recession and that major changes 
should be made to make the program sound (see Chapter 2). The 
White House 2016 proposal dealt with selective issues and was not 
meant to be a comprehensive set of reform options.
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Proposal by the Center for American Progress–Center 
on Poverty and Inequality of the Georgetown University Law 
Center–National Employment Law Project 
A combination of three nonprofit organizations—the Center 
for American Progress, the Center on Poverty and Inequality of the 
Georgetown University Law Center, and the National Employment 
Law Project (CAP, CPI, and NELP, together the CGN)—got together 
and conducted a study of the UI program. In 2016, they issued a 
report (West et al. 2016) proposing a much wider range of UI reforms 
than the Obama administration’s proposals. The CGN proposal had as 
its major goal a sharp increase in UI program participation, as mea-
sured by greatly increasing the UI recipiency rate, that is, the percent-
age of all unemployed workers who receive UI benefits. To achieve 
this goal, CGN recommended the liberalization of a wide range of UI 
provisions, some of which, if adopted, would create a program that 
goes beyond insurance principles and would create an unemployment 
assistance program (see Chapter 5). The CGN proposal represents a 
comprehensive approach to UI reform, as does the new proposal pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
November 2016 White House Meeting on Unemployment 
Insurance
In its last days, the Obama administration considered the urgent 
need for UI reform. On November 2, 2016, senior staff from the 
Council of Economic Advisers, the National Economic Council, the 
Domestic Policy Council, and the Department of Labor met with out-
side experts to discuss UI research and policy. The meeting brought 
together leading researchers and policymakers to address the key 
components of a modern and effective UI system. The invitation 
stated: “UI plays several key roles, including providing income sup-
port to families experiencing negative income shocks and countering 
cyclical slowdown through automatic stabilization. As the Ameri-
can economy changes, researchers have an important role to play in 
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understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the UI system. This 
Convening offers a format for researchers to share evidence-informed 
solutions and for policymakers to highlight areas where additional 
research is needed.” The discussion covered four topics: “1) Stabi-
lizing Effects of Automatically Triggered Extensions; 2) Shoring Up 
Finances; 3) Impact of Changing Employer-Employee Relationships; 
and 4) Ensuring Adequate Benefits.” The purpose of the “Convening” 
appeared to be to set the stage for UI reform during a potential Hillary 
Clinton administration. The Convening had no effect on public policy. 
The National Academy of Social Insurance Examines  
UI Reform
The National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) is an orga-
nization dedicated to studying all programs covered by the Social 
Security Act, including UI. On November 9, 2015, NASI convened 
a meeting of UI experts, moderated by Stephen Wandner and Wil-
liam Rodgers. The meeting addressed issues including benefit pay-
ment (eligibility requirements, disqualifications, recipiency rates, and 
income replacement rates), benefit financing of regular benefits (tax-
able wage base and forward funding) and EBs, administrative financ-
ing, reemployment services, and work sharing. NASI issued a sum-
mary of the proceedings of the meeting (Schreur and Veghte 2016).
In late 2016, NASI also brought together a group of NASI mem-
bers who are expert with respect to public pensions, health care, and 
UI. The experts developed papers on public policy dealing with social 
insurance, which were organized and revised by NASI staff. The result 
was a discussion of possible social insurance reforms, including those 
relating to UI. The final report was shared with the Trump administra-
tion and was widely distributed (Veghte, Schreur, and Bradley 2017).
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SUMMARY OF THE CHAPTERS
The rest of this book consists of four main chapters and a brief 
summary chapter. In Chapter 2, Suzanne Simonetta first provides sub-
stantial background on the UI program and how it operates—infor-
mation useful for understanding the proposal she discusses as well 
as others that are discussed in later chapters. She presents the frame-
work of the UI program and how it has been working in states across 
the country. She reviews the evolution of the program and why some 
types of reform are needed. She then discusses the components of the 
reform proposal that was contained in the February 2016 UI legisla-
tive proposal in President Obama’s Budget Request for Fiscal Year 
2017, a proposal that was never considered by the U.S. Congress.
In Chapter 3, David Balducchi and Christopher O’Leary describe 
the origin and evolution of the partnership between the Employment 
Service (ES) and UI programs. They start with the policy objectives 
of the authors of the Wagner-Peyser and Social Security Acts, which 
established these two programs. They then analyze early actions by 
policymakers to facilitate inter-program cooperation, as well as pol-
icy changes in the ES-UI partnership over time. They turn to reasons 
for the decline in cooperation starting in the 1980s and explain why 
service availability has declined continuously since then. Next, the 
authors examine the changing sources of Wagner-Peyser Act funding, 
the decline in funding levels, and how funding could be increased. 
Finally, they suggest ways to revitalize the ES-UI partnership.
Wayne Vroman reviews the policy responses of the states to the 
Great Recession in Chapter 4. He shows that a substantial portion of 
the states were unprepared for the Great Recession, and, as a result, 
most went heavily into debt. He notes that the states could build back 
their state trust fund accounts either by raising taxes or by reducing 
benefits. He finds that state responses varied, but a substantial num-
ber of states made a slow recovery because they took little action to 
restore their trust funds. In addition, he analyzes the steps states did 
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take to build back their state trust fund accounts. On the tax side, he 
shows how success differed, depending on variation in the actions 
taken by individual states. He also analyzes the actions that a sub-
stantial number of states took to make major reductions to their future 
benefit payments.
In Chapter 5, O’Leary and Wandner review the need for UI 
reform and the research that supports some of the needed changes to 
the program. The authors compare two recent UI reform proposals 
(West et al. 2016; White House 2016) to their own. They call for a 
comprehensive and consistent reform program that is balanced such 
that UI benefit payments and tax revenue are balanced and that index-
ing of both UI benefits and taxes is likely to keep the program both 
paying adequate benefits and collecting sufficient taxes to pay for 
those benefits.
Chapter 6 presents a general set of recommendations for compre-
hensive UI reform, covering the broad range of changes that could 
yield an adequate and self-sustaining UI program for the twenty-first 
century. It briefly describes and explains the components of such UI 
reform with respect to regular and extended benefits, tax policy, and 
reemployment services.
CONCLUSION
The materials in this book have been developed to provide infor-
mation for consideration of federal and state UI legislative reform 
proposals. It provides background information that describes the 
problems with the current UI and ES programs and why these pro-
grams need to be reformed. It also provides a variety of proposals 
to deal with issues that are currently impeding the UI program from 
meeting its statutory goals of providing temporary, adequate income 
support to individuals unemployed through no fault of their own and 
acting as a macroeconomic stabilizer for the U.S. economy during 
recessionary periods. 
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The prospects for reform appear slim in the near term. Interest 
in UI reform tends to be limited when the economy is going well, 
and it increases in times of recessions. As unemployment increases, 
Congress hears from their constituents that the regular UI program is 
not sufficient and that they want Congress to enact additional weeks 
of benefits. It is at such times that public policy interest in UI reform 
surges. It is no accident that the last major reform of UI took place in 
1976, soon after the end of the 1974–1975 recession.
The authors offer this book as material and proposals that could 
be the basis for a discussion of UI reform when interest in the pro-
gram again increases. We all believe that significant reform is needed 
now and that putting reforms in place before the next recession would 
greatly help the United States to more quickly recover from the next 
recession and unemployed workers get through the next downturn 
by providing them with improved unemployment benefits and ES 
resources to help speed their return to productive employment.
Notes
 1. The UI program also pays extended benefits—beyond 26 weeks of dura-
tion—in times of high unemployment, but most of this chapter discusses 
the regular UI program. Whereas the regular UI program can be consid-
ered a social insurance program, the extended benefits programs cannot.
 2.  As federal policy after World War II, the U.S. Department of Labor 
(USDOL) made a wide range of recommendations to states about the 
contents of their UI laws, including that they should provide claimants 
with a uniform potential duration of at least 26 weeks of benefits, and 
that if a state must vary the duration, it should range from 20 weeks to 
30 weeks, along with other factors (USDOL 1962, p. 42). The depart-
ment has not issued similar recommendations on state potential dura-
tion of UI benefits since issuing “Unemployment Insurance Legislative 
Policy: Recommendations for State Legislation, 1962,” a “statement of 
unemployment insurance legislative policy and recommendations for 
State legislation.” That publication was a revision of a 1953 document, 
Unemployment Insurance Policy, Benefits-Eligibility.
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UI Reform Proposals in the Fiscal 
Year 2017 Obama Budget Request
Suzanne Simonetta
U.S. Department of Labor
The experience of the Great Depression, with unemployment rates 
reaching 25 percent in 1933, had a devastating impact at both the indi-
vidual and societal level, making it abundantly clear that the United 
States needed to establish an unemployment insurance (UI) program 
(Haber and Murray 1966). It was during this crisis that the political 
will was found to enact legislation enabling UI in the Social Security 
Act of 1935. 
The Great Recession was unquestionably the worst economic 
downturn the United States faced since the Great Depression (Good-
man and Mance 2011). The experience of the Great Recession dem-
onstrated the UI program’s success at mitigating individual economic 
insecurity (Gabe and Whittaker 2012) and providing macroeconomic 
stabilization (Kekre 2016). However, even though some of the prob-
lems outlined below developed over many decades, they were greatly 
exacerbated during and after the Great Recession and threatened 
the program’s ability to effectively function as a meaningful social 
insurance program. While these programmatic challenges are serious 
when the economy is growing, the weakening of the social safety net 
for jobless workers and their families could have devastating conse-
quences for local and state economies, as well as the national econ-
omy, during the next economic downturn. 
Building on the lessons learned from the past and looking to the 
future, the fiscal year (FY) 2017 Obama Budget contained a set of 
UI reform proposals aimed at addressing many of these challenges 
in order for all states to have a robust, meaningful, and genuine UI 
program with adequate resources in reserve to provide unemployed 
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workers with sufficient benefits as they seek new jobs. This chapter 
provides an overview of the UI program, defines the problems that 
were the basis for the UI reform proposals in the FY 2017 Obama 
Budget, describes those proposals, and explains how they were 
intended to remedy the problems.
OVERVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE1
UI is designed to provide partial, temporary income support to 
individuals who are unemployed through no fault of their own. This 
program is a federal-state partnership (USDOL 2017a) based on fed-
eral law, but it is administered by states under state law. Unless there 
is an explicit requirement or prohibition in federal law, states have 
great latitude to establish the parameters of their UI programs. For 
this reason, there is much variation among the states with respect to 
qualification and eligibility requirements, weekly benefit amounts, 
number of weeks of benefits, disqualification provisions, taxable 
wages, tax rates, and many other key policy areas (Employment and 
Training Administration [ETA] n.d.-a).
Eligibility
Determining benefit eligibility is a multi-step process. First, UI 
applicants must have sufficient recent labor market attachment, mea-
sured by work experience, to qualify for UI benefits. New entrants to 
the labor market, reentrants after a withdrawal from the labor market, 
the self-employed, and genuine independent contractors are not eligi-
ble for UI because they have not recently worked in covered employ-
ment positions. In general, prior to becoming unemployed, applicants 
must have earned sufficient amounts working in covered employment 
during at least two calendar quarters in a 12-month period to qualify 
for benefits.2 Traditionally, states would examine earnings during the 
first four of the most recently completed five calendar quarters when 
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making what is called a “monetary determination.” Recognizing that 
using this period of time (i.e., the “base period”) as a basis for estab-
lishing UI eligibility does not take into account up to the most recent 
six months of an individual’s work history, many states have begun to 
use an alternative base period that examines earnings during the most 
recent four completed calendar quarters when making a monetary 
determination (Mastri et al. 2016).3
Next, a determination must be made that the applicant was sepa-
rated from employment (i.e., became unemployed) through no fault 
of their own. The classic example of this is when an employer lays 
someone off because work is no longer available. However, under 
certain circumstances, if an individual quits or the employer fires 
an individual they may still be eligible for benefits. Every state’s UI 
law defines what constitutes good cause for quitting (ETA 2016a). 
While all states include good cause connected with work, many states 
also include certain personal reasons in their definition. Similarly, 
although there are many reasons an employer may decide to fire an 
employee, individuals generally would be disqualified from receiving 
UI benefits only if they were fired for work-related misconduct.
After the initial eligibility determination is made, applicants 
must demonstrate their continued attachment to the labor market by 
meeting a set of ongoing eligibility requirements each week that they 
claim benefits. These include being able to work, being available for 
work, and actively seeking work. Reflecting workforce behavior from 
decades ago, even if individuals earned/worked enough in part-time 
employment to qualify for benefits, many states continue to require 
individuals to be available for and seek full-time work to be eligible 
for benefits due to the presumption that individuals who work part 
time do not have a genuine attachment to the labor market.
Financing
The UI program is funded primarily through federal and state 
taxes assessed on employers.4 In general, the Federal Unemployment 
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Tax Act (FUTA) effective tax rate is 0.6 percent (ETA 2016b)5 on 
the first $7,000 of workers’ earnings (Griffin 1999).6 The full FUTA 
tax is 6.0 percent, but employers get a credit of up to 5.4 percent if 
the state’s UI law conforms to federal UI law and the state has no 
long-term outstanding federal advances (loans) to pay benefits. FUTA 
revenue is primarily used to pay for states’ costs in administering the 
program, benefit costs for certain programs that extend (provide addi-
tional weeks of) benefits, and for advances to states that run out of 
funds to pay UI benefits. 
State unemployment tax revenue is used to pay for “regular” ben-
efits—typically up to 26 weeks of benefits are payable to individu-
als when they become unemployed. Some states provide a uniform 
number of weeks of benefits to all jobless workers who qualify. Other 
states provide a variable number of weeks of benefits whereby indi-
viduals with earnings throughout the base period will be eligible for 
more weeks of benefits than individuals with earnings during only a 
small part of the base period. The unemployment tax rates and the 
amount of wages that are subject to state unemployment taxation 
vary significantly among the states. In addition, in all states, the state 
unemployment tax rate assigned in a given year varies from employer 
to employer based on the employer’s experience with unemployment 
(i.e., “experience rating”). Employer accounts are “charged” for ben-
efit payments made to their former employees, and these charges are 
factored in when determining employer tax rates in subsequent years. 
In general, employers that have more former employees who receive 
UI benefits pay higher state unemployment taxes than employers with 
lower UI benefit costs associated with their former employees. 
The range of applicable state unemployment tax rates varies from 
year to year depending on the reserves the state has in its account in 
the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) to pay future benefits. When 
the economy is strong, trust fund balances increase because there are 
more employers paying taxes on more employees’ wages while fewer 
benefit payments are made. If the state’s trust fund account balance 
exceeds certain levels, the range of applicable rates decreases in the 
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following year because less revenue needs to be raised. When the 
economy declines, trust fund balances decrease because benefit pay-
ments go up as layoffs increase and tax revenue decreases as fewer 
employers pay unemployment taxes on the wages of fewer employ-
ees. If the state’s trust fund account balance goes below specified lev-
els, the range of applicable rates increases in the next year so that 
more funds will be collected to pay for benefits. Thus, not only will 
state unemployment tax rates vary from employer to employer based 
on their experience with unemployment, rates also will vary from 
year to year based on the state’s reserves in the UTF.
Advances
Unemployment Insurance is, as its name implies, a social insur-
ance program paid as a matter of right to all individuals who meet its 
requirements. If a state runs out of funds to pay benefits, the state may 
borrow from the federal government7 to continue to meet its obliga-
tions to all eligible unemployed workers. Federal advances accrue 
interest under certain circumstances. Since states may not use trust 
fund dollars to pay this interest, many states assess a separate tax on 
employers to cover this cost. Also, in general, should a state have 
outstanding federal advances as of January 1 on two consecutive cal-
endar years, its employers’ FUTA tax credit will begin to be reduced, 
with the resulting additional revenue being used to pay back the fed-
eral debt.8 States may avoid the credit reduction or reduce it if cer-
tain requirements are met.9 In short, sustained insolvency results in 
marked increases in employers’ total unemployment-related costs—
the schedule of applicable state tax rate increases and/or a solvency 
add-on tax may be triggered, additional state taxes to pay interest may 
be assessed, and net federal unemployment taxes may increase to pay 
down the outstanding federal advances to the state to pay benefits. 
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Solvency
Maintaining sufficient reserves of benefit funding is essential to 
mitigate the likelihood of large fluctuations in employers’ state UI tax 
liability from year to year, with especially large increases needed if 
the economy is recovering from a recession. Hence, states are encour-
aged to forward-fund their accounts in the UTF (U.S. Advisory Coun-
cil on Unemployment Compensation 1996). The average high cost 
multiple (AHCM) measures state solvency. Using data from the most 
recent three recessions to determine high benefit costs in a state, the 
AHCM measures how long the state could pay benefits when benefit 
payment levels are high given the state’s current balance in the UTF. 
Although it is recommended that states maintain trust fund balances 
sufficient to pay benefits for one year at recessionary levels, there 
is no federal requirement concerning state solvency.10 Because states 
have great latitude when designing their UI tax structures and the 
revenues they are expected to yield, some states have opted to follow 
more of a “pay as you go” model that keeps employer taxes low but 
does not generate enough revenue to build significant reserves for 
use during the next economic downturn. As explained above, this can 
result in greater volatility in the state and federal unemployment tax 
payments that employers are required to make.
Extended Benefits
Recognizing that during recessionary periods regular state UI 
benefits provide insufficient income support for many unemployed 
workers, the federal-state Extended Benefits (EB) program is intended 
to provide for additional weeks of UI benefits when unemployment 
is high and rising.11 Benefit costs are shared equally by the state and 
federal government.12 EB is “triggered” when states’ unemployment 
rates exceed certain levels and are higher than they had been in recent 
years. All states must have an EB trigger based on the insured unem-
ployment rate (IUR), which is based on data concerning individuals 
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who are currently receiving regular UI benefits. To trigger on, the 
13-week IUR must be at least 5 percent and be at least 120 percent 
of the rate for the equivalent 13-week period in each of the preceding 
two calendar years. Under the IUR trigger, individuals may receive 
up to 13 additional weeks of benefits. If a state uses an optional total 
unemployment rate (TUR) trigger, which uses the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ (BLS) household survey data about individuals who are 
not working and have looked for work during the last four weeks, 
individuals may receive up to 13 or 20 weeks of additional benefits, 
depending on the state’s TUR. Up to 13 weeks of benefits would be 
available if the state’s three-month TUR is at least 6.5 percent and 
at least 110 percent of the rate for the corresponding three-month 
period in either of the two previous calendar years. A total of up to 20 
weeks of benefits would be available if the state’s three-month TUR 
is at least 8.0 percent and the rate meets the 110 percent “lookback” 
requirement. Because these triggers are not very responsive to eco-
nomic downturns and states historically have not been triggering EB 
during recessions (or not triggering on soon enough), especially via 
the IUR trigger, special federal programs have been created to pro-
vide additional weeks of benefits to unemployed workers.
Reemployment
Although providing benefits to individuals unemployed through 
no fault of their own is the overall mission of the UI program, there 
has been an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of helping 
individuals who receive UI benefits to become reemployed since the 
program’s inception. Whereas some workers maintain their attach-
ment to their jobs (i.e., they are on a temporary layoff), most do not. 
It is for this reason that federal law requires UI payments to be made 
through public Employment Offices.13 Thus, in the past, when unem-
ployed workers had to go in person to apply for UI benefits, those 
who were not job attached would be referred for assistance finding 
work to the Employment Service, which was colocated with local UI 
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offices. As UI claims taking moved out of local offices in the 1990s 
and was increasingly handled over the phone or via the Internet, the 
connection to public Employment Offices weakened in some states. 
To strengthen this connection, several strategies have been imple-
mented, including the development of the UI Reemployment and 
Eligibility Assessment (REA) program. Since 2005, funds have been 
appropriated to the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) to enable 
states to address the individual reemployment needs of UI claimants, 
and to prevent and detect improper benefit payments by reviewing 
their eligibility for benefits (ETA 2016c). The results have been posi-
tive with respect to reducing the number of weeks claimed and com-
pensated, the likelihood of exhausting UI benefits, and improper pay-
ments (Benus et al. 2008). Due to its early successes, REA funding 
was increased. The program was renamed Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA), which reflects a narrower 
focus on individuals who are most likely to be long-term unemployed 
(and on those who transitioned out of the military). Recognizing 
the need for increased reemployment services for these individuals, 
RESEA funding may now be used for this purpose. In February 2018, 
explicit permanent statutory authority for RESEA was included in the 
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018.
Short-Time Compensation
When tackling the problem of unemployment, increasing empha-
sis has been given to implementing strategies that avoid layoffs. 
Starting in 1982, federal UI law permitted states to experiment with 
short-time compensation (STC), also known as work sharing, which 
provides a partial UI weekly payment to certain individuals whose 
work hours were reduced.14 This is noteworthy because such indi-
viduals normally wouldn’t be eligible for any weekly UI payment 
because they earned too much money. Authority to run STC programs 
became permanent in 1992.15 While not all states operate STC pro-
grams, there has been increasing recognition of its value. By reducing 
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hours of work for a group of employees rather than laying off a por-
tion of them, employers maintain their skilled workforce and no one 
loses their job. The workers meanwhile experience a smaller reduc-
tion in their earnings because they receive a reduced UI payment. For 
these reasons, STC is considered a win-win situation.16,17 Interest in 
STC heightened during the Great Recession, and the Middle Class 
Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 included several provisions 
designed to encourage more states to enact STC laws and for existing 
STC states to expand their programs (ETA n.d.-b). These provisions 
include two measures: 1) reimbursing states for up to three years of 
STC benefit costs, and 2) providing grants to states for implemen-
tation or improved administration of STC programs and for promo-
tion of and enrollment of employers in STC programs. Sixteen states 
received grant funds totaling $46,154,004. As a result of these offer-
ings, the STC program has grown and strengthened (Bennicci and 
Wandner 2015). 
Integrity
An operational area that has received increasing attention and 
emphasis in recent years concerns integrity.18 This is a broad under-
taking that includes efforts to ensure that employers are paying the 
proper amount of unemployment taxes as well as efforts to prevent, 
detect, and recover improper benefit payments. These efforts have 
been central to the UI program for quite some time, but new chal-
lenges have arisen as the claim-taking process moved out of local 
offices due to advances in technology. These technological advances, 
however, have also provided more tools to help states in their efforts 
to combat these challenges. For example, states cross-match claim 
information with information in their state directories of new hires for 
the purpose of finding individuals who continue to claim UI benefits 
after they return to work. In addition, under certain limited circum-
stances, states may recover improper UI benefit payments by offset-
ting federal income tax refunds due to the individual.
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DATA: A SNAPSHOT OF THE PROGRAM19
The UI reform proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget addressed 
several key policy areas: solvency, benefit adequacy, extended ben-
efits, reemployment, short-time compensation, and integrity. Before 
discussing the specifics of these proposals, it is essential to provide 
both the high-level context and a broad description of the state of the 
UI program, which help define the problems that the proposals were 
designed to address.
Unemployment
Unemployment is a lagging indicator, so the national TUR peaked 
in June 2009 as the Great Recession ended (Figure 2.1). As economic 
recovery continued, job growth exceeded and TUR dropped below 
prerecessionary levels. These data are quite compelling, but they do 
not tell the entire story (BLS 2009).
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Although the economy continued growing and there were increas-
ing opportunities for workers, significant challenges remained. For 
example, consistent with changes at the national level, TUR declined 
in most states (Figure 2.2), but it remained markedly higher than the 
national average in some states. In addition, long-term unemployment 
remained a persistent challenge (Ghayad 2013) even as economic 
recovery continued (Figure 2.3). For example, in September 2016, 
24.9 percent of the unemployed (2.0 million people) had been unem-
ployed for more than 27 weeks. 
UI Benefits
Consistent with the long-term unemployment data, the average 
number of weeks an individual receives UI benefits (i.e., “duration”) 
Figure 2.2  Unemployment Rates by State








NOTE: Inset maps not to scale.
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increased. Historically, the average duration of UI benefit receipt has 
varied consistently with changes in TUR, but the average duration 
of UI benefit receipt did not decline as much as would have been 
expected when TUR declined (Figure 2.4). There are many possible 
reasons for this, including insufficient job growth, proportionately 
more permanent layoffs, and a mismatch between worker skills and 
emerging employer needs. 
When an individual initially establishes eligibility for UI benefits, 
the state UI agency issues a “first payment.” As expected, the number 
of first payments has varied, consistent with changes in TUR (Figure 
2.5). However, increasingly, the percentage of individuals who were 
eligible for and claimed UI benefits (i.e., claimants) and who received 
everything to which they were entitled (i.e., they “exhausted” ben-
efits) did not track with changes in TUR and exceeded the exhaustion 
rates of prior recessions (Figure 2.6). This was probably due to both 
SOURCE: USDOL/BLS data.
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NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
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NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
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the increase in long-term unemployment and the fact that, with the 
maximum number of weeks of UI benefits having been cut in several 
states (see Table 2.1), individuals exhausted benefits earlier in their 
unemployment spell than they previously would have.
Evidence of the declining role of the program can be found when 
comparing UI claims data with the size of the civilian labor force and 
the TUR. The number of weeks of UI benefits claimed is expected 
to vary cyclically as TUR rises and falls. However, it would also be 
expected that, as the civilian labor force increases and with every-
thing else being equal, the number of weeks of regular UI benefits 
claimed would increase because the pool of workers who may lose 
their jobs is increasing. However, as Figure 2.7 shows, this has not 
been the case. The trend in weeks of regular UI benefits claimed, 
other than the spikes during recessionary periods, is flat. Overall, the 










































Last data point: September 2016
NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
Figure 2.6  Exhaustion Rate in the Regular Program
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When data about the percentage of unemployed workers who 
received UI benefits (i.e., the “recipiency rate”) are examined, it 
becomes increasingly evident that, over time, fewer unemployed 
workers have been accessing UI benefits when they lose their jobs 
(Figure 2.8). As noted earlier, not everyone who loses their job is eli-
gible for benefits. It would be expected that when the economy is in a 
downturn, layoffs become the dominant form of unemployment, and 
proportionately fewer individuals will become unemployed because 
they were fired for misconduct connected with work or because they 






AR 7/27/11 26 25
7/15/15 25 20
FL 1/1/12 26 12–23a
GA 7/1/12 26 14–20a
ID 7/1/16 26 20–26a
IL 1/1/12 26 25b
KS 1/1/14 26 16–26a
MI 1/15/12 26 20
MO 4/17/11 26 20
1/16/16 20 13–20a
NC 7/1/13 26 12–20a
PA 1/1/13 16 or 26 18–26c
SC 6/19/11 26 20
a The number of weeks is tied to the unemployment rate.
b In Illinois, the number of weeks for 2012 was reduced to 25. For 2013, both the 
taxable wage base and the duration would have remained in place unless the state 
generated sufficient revenue to overcome a 2011 loss to the unemployment fund. 
Since Illinois generated sufficient revenue to overcome the loss, the benefit cut to 25 
weeks only applied to 2012. The number of weeks increased to 26 weeks in January 
2013 and has not changed.
c The number of weeks of benefits is equal to the number of credit weeks, up to a 
maximum of 26. Claimants with fewer than 18 credit weeks are not entitled to any 
benefits.
SOURCE: USDOL, Division of Legislation.
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NOTE: The gray shaded areas represent recessions.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI and USDOL/BLS data.
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quit their jobs without good cause. Thus, recipiency rates would 
increase during recessions because proportionately more individuals 
become unemployed because they were laid off (i.e., because of a 
lack of work). However, as shown in Figure 2.8, the UI recipiency 
rate nationwide plummeted to less than 30 percent and was lower 
than it had been at similar points during economic recoveries in recent 
decades.
State-level data are even more striking. Because states have much 
discretion with respect to determining who is potentially eligible for 
UI benefits, it is not surprising that there is huge variation among the 
states with respect to recipiency rates. As shown in Figure 2.9, in the 
second quarter of calendar year 2016, the range of recipiency rates 
among the states went from less than 10 percent to more than 65 per-
cent, with a national average of 28.6 percent.
Figure 2.9  Recipiency Rates by State (Insured Unemployed/Total 
Unemployed), Second Quarter 2016
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UI Taxes and Solvency
The UI program is intended to operate counter-cyclically, with 
benefit payments increasing during economic downturns and fund-
ing reserves being built up when unemployment is low. Figure 2.10 
shows how state tax rates, contributions (taxes) collected, and ben-
efits paid varied since 2000 and the impact these factors had on trust 
fund balances. During the Great Recession, when trust fund balances 
were negative, most states borrowed from the federal government. In 
total, 36 states borrowed and the peak amount of the advances was 
$47.2 billion (Figure 2.11). 
The primary reason for this impact on the trust fund was the 
severity of the Great Recession—some states would have become 
insolvent no matter how well they prepared in advance. However, 
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI, USDOL/BLS, U.S. Bureau of Public Debt data.
Figure 2.10  Contributions Collected, Regular Benefits Paid, Tax Rate on 
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the data demonstrate that had more states achieved an adequate level 
of solvency beforehand, fewer states would have run out of benefit 
funds and borrowing levels would have been much lower for the 
states whose economies were hard hit by the recession. The AHCM is 
the federal measure of state solvency, where an AHCM of 1.0 means 
that a state has a trust fund balance sufficient to pay benefits for one 
year during a recessionary period.20 Only about one-third of the states 
had an AHCM of at least 1.0 when the recession began (Figure 2.12). 
There were a few states that met this solvency standard that still bor-
rowed from the federal government to pay UI benefits, but most of the 
states that borrowed did not meet the standard (Figure 2.13).
Between the economic recovery and the actions states took to 
increase revenue and decrease expenditures, there have been marked 
improvements in solvency in recent years. However, as of 2015 a 
couple of states still had outstanding UI debt, and most states (includ-
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI, USDOL/BLS, U.S. Bureau of Public Debt data.
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NOTE: An AHCM of 1.0 (the gray line) means that a state has a trust fund balance suf-
ficient to pay benefits for one year during a recessionary period.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data.
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ing all large states) did not have an AHCM of at least 1.0, calling into 
question their readiness for the next recession (Figure 2.14). 
UI Benefit Adequacy
Although there are no federal standards regarding the adequacy 
of UI benefits, there has been a long-standing recommendation that 
the weekly benefit amount (WBA) replace at least 50 percent of lost 
earnings over a six-month period, with a maximum WBA equal to 
two-thirds of the state’s average weekly wage (AWW) (U.S. Advi-
sory Council on Unemployment Compensation 1996). At the national 
level, not only has that recommendation not been met during the last 
40 years, there is a long-term declining trend in the replacement rate 
(Figure 2.15).
Another way to examine benefit adequacy is to examine recipi-
ency rates (Figures 2.8 and 2.9). Of the many factors that influence 
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this rate, UI eligibility requirements, disqualification provisions, 
and the number of weeks of benefits available are among the most 
important. In recent years, several states enacted laws (ETA n.d.-c) 
that restrict access to the program in a multitude of ways, includ-
ing raising qualifying earnings requirements, broadening the scope of 
what constitutes misconduct connected with work, and increasing the 
requirements needed to overcome a disqualification and reestablish 
eligibility for UI benefits. In addition, several states cut the maximum 
number of weeks of UI benefits (Table 2.1). In the past, states gen-
erally offered up to 26 weeks of benefits. About one-quarter of the 
states now offer fewer than 26 weeks. In several states, the maximum 
available depends on the unemployment rate. For example, in North 
Carolina, as few as 12 weeks of benefits will be available under cer-
tain circumstances.
NOTE: AHCM: Average high cost multiple. Inset maps not to scale.
Figure 2.13  States Borrowing from the Federal Government to Pay UI 
Benefits During the Great Recession 
State Borrowing
No advances
Advances - AHCM < 1.0
Advances - AHCM > 1.0
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As should be evident from the above discussion, the UI program 
has deviated from historical standards and its original goals, resulting 
in an erosion of the social safety net for jobless workers. The propos-
als detailed in the following section were designed to address several 
of the most important causes of these problems.
BUDGET PROPOSALS AND ANALYSIS21
Solvency 
From the brief examination of the data in the previous section, 
it should be clear that states are not prepared for the next reces-
sion because they don’t have sufficient funds to pay benefits when 
demands are high. Most states’ UTF accounts do not meet the federal 
NOTE: An AHCM of 1.0 (the gray line) means that a state has a trust fund balance suf-
ficient to pay benefits for one year during a recessionary period.
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data.
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solvency recommendation. The FY 2017 Obama Budget recognized 
the importance of states having sufficient reserves to pay benefits, 
to avoid borrowing, and to avoid large increases in employer taxes 
when economic conditions are weak or recovering, so it included a set 
of legislative proposals to address solvency. First, in 2017, it would 
have restored the 0.2 percent FUTA surtax, which would help the fed-
eral accounts in the UTF pay their outstanding debts. For example, as 
of November 10, 2016, the Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account owed $7.2 billion to the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury 
and $7.5 billion to the Federal Unemployment Account. Since the 
amount of wages subject to unemployment taxation at the state level 
is closely related to the corresponding amount at the federal level, 
there was also a proposal to increase the federal taxable wage base to 
$40,000 in 2018 (at present, it is $7,000) and to index it to inflation in 
subsequent years. By itself, this would have a limited effect on state 
SOURCE: USDOL/OUI data.
Figure 2.15  Average Weekly Benefit, Average Weekly Wage, and UI 
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solvency, but it was expected that the change would encourage states 
to take action to improve their solvency. However, it would have 
more equitably allocated the tax burden among employers. When a 
taxable wage base is low, employers with more low-wage or part-time 
workers pay unemployment taxes on a larger portion of employee 
earnings than employers with more high-wage or full-time workers. 
An additional proposal would have required states to impose a 
minimum tax per employee equal to 0.175 percent of taxable wages, 
thereby spreading the cost of UI more widely among all employers.22 
At present, many states allow a significant portion of employers with 
the best unemployment “experience” to pay a zero tax rate. Not only 
does this hamper efforts to improve solvency, but it undermines the 
fundamental principle of insurance—paying a premium to insure 
against the risk of an event occurring, in this case, the risk of unem-
ployment. As it is for other types of insurance, premiums reflect the 
likelihood of an event happening. However, contributions are made 
on behalf of everyone covered by the insurance because everyone has 
the benefit of potential access to funds if the insured event occurs. 
Another proposal to help states attain solvency in the FY 2017 
budget was to reduce the FUTA credit available to employers when 
a state had an AHCM of less than 0.5 on January 1 in two consecu-
tive years, with the additional amounts paid being used to bolster 
the state’s account in the UTF. This process would be similar to that 
used to reduce FUTA credit to help states pay back their outstanding 
advances to pay UI benefits. 
To avoid a massive federal tax increase when the federal taxable 
wage base increases, the proposal would have decreased the effec-
tive FUTA tax rate to 0.167 percent. However, FUTA revenue would 
have gradually increased over time as the federal taxable wage base 
increased after indexing. This would have mitigated the likelihood of 
future borrowing from the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury, because 
the administrative and benefits costs paid from the federal accounts in 
the UTF would increase over time as well.
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Benefit Adequacy
As described above, UI claims have plummeted. They have 
reached the lowest level since the 1970s. For example, in October 
2016, initial claims were below 300,000 for more than 85 consecu-
tive weeks—the longest streak since 1970 (USDOL 2016). Although 
much of the reduction in claims is due to improving economic con-
ditions, actions by several states to cut benefits and restrict eligibil-
ity also were factors. For this reason, the FY 2017 Obama Budget 
included a set of proposals designed to expand access to UI benefits 
and services. First, it would have established the following federal 
requirements:
• States must provide at least 26 weeks of benefits for the regu-
lar program.23 
• States must adopt the following three provisions for which UI 
Modernization incentive payments were made available under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA):
 1) Use an alternative base period.
 2) Allow benefits to individuals who seek part-time 
employment.
 3) Allow unemployed workers to be eligible for benefits if 
they leave their jobs for family reasons.
Increasing the number of weeks of benefits back to the historic 
norm is important because it takes time for an individual to find a 
job, even in a good economy. Moreover, it is beneficial to both the 
individual worker and the economy as a whole if workers are able 
to take the time to find jobs that align well with their skills, educa-
tion, and experience. These workers would be able to increase their 
contributions to society, as well as better provide for themselves and 
their families. Additional weeks of UI benefits would also result in 
increased macroeconomic stabilization.
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To understand the importance of the alternative base period pro-
posal, it is important to note the history and evolution of monetary 
determinations. Before employers began reporting their employees’ 
quarterly earnings to the states (ETA 1984), the UI base period used to 
determine whether an individual earned enough to qualify for benefits 
was generally the most recent 52 weeks before the individual filed a 
claim. Although this procedure was more administratively challeng-
ing because states had to contact employers to get this information 
about each individual applying for UI benefits, it more accurately 
captured the individual’s recent attachment to the workforce. When 
states transitioned to establishing eligibility based on quarterly wage 
reports, administrative necessity forced states to use more remote 
work experience when making this determination. Before electronic 
reporting was possible, employers had to mail paper copies of wage 
information. Given the lag between when a calendar quarter ended 
and when the state could reasonably expect to have wage information 
from most employers, states opted to consider wages earned during 
the first four of the most recent five completed calendar quarters. As 
technology has advanced and employers report increasingly sooner 
after the end of the calendar quarter, this administrative constraint 
has largely disappeared. Therefore, administrative issues such as this 
should no longer be the deciding factor for a UI benefit eligibility 
requirement. Using the most recent available reported earnings data 
more accurately measures a worker’s present attachment to the work-
force and should be the basis for determining who qualifies for UI 
benefits (Carr 2016). As of 2016, 37 states, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands already used alternative base 
periods when making monetary determinations (ETA 2016b).
The remaining proposed requirements were designed to help the 
UI program better reflect the twenty-first century economy. In the 
1930s, the single breadwinner model was typical for most families—
very different from today’s conditions. With that construct in mind, 
and with the intent to design a program that provided benefits only 
to individuals who became and remained unemployed involuntarily, 
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individuals who left their jobs for personal reasons or who were only 
working part time were not considered to be genuinely attached to the 
labor force. While the risk that is insured by the UI program today 
remains the same—involuntary unemployment—the way in which 
that concept is defined should be reexamined. In particular, with an 
increasing number of two-earner families, the meaning of labor-force 
attachment has changed. For example, it is hard to argue that quitting 
a job to move across the country when a spouse’s job necessitates the 
move is voluntary. Maintaining a family unit is paramount and does 
not equate with a decision to leave the workforce. In this type of cir-
cumstance, since the individual’s employer did not cause the unem-
ployment, the UI benefits paid may be “non-charged” (i.e., won’t be 
taken into account when determining the employer’s state unemploy-
ment tax rate).24 However, denying benefits to such individuals would 
be inconsistent with the goals of the UI programs and the values of 
our society.
Similarly, regardless of economic necessity or overall preference, 
the demands of family life or older workers’ transition to retirement25 
often require some individuals to work part time. This does not auto-
matically equate with a weak or casual connection to the workforce. 
For this reason, if individuals earn enough to qualify for UI benefits 
and meet all other requirements, making them ineligible because they 
are only available for part-time work also would be out of line with 
the principles upon which the UI program is based (Michaelides and 
Mueser 2009). 
The FY 2017 Obama Budget also provided for a new $5 billion 
Modernization Fund. To become eligible for its share of funds, a state 
would have had to:
• allow for broader federal access to wage records;
• adopt employer electronic filing and/or increased penalties for 
employer nonreporting; and
• have a definition of “misconduct” that conforms to a USDOL 
model.
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In recent years, UI wage records are increasingly being used 
to evaluate and measure the performance of a vast array of public 
programs. Evidence-based decision making regarding investment 
of public funds requires access to high-quality, comprehensive data, 
which is why the first two prerequisites were chosen.
When determining whether individuals became unemployed 
through no fault of their own, the state must decide whether the rea-
son an employee was fired was “misconduct connected with work,” 
which would disqualify them from receiving benefits—typically for 
their entire spell of unemployment. Although there are many reasons 
why an employer may legitimately and legally fire a worker, only a 
small subset of those reasons would constitute misconduct connected 
with work. Historically, states generally defined misconduct con-
nected with work narrowly in line with the definition in Boynton Cab 
Co. V. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249 (Wis. 1941):
[T]he intended meaning of the term “misconduct”. . . is lim-
ited to conduct evincing such willful or wanton disregard of 
an employer’s interests as is found in deliberate violations or 
disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has the 
right to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence 
of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, 
wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and 
substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or the employ-
ee’s duties and obligations to his employer. On the other hand, 
mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good per-
formance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies 
or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors 
in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed “misconduct” 
within the meaning of the statute.
Some states have significantly broadened the definition of mis-
conduct connected with work, which has had the effect of disqualify-
ing more workers from receiving UI benefits. To be eligible for its 
share of the Modernization Fund, a state’s definition would have to 
conform to the federal definition. 
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In addition to the prerequisite requirements, to receive a Mod-
ernization Fund payment, states would have had to adopt one benefit 
expansion and two pro-work reforms. The benefit expansions were:
 1) allow more individuals to receive UI benefits while partici-
pating in training;
 2) provide a maximum WBA equal to at least two-thirds of the 
state’s AWW during the most recent 12 months; or
 3) improve eligibility for temporary workers.
Recognizing that training may increase the likelihood of reem-
ployment and the quality of the job obtained, federal UI law prohib-
its states from making individuals ineligible because they are not 
available for work or actively seeking work while they are in train-
ing approved by a state agency.26 States would have sole authority to 
determine which types of training to approve for this purpose, but this 
proposal would have given states an incentive to expand the scope of 
training they approve.
The formula established in many states’ UI laws to determine the 
WBA is generally designed to replace one-half of a worker’s weekly 
wage (ETA 2016c). This amount helps jobless workers meet the 
necessities of life without providing a disincentive to work (Chetty 
2008). However, regardless of the WBA the formula would gener-
ate based on an individual’s wage history, the maximum amount is 
capped. In some states, the maximum WBA is a fixed amount that can 
only be changed by enacting a state law. In other states, the maximum 
WBA changes each year because it is set as a specified percentage of 
the AWW. Ensuring that the maximum WBA increases are consistent 
with increases to the state AWW avoids an erosion of benefits, par-
ticularly for middle income workers. 
Some states establish additional requirements in order for tem-
porary workers to be eligible for UI benefits. The FY2017 Obama 
Budget was designed to ensure that such requirements didn’t become 
a barrier to temporary workers getting benefits.
52   Simonetta
States would have had to adopt two of the following five pro-
work reforms to qualify for an incentive payment:
 1) progressively more intense reemployment service delivery 
as duration of benefit receipt lengthens;
 2) improved reemployment services for UI claimants;
 3) subsidized temporary work programs;
 4) relocation assistance coupled with individual case manage-
ment, in-person career counseling, provision of customized 
information about job opportunities, and referrals to suit-
able work; or
 5) improved data systems for workforce and education pro-
gram performance, research, and evaluation purposes.
From its inception, the UI program has been closely tied to the 
U.S. Employment Service27 because, unless workers are on a tem-
porary layoff, it is imperative to help them find jobs, which is the 
rationale for the first two options. The next two options represent 
alternative ways to help individuals find work—via temporary work 
programs and relocation. The last pro-work choice was premised on 
workforce and education programs becoming more effective at giving 
people the knowledge and skills they needed to become reemployed 
if data were used more effectively when evaluating, researching, and 
assessing the performance of these programs.
Extended Benefits
EB does not function effectively because it doesn’t trigger on soon 
enough (or at all) in states with high unemployment. Since its incep-
tion in 1970, special federal programs providing additional weeks of 
benefits were created during each major downturn and were effective 
during the periods 1972 to 1973, 1975 to 1978, 1982 to 1985, 1991 to 
1994, 2002 to 2004, and, most recently, 2008 to 2013 (ETA n.d.-d). 
Implementing these temporary federal programs poses several chal-
UI Reform Proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget Request   53
lenges. Foremost of these, it takes too long. It takes several months 
for sufficient economic information to become available to demon-
strate need and design an extension program; legislation to be drafted, 
passed by Congress, and enacted into law; the USDOL to develop 
operating instructions and guidance; and the states to implement the 
new program. In addition, in these temporary federal programs, some 
portion of the benefits is generally available in all states, rather than 
targeting all benefits only to the states experiencing higher unemploy-
ment. Moreover, without knowing the program parameters of a new 
extension, states do not have sufficient time to prepare to implement 
and administer these special federal programs, which leads to further 
delays, public confusion, and occasionally errors. In short, while pro-
viding vital benefits to jobless workers and their families, these ad 
hoc programs do not provide for efficient and timely macroeconomic 
stabilization.
To obviate the need for hurried enactment of temporary federal 
UI extension programs, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included a pro-
posal to reform the EB program. Specifically, it would have:
• Provided for four 13-week tiers of benefits, with availability 
depending on the state’s TUR.
• Provided permanent 100 percent federal funding of EB with 
nonrepayable advances from the General Fund if there were 
insufficient amounts in the federal account in the UTF.
• Established new TUR trigger thresholds of 6.5, 7.5, 8.5, and 
9.5 percent. These thresholds would have been met if the 
state’s TUR met or exceeded one of those levels or if the total 
of the state’s TUR and the change in the TUR from a com-
parable period in one of the previous two years equaled or 
exceeded one of those levels.
• Required reemployment services and eligibility assessments 
for all EB claimants. 
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These proposals drew largely on experience from the Great 
Recession—not just with EB, but also with the Emergency Unem-
ployment Compensation (EUC) program (ETA n.d.-e). At its peak, 
EUC was a four-tiered program providing up to 53 weeks of benefits, 
depending on the state’s TUR. After the federal account ran out of 
funds to pay for EUC, it was paid with funds from General Revenue 
that did not have to be repaid.28 The triggers changed over time. Most 
recently, Tier 1 had no trigger, and Tier 2 triggered on in states with 
a three-month TUR of at least 6.0 percent. For Tier 3, the rate was at 
least 7.0 percent, and for Tier 4, it was 9.0 percent.
The EB triggers failed for several reasons. First, even with the 
TUR-based triggers, it took too long for EB to become available in 
many states. The EUC program was first enacted in June 2008, six 
months after the Great Recession began.29 In January 2009, most 
states still hadn’t triggered onto EB—more than one year after the 
recession began (ETA n.d.-f). Related to this concern is that too few 
states had a TUR trigger in their laws before the recession began. One 
of the most important EB-related provisions in ARRA was temporary 
100 percent federal funding of EB.30 As a result of the 100 percent 
federal funding, 29 states amended their EB laws to provide for tem-
porary TUR triggers conditioned on 100 percent federal funding. The 
final negative consequence of the design of the EB triggers is the fact 
that states with sustained high unemployment eventually triggered off 
EB. To remain on EB, a state’s TUR must not only meet or exceed 
certain levels, but the rate had to be higher than it had been during 
comparable periods in the prior year or two. With the impact of the 
Great Recession lasting for such a long time, the unemployment rates 
in some states, while high, were not higher than they had been dur-
ing the previous two years. Even though federal law was amended to 
allow states to use a three-year “lookback,” and 33 states amended 
their laws to provide for it, the longer lookback eventually became 
insufficient, and this component resulted in EB no longer being avail-
able to long-term unemployed workers in states with sustained high 
unemployment (ETA 2012).
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Recognizing the importance of helping individuals find jobs, in 
particular the long-term unemployed, and ensuring that they continue 
to meet all eligibility requirements, the EUC program was modified 
in 2012 to require all new EUC claimants to receive reemployment 
services, and reemployment and eligibility assessments (ETA n.d.-g). 
This is the reason the EB proposals in the FY 2017 Obama Budget 
would have required reemployment services and eligibility assess-
ments for all EB claimants.
Reemployment
The increases in long-term unemployment, average duration, 
and exhaustion rates demonstrate the need for strategies designed to 
assist with reemployment efforts for individuals who become unem-
ployed. Building on the initiative that began in 2005 in a few states 
and national implementation in 2012 for individuals receiving EUC, 
the FY 2017 Obama Budget proposed making the RESEA program a 
permanently authorized program that would have required all states 
to participate and would have provided enhanced funding to enable 
more individuals to be served. For the regular UI program, the one-
third of new claimants who would have been identified31 as the most 
likely to be long-term unemployed and in need of reemployment ser-
vices would have been required to participate in RESEAs as a condi-
tion of eligibility for UI benefits.  
Recognizing the importance of helping transitioning veterans 
find employment in the civilian labor force, the FY 2017 Obama 
Budget also proposed requiring all new claimants for the Unemploy-
ment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers program32 to participate 
in RESEAs as a condition of eligibility for UI benefits.  
The FY 2017 budget included another proposal designed to 
encourage reemployment—wage insurance. Particularly for workers 
transitioning to new occupations, new jobs might pay significantly 
less than the jobs individuals had prior to becoming unemployed. 
To provide a safety net to such workers and to encourage their swift 
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reemployment, this wage insurance proposal would have been avail-
able to individuals who had been working for at least three years with 
their prior employer. If their new job paid less than $50,000 per year, 
workers would have received a payment equal to half the difference 
between their prior and new annual wage, up to $10,000 over a period 
of two years.
Short-Time Compensation
The experience during the Great Recession highlighted the 
importance of helping workers to keep their jobs. While many states 
did avail themselves of the STC-related funding opportunities in the 
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012, and a few 
states created new STC programs, not all did. Although there are a 
variety of explanations, one of the most meaningful is timing. To 
implement a new program requires an extensive time commitment. 
In 2012 and 2013, states had limited capacity to take on new initia-
tives, given the high workload and the complex modifications to the 
EUC program that they had to administer, among other reasons. Since 
economic conditions improved significantly after recovery from the 
Great Recession, states were in a much better position to consider 
commencing STC programs or improving existing ones. For this rea-
son, the FY 2017 Obama Budget included proposals to give states an 
additional two years of federal reimbursement of STC benefit costs 
and two more years to apply for and receive STC grants. In addition, 
there was a proposal to make state STC benefit costs subject to 50 
percent federal reimbursement whenever the state triggered on the 
EB program.
Integrity
Despite states’ best efforts, many challenges remain to prevent 
improper payments. The FY 2017 Obama Budget included a set of 
highly technical proposals related to benefit integrity that built on 
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recent enactments. They were designed to provide states with addi-
tional resources to dedicate to this purpose and to ensure that states 
used all of the tools at their disposal to combat this issue. Specifically, 
they would have:
• allowed states that contracted out all information technology 
functions to use the Treasury Offset Program for benefit over-
payment recovery;
• required states to use an electronic system to transmit infor-
mation with employers to obtain information needed to deter-
mine benefit eligibility;
• required states to use the National Directory of New Hires to 
find individuals who continued to claim benefits after return-
ing to work and to require penalties on employers that did not 
report their new hires;
• allowed the USDOL to require that states whose poor pro-
gram performance required creation of corrective action plans 
to dedicate specified amounts of their administrative grants 
to implementing those plans, and to provide awards or incen-
tives to states with excellent performance;
• required states to use UI penalty and interest funds for UI 
administration with a portion dedicated to program integrity 
activities;
• required states to cross-match UI claim information with the 
Prisoner Update Processing System to find individuals who 
were claiming benefits while incarcerated; and
• allowed states to use up to 5 percent of recovered overpay-
ments or delinquent employer contributions collected for in-
tegrity purposes rather than for future benefit payments. 
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CONCLUSION
As is evident from this brief description and analysis, the FY 2017 
Obama Budget included an ambitious set of UI legislative proposals 
that focused on many of the most profoundly meaningful aspects of 
the program. Opinions will certainly vary about those proposals from 
both a substantive policy perspective as well as from an ideological 
perspective. However, when considering UI’s philosophical under-
pinnings, it should be clear that many of these proposals could bring 
the current UI program into better alignment with its foundational 
principles, given the economic, societal, and technological changes 
that have occurred during the more than 80 years since the inception 
of the UI program in 1935. Moreover, by raising the profile of some 
crucial issues and setting forth a comprehensive plan for addressing 
them, public dialogue and debate might yet be encouraged and result 
in permanent positive reforms to the UI program.
Notes
The opinions expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone. They do not 
purport to reflect the official position or views of the U.S. Department of 
Labor. Many thanks are given to Daniel Hays in the Division of Legislation 
of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Unemployment Insurance for 
his assistance with research. Thanks also to Ed Dullaghan in the Division of 
Fiscal and Actuarial Services of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of 
Unemployment Insurance for creating and updating all of the figures.
1.  Although this overview addresses many key aspects of the UI program, 
it mainly focuses on the aspects of the program pertinent to the reform 
proposals discussed in this paper. It is not comprehensive and is intended 
to provide the information necessary to understand the issues that pres-
ently exist and how the proposals were intended to address them.
2. Washington State does not determine UI eligibility based on earn-
ing wages equal to or exceeding a specified amount. Instead, state 
law requires an individual to have at least 680 hours of base period 
employment.
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3. Following the enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act, 23 states enacted new or modified existing alternative base periods.
4. Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania levy nominal UI taxes on work-
ers under certain limited circumstances. In Alaska, the tax rate is equal 
to 27 percent of the average benefit cost rate, but not less than 0.5 per-
cent or more than 1.0 percent of taxable wages. In New Jersey, the tax 
rate is 0.3825 percent. Depending on the adequacy of the fund balance 
in a given year, Pennsylvania employees pay contributions ranging 
from 0.0 percent to 0.08 percent of total gross covered wages earned in 
employment. 
5. Until June 2011, the FUTA tax was 6.2 percent and the effective FUTA 
tax rate was 0.8 percent. A 0.2 percent “surtax” was originally added 
in 1985 to help the federal accounts in the Unemployment Trust Fund 
(UTF) pay back their advances from the General Fund of the U.S. Trea-
sury. Between advances to states and federal benefit spending during the 
Great Recession, the federal accounts in the UTF ran out of funds and 
had to borrow to meet all obligations.
6. At the onset of the program, the FUTA tax was 1.0 percent on total wages 
with an effective rate of 0.1 percent. In 1939, the FUTA taxable wage 
base was set at $3,000, which exceeded the annual wages of 98 percent 
of workers. According to USDOL estimates, FUTA taxable wages in 
2015 represented less than 17 percent of total wages in the United States.
7. States may use other state funds or may borrow from other sources 
to pay UI benefits. During the Great Recession, Colorado, Illinois, 
Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas borrowed via bonding. On 
December 31, 2013, the outstanding bond amount for these states was 
$9.725 billion.
8. If on November 10 of the year in which on a second consecutive Janu-
ary 1 a state has a remaining outstanding Title XII advance balance, the 
state’s FUTA credits will begin to be reduced in the subsequent year to 
repay the outstanding debt. 
9. The state must apply for and be found eligible for relief from tax credit 
reduction in the form of avoidance or a cap on reduction (26 U.S.C. 
3302 and Social Security Act, Section 901(d)(1)).
10. There is an incentive in 20 C.F.R. 606.32 for states to maintain a solvent 
account in the UTF. Without meeting the funding goals prescribed by 
this regulation, any Title XII advance that a state receives is interest 
accruing.
11. The program was created in the Federal-State Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act of 1970.
12. FUTA revenue in the Extended Unemployment Compensation Account 
is used for this purpose.
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13. See section 3304(a)(1) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act and sec-
tion 303(a)(2) of the Social Security Act.
14. See P.L. 97-248, 96 STAT.409.
15. See P.L. 102-318, 106 STAT.298.
16. It is important to note that the workers who would not have been laid 
off (typically those with most seniority) experience a reduction in their 
income that they otherwise wouldn’t have. However, the fact that most 
states require labor union approval of STC plans if the workplace is sub-
ject to a collective bargaining agreement demonstrates the overall sup-
port for STC because it helps workers (typically the most junior) avoid 
becoming unemployed. Anecdotal evidence indicates that workplace 
morale often improves when an agreement is reached to avoid layoffs by 
reducing hours and offering STC. 
17. STC payments are treated like unemployment compensation (UC) pay-
ments. Thus, they are deducted from an individual’s maximum benefit 
amount during a given benefit year, which would reduce the number 
of weeks of UC available should the individual later become unem-
ployed. Similarly, under permanent law, STC payments are “charged” to 
employers’ accounts for purposes of determining their experience-rated 
state UC tax rate in the same way UC payments are charged.
18. Federal laws and executive orders establish requirements for reducing 
improper payments in Federal programs. For additional information, see 
http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/improp_pay.asp (accessed March 
24, 2018).
19. The figures contained in this section were prepared by staff in the Divi-
sion of Fiscal and Actuarial Services utilizing ETA and BLS data.
20. The AHCM is calculated by dividing the Calendar Year Reserve Ratio 
(or “Trust Fund Balance as a percent of Taxable Wages”) by the Average 
High Cost Rate.
21. The material in this section draws on USDOL (2017b).
22. To a certain extent, this is an inherent design feature of insurance. It 
generally is not expected that premiums would cover the full cost of the 
benefits. However, it is widely acknowledged that excessive levels of 
socialized costs due to ineffective charging and insufficient maximum 
tax rates to reflect employer experience with unemployment result in 
some employers paying for a smaller portion of benefits than others. 
Also, it is important to note that for UI purposes, certain entities are 
permitted to self-insure. State or local governmental entities, 501(c)(3) 
nonprofit organizations, and Indian tribes may opt to reimburse benefit 
costs rather than be assessed a contribution rate.
23. Regular benefits are paid at the beginning of a spell of unemployment. 
This is in contrast to programs like EB, which are available to individu-
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als who exhaust entitlement to regular benefits in states whose unem-
ployment rate exceeds certain levels.
24. Consistent with the insurance principle of the UI program, states have 
been allowed to have “non-charged” UI benefit payments when the 
employer is not at fault for the spell of unemployment. A typical reason 
has been when benefit payments are made to individuals who quit for 
good personal cause.
25. Older workers increasingly are taking part-time “bridge jobs” after they 
leave their career jobs and before they fully retire.
26. Federal Unemployment Tax Act, Section 3304(a)(8).
27. Since enactment of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998, the Employ-
ment Service has been incorporated into the one-stop career center 
system. For additional information, see http://research.upjohn.org/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1032&context=reports (accessed March 24, 
2018).
28. Although it was expected that the proposal to improve federal solvency 
would generally obviate the need for General Revenue, during severe 
recessions that might not have been the case, and such funds would have 
become available under this EB proposal.
29. P.L. 119-252, http://www.oui.doleta.gov/dmstree/pl/pl_110-252.pdf 
(accessed March 24, 2018).
30. Although EUC eventually was funded with General Revenue, federal 
EB costs continued to be funded by FUTA revenue in the EUC Account. 
When those funds were depleted, the federal accounts in the UTF bor-
rowed from the U.S. Treasury to meet its obligations.
31. Federal law presently requires states to operate the worker profiling 
and reemployment services program, which identifies claimants likely 
to exhaust benefits and need reemployment services to find work, and 
requires such individuals to participate in those services as a condition 
of UI eligibility.
32. Since state UI programs do not cover individuals who work for the fed-
eral government, there are separate federal UI programs to provide ben-
efits to such workers when they become unemployed. States administer 
these programs under an agreement with the USDOL. One such pro-
gram is Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers. 
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 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
 This chapter traces the evolution of the partnership between the 
Employment Service (ES) and Unemployment Insurance (UI) pro-
grams in the United States from its origins. Using primary sources, 
we analyze the early actions of federal policymakers to facilitate 
cooperation between the two programs to meet economic exigen-
cies, grapple with political cronyism, and surmount legal barriers. 
We also discuss factors that caused changes in the ES-UI partnership 
over time. We identify reasons that cooperation started eroding in the 
1980s, and explain why there has been a continuous decline in service 
availability ever since. Reviewing evidence on the effectiveness of 
in-person employment services for UI beneficiaries, we suggest ways 
to revitalize the ES-UI partnership. We explore the source of Wagner-
Peyser Act funding, how it was formalized, then eroded, and how it 
can be renewed. 
The public ES and UI programs are essential to maintain-
ing robust American labor markets. Established by the Wagner- 
Peyser Act of 1933 and the Social Security Act of 1935, respectively, 
these programs were the first permanent federal laws addressing the 
66   Balducchi and O’Leary
problem of unemployment in an American industrial society where 
workers were separated from the sustenance provided by the land. 
Both programs were structured to expand economic security using 
an approach to federalism that instituted a federal-state cooperative 
system. The federal government provides grants-in-aid (referred to 
as “grants”) to states to administer the UI and ES programs under 
state laws. With these programs, workers who lose their jobs invol-
untarily are provided temporary partial wage replacement to help 
support themselves and their families while looking for new jobs, 
and employment services are provided to speed the return to work.1 
Employers benefit from the UI program by keeping skilled workers 
attached to their businesses during periods of slack product demand.2 
They also benefit from the ES program by having a reliable means 
of canvassing local registries for qualified new workers and ensur-
ing that UI beneficiaries are actively seeking work. By emphasizing 
reemployment for beneficiaries, the social insurance character of UI 
is maintained and the moral hazard risk is reduced—that is, the risk 
that payment of cash benefits during periods of joblessness might 
unnecessarily prolong unemployment. 
Four broad topics are explored in this chapter. First, we describe 
the origin and evolution of the ES-UI partnership and the decisive 
efforts undertaken to unify the two programs at the federal and state 
levels. Second, we explain how the partnership matured as policy-
makers sought to secure adequate funding to support the national sys-
tem of public employment offices (now referred to as American Job 
Centers [AJCs]) through cycles of policy preferences. Third, focusing 
primarily on ES, we show how the partnership has acquired added 
service mandates over the past four decades despite chronic reduc-
tions in ES resources. These reductions in real funding have curtailed 
staff-assisted assessments (interviewing, testing, and counseling), job 
search assistance (JSA), and job finding and placement services, as 
well as diluted ES-UI coordination.3 We explain that while technology 
has offered enormous job finding capabilities, it often has not worked 
for many long-term UI claimants, who are exhausting unemployment 
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benefits at higher rates before securing new work. We summarize 
several research studies providing evidence that offering employment 
services for UI claimants is highly cost effective. Finally, we suggest 
policy remedies to revitalize the ES-UI partnership based on the pro-
posals of others and our own research, thoughts, and experience with 
the programs.
ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE ES-UI PARTNERSHIP 
The initial impetus for a social security program in the United 
States emerged in the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century. 
During the Great Depression of the 1930s, key elements of social 
insurance were enacted into federal law. A national network of pub-
lic employment offices was established, along with a UI program for 
partial income replacement to the unemployed that provided a safety 
net for jobless workers (Reich 2010, p. 44). Curt Harding, an early 
policymaker of the Utah Employment Security Agency, summed 
up the economic security history of that period, saying it “was part 
of a reform that was needed in order that the free enterprise system 
might continue” (USDOL 1985, p. 1). While some European coun-
tries nationalized industries and others expanded public assistance 
to the needy, the United States took a different approach to estab-
lishing a social insurance system. Within the panoply of other New 
Deal reforms and programs, the introduction of ES and UI programs, 
dubbed “employment security” programs, helped sustain American 
capitalism.4 
In the late 1930s, federal ES and UI policymakers sought to oper-
ate as partners out of necessity. A report from the Committee on Eco-
nomic Security (CES), prepared by a White House working group, is 
the seminal document on social insurance policy in the United States.5 
Baldwin (1993, pp. 31–32) observes that the 1935 CES report recom-
mended a program of employment assurance before suggesting a UI 
program. In Baldwin’s view, this was an attempt to emphasize reem-
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ployment after job loss and resulted in ES offices being designated 
as the points of service for UI claimants.6 Thus, the expectation of 
continued public support for reemployment efforts during periods of 
UI receipt gave birth to the ES-UI partnership. 
BEGINNINGS OF THE ES AND FUNDING
Ordered by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933 to immedi-
ately revitalize the federal U.S. Employment Service (USES), which 
was originally set up in 1918 to staff the buildup of defense industries 
in the first world war (O’Leary and Eberts 2008, p. 2), U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor (USDOL) Secretary Frances Perkins instructed staff 
members to begin helping states enact ES laws consistent with the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. State agencies were established and became 
affiliated with the USES system, using federal ES grants to support 
operations (Perkins 1946, p. 179). 
Under the Wagner-Peyser Act, the network of ES offices was 
administered by states and funded by the federal and state govern-
ments on a 50-50 matching basis. During the initial stage of USES 
growth, recruitment of unemployed workers to fill job openings for 
public works projects7 necessitated setting up temporary federal 
reemployment offices (called National Reemployment Service [NRS] 
offices). These offices were financed 100 percent by the federal gov-
ernment. To supervise the national buildup of NRS offices, a separate 
division of NRS was organized within USES (USDOL 1953, p. 12). 
As states affiliated with USES and received Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES grants, NRS offices were either closed or transferred to 
state administration. In December 1933, there were 158 ES offices 
and 3,270 NRS offices nationwide. By June 1938, the balance was 
reversed, with 1,263 ES offices and only 188 NRS offices. From 
1933 until the early part of fiscal year (FY) 1938, the ES system was 
financed by five different sources. The biggest source was NRS allot-
ments from federal public works appropriations, but there were also 
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state and local government appropriations, Wagner-Peyser Act ES 
grants, and facilities or staffing contributions from local governments 
(USDOL 1953, p. 13). 
RECESSION OF 1937–1938 SPURS ES-UI PARTNERSHIP 
Unemployment declined in 1934, the year after President Roo-
sevelt took office, but recovery from the Great Depression was not 
continuous.8 A new economic downturn started in May 1937 and 
lasted until June 1938. Unemployment reached 20 percent, with 11 
million unemployed in 1938 (Burns 1956, p. 324; Waiwood 2013). 
The economic recession of 1937–1938 had an enormous impact on 
the emerging federal-state ES and UI programs. The Social Security 
Board, which administered the nascent UI program, and USDOL, 
which administered the fledgling ES system, began discussions to 
gather resources to help states expand the network of ES offices.9
The CES report had advised states to pay unemployment benefits 
only through ES offices pursuant to provisions in the Wagner-Peyser 
Act (CES 1935, p. 19),10 and immediately after the Social Security 
Board was organized, it accepted that advice (Blaustein 1993, p. 156). 
The Board believed that idled claimants should be offered publicly 
posted job openings. It also sought to bolster the public image of UI 
as an earned entitlement rather than a dole involving a means test and 
therefore opted not to pay benefits out of state welfare offices. That 
decision flowed from an overarching New Deal policy that sought 
to establish permanent federal-state programs to ameliorate unem-
ployment, and findings from the CES report, which saw unemploy-
ment benefits as a temporary income support paid only when suitable 
jobs were not available. These are foundational elements of social 
insurance distinct from relief. Every state provided for ES offices to 
administer UI payments. 
USDOL and the Social Security Board agreed in 1937 that an 
expanded system of ES offices was needed to meet the demands of 
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the UI program. Expansion came after intense discussion among poli-
cymakers involving valid misgivings. Some USDOL policymakers 
believed too rapid a buildup of state ES offices could lead to hiring 
incompetent ES staff, which could result in bias and a lack of profes-
sionalism in administration and have severe adverse public conse-
quences. This perspective was not without merit, given the patronage 
systems operating in many local and state governments at that time. 
After state ES laws11 were enacted, Secretary Perkins’s hand-
picked director of USES, Frank Persons, proceeded cautiously to 
partner with some states.12 There were nine states in 1937 where affil-
iation with USES was withheld and distribution of Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES grants and the closing of NRS offices were delayed, in most 
instances because of political issues surrounding the administration 
of ES agencies (USDOL 1937a).13 For example, in Massachusetts, 
where the ES director was an appointee of Governor James Curley, 
Director Persons believed the Massachusetts appointee was too weak 
to resist patronage pressures (McKinley and Frase 1970, p. 295).14 
Most striking was that, of the 35 states affiliated with USES in 1936, 
only nine were attempting to provide services statewide.15 The other 
26 states had not yet set up ES offices outside large cities (USDOL 
1953, p. 12). 
Frank Persons and others argued against consolidated ES and 
UI activities because it might be harmful to placement activities and 
hinder participation by employers. Although there was sympathy for 
this view, it was ultimately not shared by Secretary Perkins and the 
Social Security Board (McKinley and Frase 1970, pp. 298, 305). The 
relationship between ES and UI raised a host of new policy issues in 
public administration. These issues necessitated an exchange of view-
points among remarkably capable New Deal public officials. 
Policymakers understood that the UI provisions of the Social 
Security Act would radically expand the mission and volume of ES 
operations. The policy dilemma facing USDOL and the Social Secu-
rity Board in 1937 was that the Wagner-Peyser Act did not authorize 
money for UI activities or the carrying out of UI activities by the 
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state ES (USDOL 1937b, p. 5). However, the Social Security Act did 
permit the funding and conducting of UI activities by the state ES. 
The administrative challenges were to obtain agreement between the 
secretary and the Board on how to connect federal ES and UI funds, 
and then figure out how states were to coordinate ES and UI functions 
within ES offices. Meeting the challenges required a formal collabo-
ration between two federal agencies, USDOL and the Social Security 
Board, to successfully enlarge the national network of ES offices and 
coordinate the UI and ES programs. 
POLITICAL CONTEXT AND AGREEMENT OF 193716 
Getting government executive agencies to collaborate is always 
a challenge. Perhaps more so in this instance because when Congress 
enacted the Social Security Act, it authorized the Board as an inde-
pendent agency, outside USDOL. According to Perkins, legislators 
made the Board independent because they did not want USDOL to 
acquire additional responsibilities and resources (Perkins 1946, p. 
300). 
Therefore, the political context for the agreement included the 
following: 
• The 1937–1938 recession was causing unemployment to rise 
again, and there were fears of another structural breakdown. 
Thirty-two states were to start paying unemployment benefits 
in 1938 (USDOL 1937b).17 Payment of UI benefits in each 
state required establishing standard administrative procedures 
for determining eligibility, paying benefits, and certifying that 
claimants had conducted job searches. 
• The recession produced rising political pressure to increase ac-
cess to services for the jobless. There were large service gaps 
in helping the unemployed file UI claims and locate work, and 
Wagner-Peyser Act ES funds alone could not expand service 
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capacity for the burgeoning UI program (McKinley and Frase 
1970, p. 306). The fledgling ES system required rapid estab-
lishment and expansion of ES offices statewide in each state. 
• A novel financial relationship between two federal agencies, 
USDOL and the Board, was essential for the success of the 
untested federal-state ES and UI programs. 
A policy agreement, dated March 30, 1937, between Secretary 
Perkins and Board Chair Arthur Altmeyer established coordination 
and integration of the functions between the two federal agencies. 
The agreement created a type of “unified service and financing pact,” 
but it did not govern state operations. According to the agreement, 
two federal agencies, the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation 
(within the Board) and USES (within USDOL), were to 
• “act as if they were a single agency” with respect to all matters 
affecting state ES agencies, including state plans funded under 
the Wagner-Peyser Act and the Social Security Act (USDOL 
1937c, 1953, p. 19); 
• expand state ES offices and prepare for the payment of UI 
benefits (USDOL 1937b); 
• regard the state agency ES and UI systems as a “unified ser-
vice” (USDOL 1937d, e); and 
• use UI grants under Title III of the Social Security Act to 
expand public ES offices, administer benefit payments, and 
maintain standards of USES (e.g., merit standards); such UI 
grants were in addition to ES grants (USDOL 1937d). 
The Board interpreted the requirements of the Social Security Act 
to allow UI grants to support ES. This interpretation was based on the 
intent of the CES report and the Board’s subsequent selection of state 
ES offices to administer UI payments (Haber and Murray 1966, p. 
104).18 An opinion from the Comptroller General of the United States 
in July 1937 affirmed the Board’s decision (Atkinson, Odencrantz, 
and Deming 1938, p. 55). USDOL and the Board required states to 
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appropriate funds to match Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants before they 
could receive UI grants.19 
The Secretary-Board Agreement formalized the ES-UI partner-
ship. It was an improvised interdepartmental arrangement, which 
allowed UI grants to supplement ES grants and state resources to 
build and maintain a national ES system.20 Under the Secretary-
Board Agreement, both ES and UI services were provided jointly in 
ES offices. While ES and UI functions were unified at a single point 
of service, ES and UI grants were not comingled. Both USDOL and 
the Board made federal grants available during FYs 1936 to 1938 to 
establish and maintain ES offices and to coordinate ES and UI activi-
ties. During 1938, 9.2 million initial UI claims were filed, and ES 
made 2.7 million nonagricultural job placements (Haber and Kruger 
1964, p. 29). By the end of FY 1939, the plan to expand ES offices 
was completed in the 48 states, District of Columbia, and territories 
of Alaska and Hawaii (USDOL 1953, p. 13).21 
FINANCING AND ORGANIZING THE PARTNERSHIP 
The Wagner-Peyser Act provided ES grants to states, which they 
were required to match, to administer state ES systems. Title III of the 
Social Security Act provided nonmatching UI grants (and still does) 
to states to administer state UI laws and, as a result of the Secretary-
Board Agreement, to finance the ES system.22 Between 1938 and 
1941 about 85 to 90 percent of the costs for administering ES offices 
were financed through UI grants. Overall, between 90 and 95 percent 
of the entire costs of maintaining all state ES office systems were 
financed by the federal government under the Wagner-Peyser Act and 
the Social Security Act. Between January 1942 and November 1946, 
war-time mobilization of civilian labor required federalization of the 
state ES systems, and the total cost of administering ES offices was 
paid from federal general revenues. When Congress returned the ES 
to federal-state administration after the war, it waived the state ES 
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matching requirement. The 1947 Labor-Federal Security Appropria-
tion Act and subsequent laws (Friedman 1948, p. 17) provided 100 
percent federal funding of ES administrative costs until 1950, when 
the Wagner-Peyser Act was amended to permanently eliminate the 
matching provision.23 
Locating the ES and UI programs in USDOL to overcome federal 
and state structural barriers to fortify the two programs’ partnership 
proved challenging during the Truman administration.24 Ultimately, 
in August 1949, under Reorganization Plan No. 2, the Bureau of 
Employment Security that had responsibility for both programs was 
permanently transferred from the Federal Security Agency to USDOL 
(USDOL 1955, p. 53). 
EARMARKING REVENUES FOR  
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
 Struggles in obtaining adequate appropriations for ES and UI 
after World War II led to legislative proposals starting in 1949 to ear-
mark the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) receipts solely for 
the purpose of employment security—that is, ES and UI. Earmarked 
funds were thought to be less susceptible to budget manipulations. 
Not until the Employment Security Administrative Financing Act 
of 1954 (P.L. 83-567) was the proposal enacted into law to earmark 
FUTA receipts. However, FUTA receipts continued to be deposited 
in general revenues of the U.S. Treasury, and appropriations for ES 
and UI administration continued to be paid from general revenues. 
The 1954 law did provide, however, that excess tax receipts (rev-
enues over expenditures) at the end of each FY were to be credited to 
the Unemployment Trust Fund (UTF) (Haber and Murray 1966, pp. 
404–405). 
Since the 1954 amendments, administrative grants for both ES 
and UI have been financed from FUTA revenues. In the ensuing 
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years, however, USDOL budget requests for ES and UI administra-
tive grants continued to be cut by Congress. Thus, in 1959, the Eisen-
hower administration proposed yet another change in the law that 
would require Congress to finance employment security administra-
tion directly from the UTF. Amounts equal to FUTA revenues could 
then be placed in the UTF, from which the grants to states could be 
appropriated with an adequate balance maintained as a reserve. The 
president’s budget message for FY 1961 argued that “employment 
security programs would be financed in essentially the same way as 
other major social insurance programs” (Federal Reserve Archive 
1960).
During the Eisenhower presidency, many of the early architects 
of the federal and state ES and UI programs remained active in policy 
making. Based on their experiences, they sought to strengthen the 
ES-UI partnership into the future. Congress approved the proposed 
Eisenhower reform with overwhelming bipartisan support; the Social 
Security Amendments of 1960 were enacted on September 13, 1960.25 
Title V of the 1960 amendments, the Employment Security 
Administrative Financing Amendments, established a new federal 
Employment Security Administration Account (ESAA) within the 
UTF.26 Under the law, FUTA payroll taxes paid by employers to the 
U.S. Treasury are deposited in the ESAA, and about 20 percent of 
those receipts today are allotted to the Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Account (established in 1970). Funds to administer 
state ES and UI programs are expended directly from ESAA, rather 
than from the general revenue fund (Miller 1997, p. 359). 
The 1960 amendments transformed the fiscal federalism of the 
ES and UI programs. Since then, FUTA revenues have not only been 
earmarked, but they go directly into the UTF and also come out of 
the UTF as ES and UI grants. Federal ES and UI laws, federal-state 
grant agreements, and state operating plans set forth conditions for 
administration of the grants. The 1954 and 1960 revisions to the UTF 
remain in place, and over time, have safeguarded the framework of 
the ES-UI partnership. 
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CHANGES IN THE LABOR FORCE 
The role of the ES expanded in the second half of the twentieth 
century to serve more of the economically disadvantaged, who had 
little or no previous work experience and difficulty entering the labor 
market. Because added funding for ES was needed to serve the disad-
vantaged, advocates began to consider new ES funding sources and 
arrangements. They argued for the use of monies from federal general 
revenues to augment ES appropriations and expand service capacity. 
During mid-century, the national effort to enact the first large-scale 
public job training program also emerged.27 Ruttenberg and Gutchless 
(1970, p. 73) typified the sentiments of some job training advocates, 
observing: “Trust fund financing has provided a continuity and stabil-
ity that was essential to the steady development of the employment 
service.” They and others argued that grant funds from FUTA should 
be used to assist job seekers with prior attachment to the labor force, 
and that additional grant funds to serve the disadvantaged and other 
groups should be drawn from federal general revenues to finance 
some ES administration. 
The 1970 Employment Security Amendments (P.L. 97-373) 
provided that the ES grants include a “mix” of monies from FUTA 
and general revenues. Based upon USDOL policies to meet statutory 
requirements, the percentage of FUTA monies in the mix is deter-
mined by the percentage of persons in UI-covered employment. In 
1973, the source of funding for ES grants was 85 percent from FUTA 
and 15 percent from general revenues. A series of changes in this 
formula followed. In 1975, the grant mix was set at 86 percent from 
FUTA and 14 percent from general revenue. In 1976, the proportions 
were changed to 87 percent and 13 percent, respectively. In 1978, the 
proportions were adjusted to 92 percent from FUTA and 8 percent 
from general revenue. Before the summer of 1980, the proportions 
were again revised to 97 percent from FUTA and 3 percent from gen-
eral revenues, and they have remained unchanged since then (Lubin 
1980, p. 877). 
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Over the next 30 years, national policy shifted about whether 
UI and ES services should be delivered jointly or separately at local 
offices. In 1980, a report by the National Commission on Unemploy-
ment Compensation (NCUC) made recommendations to revitalize 
the ES-UI partnership by enhancing the ES program. The report spec-
ified that for ES to serve as the prime federal and state labor exchange 
and provide job search and work test services to UI claimants, the 
Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to states had to be increased. To accom-
plish essential ES objectives, the report proposed that annual federal 
grants be sufficient to fund at least four ES staff positions for each 
10,000 local members of the civilian labor force (NCUC 1980, pp. 
137, 141). No action by the president or Congress was ever taken on 
these NCUC policy recommendations.28 
ES AND UI AS INTERDEPENDENT PROGRAMS 
From FY 1994 through FY 2000, under the “One-Stop” initiative, 
states received supplemental USDOL grants totaling $825 million to 
consolidate fragmented workforce development delivery systems. 
Interestingly, one of the federal principles for the states’ receipt of 
the new funding was integrated services (Balducchi, Johnson, and 
Gritz 1997, p. 476; Balducchi and Pasternak 2001, p. 145),29 and the 
meaning of integrated services became a source of policy differences 
within USDOL because it concerned how local offices would be 
funded. Unlike the position held by federal UI policymakers in 1937, 
this time federal UI policymakers did not want state UI agencies to 
assume large costs for the upkeep of the consolidated One-Stop cen-
ters that housed multiple program partners. USDOL UI policymak-
ers who previously had been reluctant to sponsor new telephone and 
Internet claims processes, changed position to avert a potential UI 
resource grab by One-Stop operators. USDOL began distributing sup-
plemental UI grants to states for new telephone and Internet technolo-
gies, which resulted in relocating the vast majority of state UI staff 
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out of local offices and into detached call centers. Currently, most UI 
staff members are not located in physical AJCs, although states are 
required to provide access to claims services at these centers (Wand-
ner 2010, pp. 198–199). 
With implementation of the One-Stop grant initiative, the Clinton 
administration next sought to enshrine in law the One-Stop approach 
in the delivery of workforce development programs. Codified in 
the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, this reform brought 
together the ES, UI, and job training systems into a single One-Stop 
delivery system, without reapportioning state control of ES and UI 
programs and local control of job training programs (Balducchi and 
Pasternak 2001, p. 156). 
The ES-UI partnership weakened during the WIA era (1998–
2014), mostly because of inadequate funding for the ES program 
under the Wagner-Peyser Act. This happened despite the introduc-
tion of new federal programs requiring ES-UI cooperation to assist 
the increasing numbers of dislocated UI beneficiaries. These included 
the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services30 (WPRS) program 
(1994), and the Reemployment and Eligibility Assessment initiative 
(2005), which was replaced in 2015 by the Reemployment Services 
and Eligibility Assessment (RESEA)31 program. Over the past four 
decades, the president’s annual budget requests have been insufficient 
to provide adequate Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to states,32 and sub-
sequent underfunding by Congress has widened the fissure between 
ES and UI program activities. 
Despite these challenges, the union of ES and UI remains intact 
in federal statutes, and the operating procedures of the ES-UI partner-
ship are still faithful to its founding principles (USDOL 1955, p. 12), 
which 
• guarantee that impartial services will be delivered by compe-
tent state government professionals who are free of patronage 
or private interests; 
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• pledge that the prospect of suitable jobs will be found for UI 
claimants as soon as possible, so that in many cases the pay-
ment of benefits will be unnecessary; 
• assure cooperation between staff members performing job 
finding and placement, and those performing claims activities 
to satisfy state laws requiring that UI beneficiaries must be 
able and available to work or they may be disqualified if they 
refuse suitable work without good cause; 
• state that when a claimant has refused a referral or a job based 
upon a referral, ES must report the facts to the UI claims staff 
to determine whether a benefit disqualification should be im-
posed; and 
• assure employers that claimants who are required to do so ful-
fill their responsibility to seek work and that employers have a 
reliable means to obtain qualified workers. 
The Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) of 2014 
retained the WIA’s One-Stop concept along with the distribution of 
authority for ES and job training between state and local entities. 
However, WIOA did collapse the WIA categories of core and inten-
sive services into the single category of “career services.” Career ser-
vices are typically the same as Wagner-Peyser Act ES services. The 
key differences between the structure of ES and WIOA are that ES is 
under the administrative control of state workforce agencies, where 
resources can be reassigned within states, and services are mostly 
delivered by merit-based government employees, retaining the assur-
ance of impartiality sought by the founders of the ES and UI pro-
grams. Grants (derived largely from FUTA) are awarded for adminis-
tering ES services throughout each state, with distinct responsibilities 
for UI claimants. Thus, ES funds enable governors to align statewide 
economic development with recruitment and job placement services 
without destabilizing local WIOA resources in any area. In contrast, 
grants (derived from general revenue) for administering WIOA career 
services and job training are mostly under the control of local work-
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force development boards, and WIOA services are delivered by pri-
vate and public employees. 
EVIDENCE OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS 
In this section, we examine selected studies evaluating the cost-
effectiveness of ES programs. Syntheses of the best evidence about the 
cost-effectiveness of ES for UI beneficiaries may be found in O’Leary 
(2006) and Wandner (2010). Studies since the 1980s have shown that 
many dislocated, experienced workers actually only require adequate 
unemployment benefits and JSA to return to employment (Corson et 
al. 1989; Jacobson et al. 2004; Johnson et al. 1983). In addition, ran-
dom trials testing strategies to renew linkages between ES and UI 
have estimated that closer cooperation results in shorter unemploy-
ment durations and lower UI benefit payment costs (Corson, Long, 
and Nicholson 1985). 
These results mean that conservation of UTF reserves through 
reduced joblessness can be achieved by providing job finding and 
placement services and exposing UI claimants to suitable jobs. This 
is particularly true for younger and dislocated UI claimants. Analyz-
ing data from Washington State, Lachowska, Meral, and Woodbury 
(2016) find that for dislocated UI claimants the work test reduced 
time to reemployment by one to two quarters and increased post-UI 
job tenure by about two quarters.33 
Other evidence can be found in several USDOL-sponsored 
studies. A demonstration in Wisconsin (Almandsmith, Adams, and 
Bos 2006) tested a services regimen that included joint ES-UI staff 
interviews with UI claimants, JSA, UI eligibility reviews, and staff-
assisted job referrals. Using a quasi-experimental methodology, the 
researchers found that UI durations were shortened by 0.9 week, rela-
tive to the comparison group of other UI claimants. More evidence of 
effective ES activities comes from three evaluations of reemployment 
and eligibility assessments (REA) involving random trials (Benus et 
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al. 2008). In Nevada, REA led to significantly shorter UI durations 
and lower benefit amounts where treatment group UI claimants col-
lected 3.13 fewer weeks and $873 lower total benefit amounts than 
their non-treatment peers (Michaelides et al. 2012; Poe-Yamagata et 
al. 2011).34 
INADEQUATE ES FUNDING AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
Because of chronic underfunding of the Wagner-Peyser Act 
ES grants to states, the types of effective, staff-assisted ES services 
needed to return the unemployed or underemployed to work are not 
always available at the AJCs.35 These grants have been underfunded 
in spite of research showing that assessment, JSA, and job finding 
and placement services can be highly cost-effective ways of reducing 
joblessness. 
Since program year (PY) 1984, Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to 
states have remained stagnant or decreased in nominal terms.36 Addi-
tionally, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 capped 
a shift in federal policy that tightened rather than expanded access 
to UI benefits. This was manifested in tougher initial and continu-
ing eligibility conditions at the state level (Blaustein 1993, pp. 262–
263).37 This shift was the result of federal fiscal policies that promoted 
reduction in the size of government, opposition to tax increases, and 
devolvement of social programs to states. Resistance by some states to 
tax hikes in recent years also has resulted in unprecedented reductions 
in unemployment benefit durations. The potential federal funding of 
ES-UI programs was further squeezed with the drop in 2011 of the 
FUTA tax rate from 0.8 percent to 0.6 percent. Likewise, the federal 
UI wage base, the wage cap per employee used to calculate employ-
ers’ tax contributions to support the ES-UI programs, has remained at 
$7,000 since January 1, 1983. After enactment of the Social Security 
Amendments of 1939, laws to increase the federal UI wage base to 
support these vital programs have been enacted only three times, all 
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under Republican administrations, in 1970 (P.L. 91-373), 1976 (P.L. 
94-566), and 1982 (P. L. 97-248).38 
The tightening of state UI eligibility conditions and reduction in 
funds for ES services occurred in a period of enormous technological 
advancements. This leap in technology enabled states to move to high 
volume mainframe and distributed computer processing and Inter-
net services without workload disruptions. Sometimes, particularly 
in rural areas, this gave a false impression that access through com-
puter-assisted services always resulted in effective service interven-
tions (Dunham et al. 2005). With federal budget constraints and the 
rampant use of technology-based self-services, there has been precip-
itous erosion in staff-assisted ES job finding and placement services. 
Moreover, utilization of technology-based services appears to have 
expanded during the Great Recession. According to state workforce 
agency administrators, more than 80 percent of the 45 respondents to 
a 2012 National Association of State Workforce Agencies (NASWA) 
survey funded by the Urban Institute (Wandner 2015, pp. 156, 163) 
reported that they had increased rather than cut computer-assisted 
services. Throughout this period, regular UI average durations and 
exhaustion rates have been trending upward, suggesting a possible 
cause and effect. 
From 1993 until the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
WPRS program required states, as an unfunded mandate, to provide 
additional reemployment services to UI claimants likely to exhaust 
benefits. As a consequence, ES services in states were widely under-
funded and WPRS claimants underserved.39 
Both the executive and legislative branches of the federal govern-
ment have contributed to the underfunding of the ES program in recent 
decades. Neither the president’s annual budget requests to Congress, 
nor separate Congressional appropriation actions have provided ade-
quate funding. FUTA provides a statutory mechanism to fully fund 
ES services, and funds are contained in the UTF for this purpose, but 
it has not been adequately used to support the program. On the other 
hand, since 1962, there have been five major federal job training laws 
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enacted, including WIOA most recently, and each incarnation has 
included changes to state and local delivery arrangements.40 Every 
one of the five public job training programs has been funded from 
general revenues with discretionary Congressional appropriations. 
Public job training has received policy attention and funding; but it is 
not an entitlement, nor does it have a statutory funding mechanism. 
In contrast, the Wagner-Peyser Act ES program, which has an exist-
ing institutional structure for funding, has regularly lacked sufficient 
funds despite the fact that they have already been paid for by employ-
ers through FUTA taxes. 
Most industrialized nations provide a free public employment 
service as a right to all citizens. Indeed, these developed nations and 
many middle-income nations are signatories to the 1948 International 
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 88 on public employment ser-
vices (ILO 1948). Convention 88 asserts that all labor force members 
should have the right to free labor market information and job match-
ing services as a means to social participation. Although the United 
States is not a signatory to ILO Convention 88, it has respected the 
principle of the convention that all nations “shall maintain or ensure 
the maintenance of a free public employment service” (ILO 1948, 
article 1). President Eisenhower asserted, “[S]tate employment secu-
rity offices are important for a smoothly operating free labor market 
in a growing economy” (Federal Reserve Archive 1960). Through the 
ES, the United States provides a public exchange at no cost to job 
seekers. Furthermore, the ES has a statutory funding mechanism to 
ensure Americans have access to a free public employment service. 
However, the mechanism has not worked well in recent years. Pol-
icy action should be taken to ensure adequate funding under FUTA. 
Additional factors for ES budget formulation might be established 
by USDOL to improve justifications to the Office of Management 
and Budget and Congress for increases in annual appropriations.41 In 
an American society where work is the avenue to self-sufficiency, a 
free and effective public labor exchange should be available to all job 
seekers. 
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Because Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant funds to states have 
declined in nominal terms since PY 1984, their real value through PY 
2015 has dropped by more than half (Figure 3.1). For 2015, it would 
have taken funding of $1.47 billion to have maintained the 1984 real 
level of spending.42 Workers and employers need to be more aware of 
the role ES contributes to the smooth functioning of the labor market 
and to the integrity of the UI program. Some states have taken lim-
ited measures to make up for portions of these ES grant shortfalls by 
augmenting federal funding through special assessments or by tap-
ping UI funds. As of 2015, 30 states have provided supplementary ES 
funding (USDOL 2016a, Table 2-17, pp. 2-31 to 2-32). In addition, 
based on the annual NASWA survey of state workforce agencies, 
state supplementary spending on ES totaled more than $150 million 
(NASWA 2016). This is compelling evidence that state workforce 
agency administrators value ES programs for their customers.
Figure 3.1  Wagner-Peyser Funding for Employment Services in Millions 
of Nominal and Real Dollars, 1984 to 2015 (1984 = 100)


















Real Funding (1984 = 100)
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OPPORTUNITY FOR ES-UI  
PARTNERSHIP REVITALIZATION 
Over the years, the ES-UI partnership has ebbed and flowed. 
Historically about 40 percent of the ES registrants for services have 
been UI claimants. In the Great Recession, the highest number of 
ES registrants in any year was 22,447,124 in PY 2009, and of those, 
10,712,573 were UI claimants, totaling 47.7 percent of all registered 
ES job seekers (USDOL 2009). 
Workforce changes over several decades and new work arrange-
ments, including in today’s so-called gig labor market, have resulted 
in more workers being at risk for joblessness. Currently, fewer than 
one in three unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits, and 
a record high 38 percent of workers exhaust benefits. After the Great 
Recession, nine states (Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, 
Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Carolina)—mostly as 
a result of debt due to inadequate benefit financing—reduced their 
maximum unemployment benefit durations to less than 26 weeks, 
ranging from 12 to 25 weeks.43 The number of weeks available in 
four of those states (Georgia, Florida, Kansas, and North Carolina) is 
based on a sliding scale governed by the states’ unemployment rates 
(The White House 2016). 
The decisions by some states to reduce UI benefit durations have 
adverse effects on both claimants and job seekers who have exhausted 
unemployment benefits. Reductions in UI receipt by unemployed 
workers will not reduce the number of job seekers who need ES ser-
vices. Business downturns or dislocations will cause many claimants 
in states with reduced durations of benefits to exhaust benefits, but 
many will continue to be job seekers who need an array of job finding 
and placement services. Shortened maximum durations of UI make 
provision of early ES services even more important. For example, 
in PY 2014, UI claimants accounted for 37.3 percent of all job seek-
ers registered with ES—a 10 percentage point decline from PY 2009 
(USDOL 2014). Although much of this decline may be attributed 
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to improved economic conditions, if additional states reduce their 
maximum duration of benefits, the percentage gap between UI claim-
ants and ES job seekers may widen, but the necessity of providing 
employment services to UI exhaustees will remain.   
POLICIES TO REVITALIZE THE ES-UI PARTNERSHIP 
In June 2016, the Center for American Progress (CAP), the 
National Employment Law Project (NELP), and the Center on Pov-
erty and Inequality (CPI) of the Georgetown University Law Center 
proposed improvements in unemployment protections for workers 
and enhancements of the ES-UI partnership. They called for a $1 
billion increase in Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants and a $535 million 
increase in RESEA above the 2017 presidential budget request (West 
et al. 2016, pp. 20–21). 
If the current administration is successful in stimulating aggregate 
demand through tax reform or other measures, then domestic labor 
demand also is likely to increase. Many businesses with job openings 
will require some staff-assisted ES recruitment services. This possible 
surge in labor demand is an ideal time for policymakers to revitalize 
the ES-UI partnership. We offer four policies for consideration. 
Increase Annual Wagner-Peyser Act ES Grants to States 
 In FY 1981, regular Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants totaled $781.4 
million. That year ES grants served 16.5 million job seekers (USDOL 
1982, pp. 48–49). Had ES received only increases in annual funding 
that maintained the real level of funding over the years, the amount 
would have been $1.47 billion in FY 2015 instead of the $664 million 
appropriated by Congress. We therefore support the funding increases 
proposed by CAP, NELP, and CPI. 
In a report issued by the Brookings Institution, Jacobson (2009, 
p. 25) estimates a cost of $383 per UI claimant to institute call-in 
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notifications and provide JSA services. Adjusting for annual infla-
tion, the cost rises to $430 per UI claimant in 2016. Based on his-
toric usage, $430 seems to be a reliable estimate for the average cost 
per UI claimant to receive staff-assisted assessment and job search 
services.44 Using the $430 amount, the proposed $1 billion in added 
Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants could provide job search activities to 
an added 2.3 million UI claimants (or the long-term jobless who have 
exhausted their unemployment benefits). In FY 2015, for example, 
only 16 percent of UI claimants were scheduled for RES or RESEA 
eligibility and job search services (USDOL 2016b, p. 37). Using PY 
2014 national ES data, 5,411,656 UI claimants were registered with 
ES, and of those, 1,845,036 received job search activities (USDOL 
2014). An additional $1 billion could have increased the receipt of job 
search activities for UI claimants from 34.1 percent to 77 percent.45 
Furthermore, amendments to the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIOA 
in 2014 expanded ES assistance to UI claimants, added work test 
responsibilities to include making eligibility assessments, and broad-
ened ES referrals and assistance to training and employment oppor-
tunities.46 Logically, additional ES responsibilities should give rise 
to increases in annual Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants to states, but no 
increases in ES grants to states have thus far been proposed. 
Raise and Index the FUTA Taxable Wage Base and Make the ES 
Grants Budget Mandatory 
Americans should have a right to a vibrant and free public 
employment service. We propose restoring the funding capacity of 
the Wagner-Peyser Act ES program by raising and indexing the FUTA 
taxable wage base as well as moving the Congressional allocation 
derived from funds in the ESAA for state ES grants from the discre-
tionary to the mandatory side of the federal budget. 
To secure additional Wagner-Peyser Act ES financing, the FUTA 
wage base could be tied to one-third of the Social Security taxable 
wage base or set equal to the average weekly wage in UI covered 
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employment. Either rule would secure the foundation for Wagner-
Peyser Act ES grant financing and help insulate it from the politics of 
the budgetary request and appropriation processes. 
Create a Contingency Fund for the Wagner-Peyser Act  
ES Program 
Starting in FY 1950, the federal budget for state UI grants has 
included a contingency fund to cover state workload expenditures 
above the expected level. Supplementary grants to states from this 
fund are based on the number of UI claims filed, claims paid, and 
state salary increases above the expected level (USDOL 1957, p. 6). 
USDOL should create a companion ES contingency fund so that as 
UI workloads climb, so does ES funding under the Wagner-Peyser 
Act in order to serve the additional ES workload. 
Establishing an ES contingency fund would ensure that as state 
UI workloads go up, funds above budgetary levels for Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES services would also rise proportionally. These additional ES 
funds would be provided to serve added UI claimants and provide to 
them cost-effective, staff-assisted ES job finding and placement ser-
vices. Also, such funds could be used to administer increased work 
test activities and referrals to appropriate training. A federal-state 
work group should be formed to design and test an ES contingency 
model to determine its effectiveness and exportability. 
Increase Uniformity of State UI Provisions 
Reforms of the Social Security Act and FUTA and state UI 
financing rules will be more successful if UI eligibility provisions 
that are truly national in scope become federal conformity require-
ments where states are compelled to enact companion laws.47 Exam-
ples include not disqualifying individuals for benefits who leave work 
to care for immediate family members who are ill or disabled, or to 
accompany spouses who are relocating, and program alternatives 
such as short-time compensation and self-employment assistance. 
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This will ensure that conditions for receipt of benefits are uniform and 
lessen the advantage of one state over another as a cost of doing busi-
ness. Likewise, such federal policy mandates will advance national 
economic security outcomes, increase recipiency, strengthen the ES 
and UI partnership as an economic stabilizer, and expand labor mobil-
ity and the equal treatment of workers. 
SUMMING UP 
The ES-UI partnership is rooted in permanent authorizing stat-
utes, an identical fund source, common rules for state administration, 
and interdependent practices to guard against improper payments 
and to expose claimants to suitable job openings. This partnership is 
central to the success of the public workforce system. Over the past 
several decades, the ES has been consistently underfunded, thereby 
weakening the ES-UI partnership, despite research evidence that 
demonstrates its value to reducing unemployment durations. During 
recent recessions, federal policies have increased emergency unem-
ployment benefits and job training, but they have by and large ignored 
long-term underfunding of Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants, and Con-
gress has been inattentive to the adequacy of ES finances. Similarly, 
state governors and interest groups have not advocated for ES fund-
ing sufficiently to revitalize the ES-UI partnership. 
 In this chapter, we explored the origin and objectives of the 
ES-UI partnership. We reviewed the early actions by ES and UI fram-
ers to forge an interdependent relationship between the two programs. 
At the outset, creative financing and strict rules for professionalism 
were required to properly launch and maintain employment security 
programs. A statutory system for cooperation and financing was set 
by 1960, but it has atrophied—along with the ES and UI partner-
ship—mostly because of inattention and underfunding of the ES pro-
gram. We also reviewed research that demonstrates the effectiveness 
of ES and the reliance of the ES and UI programs on each other to 
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satisfy social insurance principles. We described how amendments 
to the Wagner-Peyser Act in WIOA broadened ES activities, and we 
proposed a path to revitalizing the long-standing ES-UI partnership. 
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1. The ES provides employment services without cost to job seekers—both 
UI beneficiaries and other individuals. 
2. Preventing unemployment was one of the original objectives of the UI 
policymakers, and maintaining employer–employee attachments by pre-
venting dispersal of an employer’s workforce was the practical policy 
enunciated by USDOL (Blaustein 1993, pp. 43–64). 
3. On average, just over half of UI claimants each year obtain at least one 
staff-assisted ES service (West et al. 2016, p. 15). 
4. The term employment security was the invention of Arthur Altmeyer, 
chairman of the Social Security Board. President Roosevelt’s Reorgani-
zation Plan No. 1 of 1939 created the Federal Security Agency. Within 
the agency, a new bureau was formed containing the Social Security 
Board and the U.S. Employment Service. Altmeyer named it the Bureau 
of Employment Security to unite the ES and UI programs (Blaustein 
1993, pp. 175–176). Employment security is likely a derivative of social 
security and economic security (the original term used by Roosevelt to 
introduce social insurance). 
5. The president initiated CES to study social insurance at the sugges-
tion of the Secretary of Labor (Perkins 1946, p. 279). The membership 
included the Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, and Treasury, the Attor-
ney General, and Federal Relief Administrator. 
6. See also Balducchi (2011) for an analysis of CES’s recommendations. 
7. These projects were launched under the National Industrial Recovery 
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Act, Public Works Administration, Civil Works Administration, and in 
1935, Works Progress Administration. 
8. This section draws from Friedman (1948). 
9. Of the over 30 states in March 1936 that had affiliated with USES, only 
11 had matched funds to the upper limit of federal Wagner-Peyser Act 
ES grants available to them (McKinley and Frase 1970, p. 302). 
10. The Social Security Act requires that benefits must “be paid through 
public employment offices or such other agencies as the Social Security 
Board may approve.” There was little early resistance to the Board’s 
mandate. In one instance, the South Dakota legislature adjourned in 
early 1939 without appropriating funds to match the Wagner-Peyser 
Act ES grant. The state proposed to pay unemployment benefits through 
the state welfare offices instead of state ES offices. The Board withheld 
South Dakota’s UI administrative grant until the state came into com-
pliance. By September, the legislature provided matching funds for the 
Wagner-Peyser Act, state ES offices were reopened, and the UI grant 
resumed (Rubin 1983, p. 175). 
11. State ES laws included authorization for or appropriation of matching 
funds. Legislative acceptance of the Wagner-Peyser Act was included 
in the UI laws of Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming (USDOL 
1937a). 
12. Incrementalism is a trait of federalism. Stepwise adoption of ES by states 
and USDOL validation was a harbinger for later ES-UI policy initia-
tives. For example, the national WPRS system was enacted into federal 
law in 1993 and required concomitant state compliance. Not until June 
1996 did all states implement WPRS systems (Robinson 1996, p. 11). 
13. The states were Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Virginia, Illinois, 
Missouri, Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Colorado. 
14. From the outset, a professional cadre of employees of state government 
was indispensable to avert favoritism or corruption by private interests 
in classifying and referring job seekers. After state ES laws were enact-
ed, USDOL continued to uphold standards of professionalism. The Iowa 
ES agency in March 1935 was warned that not adhering to merit stan-
dards would jeopardize its Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant. In August 1935, 
USDOL suspended Missouri’s Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant for violation 
of merit staffing standards. It wasn’t until 1998 in Michigan that another 
state’s Wagner-Peyser Act ES grant was suspended for violating federal 
standards (Balducchi and Pasternak 2004; Michigan v. Herman 1998). 
15. By May 1937, 44 states had adopted UI laws. 
16. We refer to this agreement as the Secretary-Board Agreement. 
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17. Thirty-two was the number of states used in memoranda prepared by 
the Social Security Board. In fact, benefits became payable in 22 states 
in January, with an additional eight states by the end of 1938 (USDOL 
2017). The Social Security Act delayed initial UI payments in each state 
for two years to build reserves. In August 1936, Wisconsin became the 
first state to pay unemployment benefits. 
18. The Board also cited testimony of January 21, 1935, of Edwin Witte, 
executive director of CES, before the House Ways and Means Commit-
tee (McKinley and Frase 1970, p. 302). 
19. A technical resolution adopted in May 1937 governed the operating 
mechanics of the Secretary-Board Agreement (USDOL 1937d). 
20. A UI grant for the ES was first made to Wisconsin in 1936 and to other 
states in mid-1937 (Atkinson, Odencrantz, and Deming 1938, p. 197). 
21. For the two FYs, 1938 and 1939, the Board increased its share of the 
total costs of the ES from 60 percent ($14.3 million) in FY 1938 to 80 
percent ($25 million) in FY 1939 (Haber and Joseph 1939, p. 29). 
22. Parts of this section are drawn from U.S. Congress (1950). 
23. The cost to states for administering ES offices from 1933 through 1950 
in the years when matching was required never exceeded 10 percent 
(U.S. Congress 1950). Federal law has never prohibited supplementa-
tion of funds by states to support the ES system. 
24. In July 1946, the Social Security Board was abolished. Its functions, 
including UI administration, were transferred to the new Social Secu-
rity Administration in the Federal Security Agency (FSA). During the 
presidential campaign of 1948, over President Truman’s veto, Congress 
transferred the ES program from USDOL to FSA. Thus, the USES and 
UI programs were combined in the Bureau of Employment Security, but 
not in USDOL. 
25. In contrast to recent partisanship in tax policy, HR 12580 (P.L. 86-778) 
also raised the federal payroll tax from 3.0 to 3.1 percent without a 
change to the allowable 2.7 percent offset (USDOL 1985, p. 48). The 
bill sponsored by a Republican administration received 369 House 
votes to approve, with 236 Democrats voting for it. In the Senate, the 
bill received 74 votes to approve, including 43 Democrat votes (Social 
Security Administration 2016). In 2017, a tax under FUTA was levied 
on employers at a rate of 6.0 percent on wages up to $7,000 a year paid 
to an employee. The law provides a credit against federal tax liability of 
up to 5.4 percent to employers who pay state UI taxes. Thus, employers 
pay an effective federal tax rate of 0.6 percent, or a maximum of $42 per 
covered employee per year. 
26. Sections 901(a) and (c) and 903 (c), Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1103).
27. The rise of automation as a means of production began to trigger dis-
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location of workers. The needs of the dislocated and disadvantaged 
prompted the birth of public job training. Under the Manpower Devel-
opment and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962, ES and UI played vital roles. 
The state ES screened and referred job seekers to training institutions, 
and UI administered MDTA allowance payments (Wandner, Balducchi, 
and O’Leary 2015). 
28. In 1982, James Rosbrow, executive director of NCUC, told an author 
of this chapter that the report’s recommendations were not acted upon 
because of the publication’s timing. It was issued during the 1980 presi-
dential election, and the outcome of that election resulted in a rollback 
of federal policy making (Rosbrow 1982). 
29. Supplemental USDOL grants for the development of state One-Stop 
delivery systems were authorized under the Wagner-Peyser Act, but the 
source of funds was general revenue. The other One-Stop principles 
were universality, customer choice, and performance-driven/outcomes 
based. 
30. Reemployment services is defined as employment services for individu-
als who have work experience and seek new work. 
31. The RESEA program requires UI claimants to report in person to AJCs 
and receive one-on-one reviews of eligibility for UI, assessing their abil-
ity and availability for work, and referrals to reemployment services or 
training. When the WPRS program was launched in March 1994, the 
inclusion of UI eligibility reviews was considered, but obtaining funding 
and setting up the framework would have delayed state implementa-
tion. Eligibility reviews, thus, were not included in the original WPRS 
process (USDOL 1994). Later efforts to introduce such reviews lacked 
policy support, until the launch of the REA initiative. However, the 
ultimate aims of WPRS and RESEA are similar—reduced duration and 
faster job placement. In FY 2015, USDOL merged aspects of the two 
efforts. Claimants determined most likely to exhaust benefits under state 
WPRS systems and veterans receiving unemployment benefits are the 
primary groups directed to RESEA. For a discussion of other aspects 
of the WPRS and RESEA, see Wandner (2010) and USDOL (2015a). 
32. Grants for the ES refer to annual formula grants, which support staff-
ing and infrastructure of state labor exchange operations. They are dis-
tinct from episodic federal grants for reemployment services under the 
RESEA program. 
33. The work test is an ES responsibility under the Wagner-Peyser Act, sec-
tion 7(a)(3)(F). Provision of the work test is not in WIOA. The Middle 
Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 amended the Social Secu-
rity Act at section 303(a)(12) to require that UI claimants be able to 
work, available for work, and actively seeking work. 
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34. Material in this section was derived from Wandner, Balducchi, and 
O’Leary (2015). Some research suggests that shorter unemployment 
durations result from the threat of requiring participation in services 
rather than due to the value of the services. For example, Johnson and 
Klepinger (1994) asserted that responses to enhanced work search sup-
ports in a Tacoma experiment happened after assignment but before 
service participation; Black et al. (2003) found a similar response after 
Kentucky UI beneficiaries were assigned to WPRS. However, the cited 
Nevada experiment provided persuasive evidence that the reemploy-
ment services in REA had strong positive effects separate from any 
threat effect of the eligibility assessment.
35. One result of underfunding has been cutbacks by some states of physi-
cal local offices and staff-assisted ES services. For example, since 2011 
the governor of Iowa has closed 36 offices and reduced state workforce 
agency staff by 27 percent, which makes it hard “to provide employment 
services to individual job seekers” (Des Moines Register 2017). 
36. Appropriations for ES and UI had been funded on the basis of FYs, and 
they jointly developed annual state plans of service. Amendments to the 
Wagner-Peyser Act in 1982 (P.L. 97-300) required appropriations for 
ES in FY 1985 and thereafter to be made available for obligation on a 
PY basis, and the joint development of state ES plans of service with 
agencies of the Job Training and Partnership Act. The PY begins July 1 
of the calendar year and ends June 30 of the following year. Beginning 
in 1976, the FY begins October 1 of the calendar year and ends Septem-
ber 30. https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-96/pdf/STATUTE 
-96-Pg1322.pdf (accessed May 23, 2017).
37. See https://history.nih.gov/research/downloads/PL97-248.pdf (accessed 
February 15, 2017). 
38. In 1939, two federal laws were enacted that affect the ES-UI partnership. 
P.L. 76-1, untitled, transferred Title IX of the Social Security Act to the 
Internal Revenue Code, Chapter 23, FUTA. The Social Security Amend-
ments (P.L. 76-379) limited the tax base under FUTA to the first $3,000 
of a covered worker’s earnings (USDOL 1986, p. 43). 
39. In 1997, USDOL staff began drafting internal papers arguing for 
increases in Wagner-Peyser Act ES funds to serve dislocated UI claim-
ants. Separate approvals were required from Employment and Training 
Administration, other offices in USDOL, the Office of Management 
and Budget (for inclusion in the President’s annual budget request), and 
Congress. It took three years to gain concurrences. For PYs 2001–2005, 
Congress added $35 million to the Wagner-Peyser Act ES appropriation 
to serve WPRS UI claimants, but these funds were inadequate. Subse-
quently, the George W. Bush administration abandoned supplementation 
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and cut Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants. In 2009, the Obama administra-
tion, under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, achieved 
a one-time increase in Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants of $400 million, 
available through PY 2010, which included $250 million targeted for 
reemployment services to UI claimants. 
40. O’Leary, Straits, and Wandner (2004) review the first four federal job 
training laws. 
41. Section 901(d) (4) of the Social Security Act establishes the factors for 
requesting funds for Wagner-Peyser Act ES grants. These factors include 
“the relationship between employment subject to state laws and the total 
labor force in the United States, the number of claimants and the num-
ber of job applicants, and such other factors as he finds relevant.” Thus, 
federal law permits development of modernized factors to strengthen the 
case for increased ES grants. 
42. The implicit price deflator value for 2015 was 197.97, with the base year 
1984 equal to 100.00. The nominal 1984 level of funding for Wagner-
Peyser Act programs was $740 million. 
43. In 2013, Illinois resumed a 26-week maximum UI duration. 
44. The ES provides job finding and placement services to all job seekers 
who ask for them. In PY 2014, the cost per individual for ES was $45.74. 
This rate included individuals receiving self-service through virtual tools 
and those receiving staff-assisted ES services (USDOL 2016b, p. 53). 
45. The actual 1,845,036 UI claimants in receipt of job search activities 
added to an estimated 2,325,000 UI claimants in receipt of job search 
activities totals 4,107,036 UI claimants. 
46. Sections 7(a)(3)(F) and (G) of the Wagner-Peyser Act. 
47. The National Governors Association’s principles of state-federal rela-
tions endorse federal action for problems that are truly national in scope 
(National Governors Association 2017). 
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The Great Recession of 2007–2009 placed a heavy strain on state 
unemployment insurance (UI) programs and their method of financ-
ing. This short chapter introduces and discusses several aspects of 
the state UI responses during and after the downturn. Individual pro-
grams within the state UI system are highly varied. Whereas many 
states still have low net balances in their UI trust fund accounts at 
the Treasury, many other states have restored their trust funds to pre-
recession or even higher levels. This chapter documents the varied 
financing responses of the state programs to the recession with spe-
cial attention to a number of specific elements in their responses. The 
chapter also assesses the health of the state trust funds as of mid-2016.
PROGRAM FINANCING RESPONSES
Two factors that contributed to the financing difficulties experi-
enced by state UI programs during and after the Great Recession were 
the low level of reserves prior to the recession and the severity (both 
depth and duration) of the downturn. At the end of March 2011, the 
states had trust fund debts that exceeded $40 billion. At the end of 
June 2016, net reserves totaled roughly $36 billion. While the states 
still owed approximately $8 billion, this $76 billion turnaround was 
achieved by taking several distinct types of state-level actions.
Trust fund restoration was achieved both by actions that increased 
tax revenue and those that reduced UI benefit payments. Table 4.1 
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summarizes six different actions that states took affecting revenues. 
For each type of financing response, the states are sorted according to 
their prerecession reserve ratio multiple (RRM, also termed the aver-
age high-cost multiple [AHCM]) measured at the end of 2007.1 The 
RRM is an index of trust fund adequacy that incorporates informa-

































Below 0.25 13 0 1 0 1 1 7
0.25–0.499 17 1 4 1 5 5 2
0.50–0.749 8 3 0 2 3 2 0
0.75–0.999 6 6 0 0 0 0 0
1.0–1.249 3 3 0 0 0 0 0
1.25 and 
above
4 2 0 0 2 0 0
Total 
number
51 15 5 3 11 8 9
Mean RRM 0.54 0.92 0.30 0.52 0.61 0.37 0.17
Median 
RRM
0.43 0.83 0.30 0.59 0.44 0.40 0.16
Table 4.1  State Actions to Improve UI Program Financing (Number of 
States), 2007 to 2016
a Alabama, Alaska, District of Columbia, Iowa, Louisiana, Montana, Maine, Maryland, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  
b Legislation to improve solvency in 2008 and 2009: Arkansas, New Hampshire, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. 
c Tax base indexation adopted after 2009: Colorado, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
d Tax base in 2015 at least 50 percent higher than in 2007: Delaware, Kansas, Missis-
sippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Vermont, West Virginia, and Oklahoma (2013).  
e Municipal bonds issued during 2010–2013 to repay Treasury UI loans: Arizona, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 
f FUTA tax credit offsets during 2012–2015 equal to at least 10% of total tax revenue: 
California, Connecticut, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, North 
Carolina, and Ohio. 
SOURCE: Table developed by the author with data from the Office of Unemployment 
Insurance, U.S. Department of Labor. 
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the size of a state’s economy. The latter is approximated by the total 
payroll of employers covered by the UI program in each state. Higher 
RRM levels signal more adequate trust fund balances. An RRM equal 
to 1.0 means there are 12 months of benefits in the trust fund, and 
many view an RRM of 1.0 as signaling an adequate UI trust fund 
balance.
Column (1) in Table 4.1 summarizes the distribution of RRMs 
for the 51 UI programs2 at the end of 2007 or just prior to the Great 
Recession. The mean and median RRMs for the 51 programs of 0.54 
and 0.43 indicate that the average prerecession trust fund balances 
were about half of the balances needed to meet the suggested actuarial 
standard of 1.0. Only seven states had an RRM of 1.0 or higher and 
30 had RRMs below 0.50, so many states entered the Great Recession 
with low trust fund reserve balances. 
Columns (2) to (7) identify the number of states undertaking 
specific revenue-enhancing actions. The identification of specific 
actions in individual states is somewhat arbitrary, reflecting my own 
judgments. The 15 states in column (2) allowed their UI tax laws to 
operate as written in their tax statutes. These states moved to higher 
tax rate schedules and made other adjustments automatically without 
legislative changes. Note that these states had trust funds with mean 
and median RRMs of 0.92 and 0.83, respectively, much larger than 
the group as a whole. This group also included 11 of the 13 states 
with a prerecession RRM of 0.75 or higher. Having large trust funds 
meant that these states had limited need for loans from the Treasury, 
and only two (Alabama and Maryland) borrowed from the Treasury 
from 2009 to 2012. 
Column (3) summarizes five states that took early policy actions 
to avoid or reduce the volume of borrowing. All five of these states 
had low prerecession reserves, with RRMs below 0.50. Three of the 
five (New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Tennessee) instituted tem-
porary quarterly taxes to enhance revenue. These taxes were to sun-
set when the trust fund’s recovery was deemed adequate by program 
administrators.
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Prior to the Great Recession, 16 states plus the Virgin Islands 
had indexed taxable wage bases with increases tied automatically to 
changes in statewide average wages. Following the recession, three 
states adopted indexation. In two, the tax base started to increase 
automatically in 2013 (Colorado and Rhode Island). In the third, Ver-
mont, the base increased from $8,000 in 2009 to $16,000 in 2012, 
with indexed increases commencing in 2015.
During and after the recession, 11 states increased their tax bases 
by at least 50 percent (column [5]). The largest increases occurred in 
Delaware, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Vermont, where the tax 
base at least doubled between 2007 and 2015. Note that the states 
making these large increases had a prerecession average RRM that 
about matched the national average.
Six of the eight states that issued municipal bonds (column [6]) 
had prerecession RRMs below 0.50. Four of these states (Illinois, 
Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Texas) issued municipal bonds with 
long maturities (final maturities of 2020 or later). Each of the four 
used the proceeds from the bonds to repay Treasury loans that carried 
higher interest rates than the bonds. The issuances could be described 
as arbitrage (or debt-restructuring) transactions that delayed repay-
ment dates as well as secured lower interest rates. It is quite likely 
some of these bonds will still be outstanding when the U.S. economy 
enters the next recession.
If a state’s debt to the Treasury is outstanding on January 1 
of two consecutive years and not fully repaid by November 10 of 
the second year, it may be subject to Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act (FUTA) credit offsets payable in January of the following year. 
Roughly half the state UI programs were subject to FUTA credit off-
sets in at least one year between 2009 and 2015. From 2012 to 2015, 
these added federal taxes accounted for 10 percent or more of state 
UI tax revenue in nine states. These nine states had very low pre-
recession reserves, with seven of nine RRMs falling below 0.25 in 
2007 (column [7]). These states exhausted their trust funds early in 
the recession and became subject to FUTA credit offsets in 2012. 
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Several of the nine states experienced prolonged indebtedness to the 
Treasury, hence multiple years of reduced FUTA credit offsets. The 
mean and median RRMs for these states in 2007 are the lowest of any 
group in Table 4.1, both below 0.20. 
FUTA CREDIT REDUCTIONS
As just noted, one feature of the Great Recession was the wide-
spread and prolonged indebtedness of most state UI trust funds. From 
2009 to 2011, 35 state programs (36 including the Virgin Islands) bor-
rowed from the Treasury. Many states had debts for multiyear periods, 
and 11 programs were still making debt repayments in April 2016.3 
Because these debts were outstanding for multiyear periods, 
26 programs were subject to the automatic debt repayment through 
reductions in their FUTA tax credits. Typically 5.4 percent of the 
6.0 percent FUTA tax levied on the first $7,000 of taxable payroll is 
waived in states with acceptable experience-rating systems. However, 
if Treasury loans are outstanding on January 1 of two consecutive 
years and not fully repaid by November 10 of the second year, the 5.4 
percent FUTA tax waiver usually starts to be reduced, with the reduc-
tion payable in January of the following year. The initial reduction 
is 0.3 percent of federal taxable payroll ($21), but the reduction then 
grows with each successive year of continued indebtedness.
From 2009 to 2015, 24 states and the Virgin Islands were sub-
ject to FUTA credit reductions. Eighteen states plus the Virgin Islands 
experienced credit reductions for three or more years during this 
period. The aggregate revenue from the credit reductions totaled 
$10.7 billion, with $10.4 billion paid from 2012 to 2015.4 Total state 
UI taxes (including FUTA credit reductions) paid during this period 
were $128.3 billion. Thus, over these four years, the credit reductions 
accounted for 8.3 percent of total state UI tax revenue.
The FUTA credit reductions were of varying importance in 
individual states. Table 4.2 focuses on the experiences of 18 states 
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from 2012 to 2015, the 13 largest states (in terms of taxable covered 
employment in 2013) and five other states where FUTA credit reduc-
tions accounted for at least 5.0 percent of total UI tax revenue during 
the period. The 13 largest states were singled out for two reasons: 
1) they dominate in aggregate UI program performance, account-
ing for about two-thirds of tax revenue and benefit payments; and 2) 
their debt repayment behavior differs from that of smaller states, as 
documented in Vroman (2016). Only 2 of the 13 largest states (Texas 
and Massachusetts) were not subject to FUTA credit reductions from 
2012 to 2015. Texas issued municipal bonds in late 2010, while Mas-
sachusetts incurred debts for just a few months during 2011. The 
other 11 states paid $8.0 billion in credit offsets, about 77 percent of 
the national total in that four-year period.
With widespread trust fund restoration now underway, 2017 and 
2018 may be the final years when FUTA credit offsets will make a 
measurable contribution to state UI tax revenue. Estimates made at 
the Urban Institute indicate that the credit reductions will total $2.0 
billion in 2017 (California) and $2.4 billion in 2018 (again Califor-
nia). Although the payments could extend into 2019, it seems more 
likely that California’s trust fund balance on November 10, 2018, will 
be positive, obviating the need for a credit offset in 2019. If this is the 
Table 4.2  FUTA Credit Reductions as a Share of Total UI Tax Revenue, 
2012 to 2015
Share of total tax revenue
Number of  
state programs States
0.20 and above 2 IN, OH
0.15–0.199 1 KY
0.10–0.149 6 CA, CT, GA, MO, NY, NC
0.05–0.099 3 AR, FL, WI
0.00–0.049 4 IL, NJ, PA, VA
0 2 MA, TX
Total 18
SOURCE: Estimates of FUTA credit reduction shares made by the author. 
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case, FUTA credit offsets will have been active for nine consecutive 
years from 2010 to 2018, with total offsets exceeding $18.0 billion.
Although FUTA credit offsets have helped many states to repay 
their debts, their positive effect on tax revenue occurs only in years 
when a state’s net trust fund balance is negative. Once the net balance 
starts to consistently exceed zero, these added UI taxes automatically 
stop. Thus, only California, Connecticut, Ohio, and the Virgin Islands 
paid FUTA credit offsets in 2016. FUTA credit offsets, in other words, 
help states eliminate negative trust fund balances, but they do not 
continue to help in fund building after a positive balance has been 
achieved.
To summarize the responses of the state UI tax systems follow-
ing the Great Recession, four points should be emphasized. 1) The 
individual states responded in a wide variety of ways, and Table 4.1 
summarizes the responses. 2) About one-third of the states, mostly 
those with adequate prerecession reserves, allowed their experience-
rating systems to operate as specified in their state statutes. These 
states had limited need for Treasury loans, and their trust funds have 
been restored to generally high levels. 3) Eleven states made large 
increases in their taxable wage bases, and each of them had a tax 
base in 2015 that was at least 50 percent higher than it had been in 
2007. 4) One-third of the states either issued municipal bonds (eight) 
or allowed FUTA credit reductions to account for at least 10 percent 
of their postrecession tax revenue responses (nine). Neither strategy 
promoted robust trust fund recoveries. The states that issued bonds 
deferred part of their debt repayment until much later time periods. 
The FUTA credit offsets stopped contributing to trust fund recoveries 
after net trust fund balances became positive. Both strategies retarded 
the restoration of adequate trust fund balances in the states that fol-
lowed these policies. 
110   Vroman
POSTRECESSION RESPONSES OF STATE UI BENEFITS
Improvements in fund solvency also can be achieved through 
benefit reductions. Over the long run, of course, benefit reductions 
also weaken the performance of UI as an automatic stabilizer of the 
macro economy. Documenting the recent changes in program benefits 
can provide a basis for estimating how much UI’s stabilizing perfor-
mance has been weakened.
Among various benefit adjustments made by states following the 
Great Recession, three were particularly prevalent, one passive and 
two active. The passive adjustment was not increasing the maximum 
weekly benefit for several consecutive years. One active adjustment 
was reducing the maximum number of potential weeks of regular UI 
benefits starting in 2011. The other active adjustment was increasing 
the amount of administrative activity to monitor payment accuracy, 
which, coupled with ongoing problems of program administration, 
could adversely affect receipt of benefits. 
Changes in the Replacement Rate 
About half the state programs operate with an indexed maxi-
mum weekly benefit that increases automatically as statewide wages 
increase. Other states raise the maximum periodically by state legisla-
tion. Several of these latter states have not increased their maximum 
benefits for many years. 
To document the prevalence of this nonadjustment pattern, each 
state’s maximum weekly benefit amount (WBA) was noted for Janu-
ary 2016 and for previous Januarys, and the number of consecutive 
Januarys with the same maximum was counted. Of the 24 states with-
out an indexed maximum, the number of consecutive years with an 
unchanged maximum ranged from 4 to 19. In all but one state, the 
maximum WBA was unchanged for at least 5 consecutive years, and 
in five states, it ranged from 13 to 19 (Florida). The mean for the 24 
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states was 9.75 years, and the average 2016 maximum WBA had been 
unchanged for a decade. 
From 2004 to 2015, the annual earnings in taxable covered 
employment nationwide increased from $39,141 to $52,066 or by 
33.0 percent. For a state with average wage inflation and whose maxi-
mum was stable during 12 consecutive years, the maximum benefit 
would be 33.0 percent lower relative to annual wages at the end of 
the period. This decrease would exert a downward pressure on the 
replacement rate (the ratio of weekly benefits to the average weekly 
wage).5 Because so many states have operated with unchanged maxi-
mum benefits for several consecutive years, many replacement rates 
have also been adversely affected. From 2005 to 2015, the replace-
ment rate decreased in 35 of 51 programs. Although changes in mon-
etary eligibility requirements and some actual reductions in weekly 
maxima also contributed to these decreases,6 the average replace-
ment rate decreased by 0.03 or more in 10 states from 2010 to 2015. 
Seven of the 10 experienced reductions of between 0.03 and 0.049,7 
while even larger reductions occurred in Indiana (–0.086), Rhode 
Island (–0.091), and North Carolina (–0.116). Thus, the generosity 
of weekly benefits decreased in the majority of states from 2010 to 
2015, with particularly large reductions occurring in Indiana, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island.
Figure 4.1 provides a visual summary of the national replacement 
rate for the 31 years from 1985 to 2015. The figure identifies three 
multiyear periods when the national replacement rate was noticeably 
lower than in adjacent years: 1997 to 2000, 2005 to 2008, and 2011 
to 2015. The 2011 to 2015 period has the lowest average replacement 
rate of all five-year periods covered by Figure 4.1. A large part of 
the explanation for these low replacement rates has been the failure 
of many nonindexed states to increase their maximum WBAs in the 
years following the Great Recession. Compared to the earliest five 
years in Figure 4.1, the national average replacement rate from 2011 
to 2015 was 2.6 percentage points lower (32.8 versus 35.4). 
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Potential Benefit Duration
An important recent change in several state UI programs has 
been to reduce maximum potential benefit duration. Since 2011, eight 
states have reduced maximum potential duration to fewer than 26 
weeks, and at least one additional state (Idaho) planned to implement 
a reduction in 2017. The reductions follow four decades when all state 
programs offered at least 26 weeks of potential benefits in every year.8 
During the first half of 2016, maximum duration was between 12 and 
20 weeks in these eight states, and three of them have reduced poten-
tial benefit duration twice since 2011.9 In the rest of this section, I 
examine the effects of the benefit reductions on benefit recipiency as 
well as the overall benefit recipiency rates in individual states. 
Figure 4.2 shows maximum potential benefit duration in the eight 
states that paid fewer than 26 weeks of potential benefits during the 
first half of 2016. The maximum durations ranged from 12 weeks 
(Florida) to 20 weeks (Arkansas, Michigan, Missouri, and South 
Carolina). Shorter potential benefit durations would be expected to 
Figure 4.1  UI Replacement Rate, 1985 to 2015
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reduce the recipiency rate (the ratio of weekly beneficiaries to weekly 
unemployment) through shorter periods of potential eligibility and 
more rapid exhaustion of benefits. Another potential determinant of 
the recipiency rate is the unemployment rate, because average unem-
ployment duration increases during recessions when unemployment 
increases. 
The approach followed here is to fit recipiency rate regressions 
for a period prior to the reduction in potential benefit duration, project 
the recipiency rate for later periods, and examine projection errors 
with particular attention to periods of shorter potential duration. A 
recipiency rate regression using annual data was fitted for each state 
for the years 1967 to 2007. Each regression used two explanatory 
variables: the state’s current total unemployment rate (TUR) and 
TUR lagged one year. Table 4A.1 presents the regressions.
Table 4A.1 shows that state-level recipiency rates display con-
siderable short-run noise. Although the table has regressions for 51 
UI programs, the eight highlighted in bold in the table are shown in 
Figure 4.2  Maximum Potential Benefit Duration, Eight States, 2000  
to 2016 (weeks)
SOURCE: Data from “Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance 
Laws,” various issues through July 2016. The maxima can change in January and 
June of each year. Figure 4.1 shows annual duration with weights of 0.55 and 0.45 
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Figure 4.2. Seven of the eight have adjusted R2s of less than 0.50, and 
all eight standard errors of the estimates are between 0.034 and 0.049. 
The coefficient patterns for the TUR variables are consistent. All cur-
rent TURs have positive coefficients, and six have t ratios of at least 
2.0, a common threshold for statistical significance. All eight lagged 
TURs have negative coefficients, and all eight have t ratios of least 
2.0. The recipiency rate increases in years with high unemployment 
rates but then decreases when the lagged unemployment rate is high. 
The regressions in Table 4A.1 were used to project recipiency 
rates through 2015. Two sets of average projection errors are shown 
in Table 4.3: 2008 to 2011 and 2012 to 2015. Note that all projections 
are for years beyond the regressions’ estimation periods, which ended 
in 2007, and that nearly all of the reductions in average potential dura-
tion below 26 weeks occurred during 2012 to 2015, the latter of the 
two four-year projection periods.10
The reduced maximum durations would be expected to cause 
larger projection errors during 2012 to 2015 as compared to 2008 to 
2011, and the average projection errors for the two periods generally 
support this expectation. Six of eight averages are negative (i.e., they 
are overprojections) in the first period, but all eight are negative in the 
second. Six of eight equations were overprojecting by larger amounts 
during the first period relative to the second one; that is, the changes 
in these four-year averages are negative in all states but Georgia and 
Kansas. When the changes are examined for individual states (bot-
tom row of Table 4.3), note that five changes are more negative than 
–0.045 (Florida, North Carolina, Michigan, South Carolina, and 
Arkansas). 
Period FL GA NC KS MO MI SC AR
2008–11 0.025 –0.125 –0.054 –0.034 –0.034 –0.021 –0.066 0.034
2012–15 –0.051 –0.108 –0.112 –0.033 –0.070 –0.083 –0.113 –0.038
Change –0.076 0.017 –0.058 0.001 –0.036 –0.062 –0.047 –0.072
Table 4.3  Average Projection Errors by State, 2008 to 2015
SOURCE: Average projection errors based on the regressions displayed in Table 4A.1.
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The projection analysis indicates that recipiency declined in the 
period of 2012 to 2015, the period when potential duration decreased 
in these states. The explanation for the decline may include factors 
besides changes in potential duration. For example, changes in UI 
program administration could be linked to the decreases. On the other 
hand, the 2012 to 2015 period was characterized by much lower 
unemployment than that of 2008 to 2011. Thus, the analysis yielded 
results consistent with the expectation that a shorter potential duration 
reduced recipiency rates in these eight states. 
UI Program Administration
State UI administrative activities are financed mainly by grants 
allocated by the Office of UI, which is part of the Employment and 
Training Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor. These 
administrative grants are based mainly on workloads related to UI 
claims. About one-fifth of the states supplement their federal grants 
with state resources.
Over the past 20 years, program administration has evolved away 
from face-to-face contact between claimants and administrators to 
electronic contacts, either by telephone or over the Internet. Nearly all 
decisions affecting initial eligibility and continuing eligibility are now 
made through electronic media, with Internet claims accounting for 
more than half of all administrative decisions related to UI eligibility.
Several ongoing challenges have been faced in the transition to 
electronic program administration, particularly in providing timely 
and accurate eligibility decisions. The computer IT systems in many 
states use old programming languages, and updating them has proven 
challenging. Also, since administrative allocations are closely linked 
to claims volume, financial support has decreased as the economic 
recovery has progressed.
A recent analysis by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) documented these challenges with results from a recent sur-
vey of all states and intensive interviews with claimant focus groups 
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in three states (GAO 2016). Frequent problems with telephone claims 
identified by the GAO were long wait times, frequent dropped calls, 
difficulty in reaching program representatives, and frequent aban-
doned calls. Inadequate staffing was identified as a major cause of 
these problems. Inadequate administrative funding and outmoded 
IT systems also were frequently identified as underlying causes of 
administrative problems.
In recent years, the national office of the UI program has placed 
greater emphasis on payment accuracy. Increased emphasis is being 
paid to the states’ Benefit Accuracy Measurement reports, which sum-
marize payment accuracy and identify the source(s) of payment errors 
by the party (claimant, employer, or agency) and individual adminis-
trative process, and also include estimates of claimant fraud. While no 
research has thoroughly documented the effects of the administrative 
problems and increased emphasis on payment accuracy, these factors 
could be contributing to a decrease in UI recipiency. These adminis-
trative issues are present in all states to some degree, and they may 
have macro consequences in reducing the recipiency rate. 
RECIPIENCY RATES IN INDIVIDUAL STATES
To develop a more nuanced understanding of the recent decline 
in UI recipiency, a state-level regression analysis was conducted. For 
each state, a background time series regression was fitted using annual 
data. The estimation period was from 1967 to 2007, the 41 years prior 
to the onset of the Great Recession. For each state, the recipiency rate 
was regressed on TUR and TUR lagged one year. The recipiency rate 
measure was the ratio of weekly regular UI beneficiaries to weekly 
total unemployment (the WKTU ratio), the latter measured by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
It is well known that the recipiency rate increases at the start of 
a recession when unemployment increases but then declines in later 
periods because of UI benefit exhaustion and other factors. Hence, 
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the regressions included the current and lagged TURs as explanatory 
variables. In the highly varied labor markets of individual states, local 
factors besides unemployment undoubtedly also influence the recipi-
ency rate, but this analysis used only the two unemployment rate vari-
ables as arguments to explain variation in state-level WKTU ratios.
After fitting the regressions, the equations were then used to pro-
ject the recipiency rate for the eight years following the end of the 
estimation period, that is, from 2008 to 2015. The patterns in the pro-
jection errors were then examined. Table 4A.1 displays the underlying 
regressions for the period from 1967 to 2007. There are 51 equations, 
one for each state plus the District of Columbia. Generally, TUR had 
the expected positive coefficient while lagged TUR generally had a 
negative coefficient. The regressions had relatively low explanatory 
power, with a simple average of only 0.245 for the adjusted R2s.
Table 4.4 displays the average equation residuals for the final 
eight years of the estimation period (2000 to 2007) and for the eight 
years after the estimation period (2008 to 2015). Because the underly-
ing regressions had generally low explanatory power, the errors were 
averaged for four-year periods at the end of the estimation period 
and in the postestimation years: 2000 to 2003, 2004 to 2007, 2008 
to 2011, and 2012 to 2015. The average residuals are shown for three 
groups: the whole group (51), the 8 that have shortened maximum 
potential durations of less than 26 weeks, and the 43 that have not 
shortened the maximum potential duration. 
For the groups of 8 and 43 states, the averages during 2000 to 
2003 and 2004 to 2007 are quite similar, positive, and greater than 
0.030 for 2000 to 2003, and negative but only –0.0009 and –0.0046, 
respectively, for 2004 to 2007. During 2008 to 2011, the average 
residuals are noticeably more negative (i.e., larger overpredictions) 
for the 8 states compared to the other 43 (–0.0339 versus –0.0101). 
The average residuals for both groups of states become even more 
negative during 2012 to 2015, but the average overpredictions are 
much larger for the eight reduced-duration states (–0.0752 versus 
–0.0425). Measured relative to their respective averages during 1967 
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to 2007, the overprediction averages are 27.3 percent for the reduced 
duration states and 13.2 percent for the other 43 states. Not surpris-
ingly, recipiency decreased by a larger percentage in the states that 
have reduced maximum potential durations.
Table 4.4 also shows the number of state-level four-year average 
residuals that were negative during each of the four periods. Overall, 
33 of 51 were negative during 2008 to 2011, and 43 were negative 
during 2012 to 2015. For the most recent four years, the averages 
were negative for all 8 reduced-duration states and for 35 of the 43 
remaining states. Underlying the negative averages in Table 4.4’s 
top panel were widespread negative averages for all 8 of the reduced 
maximum duration states and 35 of the 43 other states in the 2012 to 
2015 period.
An important finding of this analysis is that on average recipiency 
in the most recent years has decreased in most state UI programs. 
Actual recipiency rates during 2012 to 2015 fell below projected 
recipiency rates in 43 of 51 programs. The decrease in recipiency 
apparent in national data (shown below) has occurred in most of 
2000–03 2004–07 2008–11 2012–15
Average residuals by 
four-year period
All states (51) 0.0320 –0.0040 –0.0138 –0.0476
Reduced duration 
states (8)
0.0327 –0.0009 –0.0339 –0.0752
Others (43) 0.0319 –0.0046 –0.0101 –0.0425
Number of negative 
average residuals
All states (51) 9 29 33 43
Reduced duration 
states (8)
2 4 6 8
Others (43) 7 25 27 35
Table 4.4  Average Residuals for Selected Four-Year Periods
SOURCE: Residuals based on the regressions in Table 4A.1. The averages weight each 
state equally.
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the individual state programs that make up the system of regular UI 
programs.
What underlies the decrease in UI recipiency? Since recipiency 
rates in the eight reduced-duration states decreased more than in the 
other states, one part of the explanation is the reductions in maximum 
potential duration. However, there must be other factors, as evidenced 
by the widespread negative error averages in the 43 other states dur-
ing 2012 to 2015. The exact cause (or causes) for the decrease in 
recipiency cannot be determined from the regression analysis pre-
sented here. What the regressions in Table 4A.1 do show, however, 
is that the recent decrease in the recipiency rate has been widespread 
throughout the system of state UI programs. 
THE UI PROGRAM NATIONWIDE
The final section of this chapter examines the regular state UI 
program at the national level, with attention to benefit recipiency and 
the aggregate trust fund. The analysis concentrates on the years from 
2006 to 2015, that is, from just before the Great Recession to five 
years after it ended.
Figure 4.3 displays the ratio of weekly regular UI claims to unem-
ployment (IUTU ratio), as measured in the monthly labor force survey 
from 2006 to 2015. A salient feature of the figure is the contrast in the 
recipiency rate prior to the Great Recession and the recipiency rate 
since 2012. The average monthly IUTU ratio between January 2006 
and December 2007 was 0.356, whereas between January 2012 and 
December 2015, the average IUTU ratio was 0.268, or 24.7 percent 
below the average for 2006 and 2007. Note also that the IUTU ratio 
does not display a pronounced upward trend during 2012 to 2015 (at 
most an increase of 0.030) as the economy was moving closer to full 
employment. The UI recipiency rate is now substantially lower than 
it was prior to the Great Recession. This decline will have adverse 
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Figure 4.3  IUTU Ratio, 2006 to 2015
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effects on the performance of state UI as an automatic stabilizer when 
the U.S. economy experiences the next recession.
Figure 4.4 traces the overall net trust fund balance of the state UI 
programs from the end of 2005 to mid-2016. The quarterly patterns 
clearly show how reserves are lowest at the end of the first calen-
dar quarter and then recover sharply during April and May when first 
quarter tax accruals are received. 
Figure 4.4 also shows the continuing presence of outstanding 
municipal bond principal (i.e., the vertical distance between total 
net reserves and the net reserves at the Treasury). At the end of June 
2016, the states owed approximately $4.5 billion in the municipal 
bond market as well as approximately $3.5 billion to the U.S. Trea-
sury. These debts were owed by UI programs in eight states plus the 
Virgin Islands, despite the fact that seven full years have elapsed since 
the end of the Great Recession.
Finally, note that net reserves at the end of June 2016 totaled 
$36.0 billion, which was nearly back to the prerecession level of 
approximately $40.0 billion. However, since the covered payroll 
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in 2016 was more than 20 percent greater than it was in 2007, net 
reserves should be roughly $48 billion to just match the reserve ratio 
at the end of 2007. Thus, while substantial trust fund building has 
occurred since the trough of the recession, the net balance would have 
to have been 24 percent higher than it was just to be equivalent to the 
balance at the end of 2007.
Although the aggregate net trust fund was about three-fourths 
of the way to matching the balance at the end of 2007, the situation 
in individual state programs remains highly varied. In 19 states, the 
reserve ratio (net reserves as a percent of total payroll) at the end of 
June 2016 matched or exceeded its level at the end of 2007. However, 
net reserves were still negative in 2 states (California and Pennsylva-
nia) plus the Virgin Islands, and another 11 had reserve ratios of less 
than half of their 2007 reserve ratios. In short, reserves in individual 
states were highly varied at the end of June 2016, and many states still 
had very low or negative net reserves.
Even though substantial progress has been made in trust fund res-
toration, more fund building is needed to return to the reserve posi-
Figure 4.4  Net UI Trust Fund Reserves, 2005Q4 to 2016Q2
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tion held just prior to the Great Recession. Given the inadequacy of 
reserves at the start of the Great Recession and the subsequent amount 
of state borrowing, prudent fund management requires continued trust 
fund building in the immediate future. 
Compared to the years prior to the Great Recession, the benefit 
side of the state system of UI programs is now measurably smaller. 
The orders of magnitude presented here suggest that the recipiency 
rate is approximately 25 percent lower (0.268 compared to 0.356) 
than prior to the Great Recession, while the benefit replacement rate 
is about 7 percent lower (0.328 compared to 0.354). Combined, these 
two changes suggest the benefit side of the UI system is now only 
about 70 percent as generous as it was prior to the Great Recession. 
While benefit reductions have contributed to the recovery of state UI 
trust funds, they have also significantly reduced the generosity of the 
system of state UI programs. These reductions in benefit generosity 
will permanently weaken the performance of UI as an automatic sta-
bilizer in future recessions.
Notes
Financial support was provided by the Urban Institute. The opinions expressed 
in the paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views 
of the Urban Institute or its sponsors. Thoughtful comments were provided 
by Richard Hobbie.
 1. The RRM is the ratio of two ratios. The numerator is the reserve ratio, 
which is the end-of-year trust fund balance (net of UI debts) as a per-
centage of total covered payroll. The denominator is the highest past 
annual payout rate (benefits as a percentage of payroll for the high- 
payout period). 
 2. There are 53 UI programs, but the table does not include the programs 
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
 3. The five programs with debts to the Treasury in mid-April 2016 were 
California, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, and the Virgin Islands. The six 
states with debts in the municipal bond market were Colorado, Illinois, 
Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Texas. Total indebtedness at the 
end of March 2016 was approximately $12.0 billion. 
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 4. Annual data on FUTA credit reductions from 2010 to 2015 were pro-
vided by the actuarial staff of the Unemployment Insurance Service of 
the U.S. Department of Labor. Estimates for 2016 and later years were 
made by the author.
 5. The change in the replacement rate would depend upon several factors, 
but the unchanged maximum and the share of beneficiaries at the maxi-
mum WBA are very important. 
 6. Most notably, North Carolina reduced its weekly maximum from $535 
to $350 in July 2013.
 7. The seven states are California, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, New 
York, Tennessee, and Washington. All but Washington experienced pro-
longed periods with a constant maximum WBA.
 8. The last state to offer fewer than 26 weeks prior to 2011 was South 
Carolina, with a 22-week maximum in 1969.
 9. Missouri enacted a 20-week maximum in 2011 and a sliding scale of 
between 13 and 20 weeks in January 2016. The sliding scale was over-
turned by a court ruling in mid-2016, restoring the 20-week maximum. 
Arkansas enacted a 25-week maximum in 2011 and a 20-week maxi-
mum in October 2015. Florida enacted a 23-week maximum in 2012 
and a sliding scale of between 12 and 20 weeks in 2014.
 10. The only reductions before 2012 were to 25 weeks in Arkansas and 20 
weeks in Missouri, both in July 2011.
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Appendix 4A 
State-Level Recipiency Rate Regressions 
Table 4A.1 displays state-level regressions that explain regular UI recip-
iency rates for the period from 1967 to 2007. The dependent variable is mea-
sured as the ratio of average number of weekly regular UI beneficiaries to 
average weekly unemployment (the WKTU ratio). The data period includes 
the years for which the BLS has published unemployment rate estimates for 
individual states.1 
Each regression has two explanatory variables: TUR and TUR lagged 
one year. The two TUR variables reflect the common observation that the 
recipiency rate increases in the early stages of a recession as overall unem-
ployment is increasing but then decreases in later periods due to increased 
benefit exhaustions by recipients. The expectation for these two variables is 
that TUR will have a positive regression coefficient and that lagged TUR will 
have a negative coefficient. 
Table 4A.1 shows these expectations are generally met. For TUR, 48 
of the 51 slope coefficients are positive, and 29 have t ratios of at least 2.0 
(a common indicator of significance). For lagged TUR, 48 coefficients are 
negative, and 38 have t ratios of 2.0 or larger. Although the slope coefficients 
generally have the expected signs, the regression fits are modest. The average 
adjusted R2 is only 0.245, and only 16 exceed 0.30.
Two factors undoubtedly account for the low R2 values. First, there is 
considerable noise in state-level estimates of annual unemployment (the 
denominator of the recipiency rate variables) due to the limited size of Cur-
rent Population Survey samples in individual states. Second, several other 
factors influence unemployment and UI recipiency at the state level, and 
those factors are not controlled for in the regressions.
After the regressions were fitted, the regression errors were noted for 
each year. Each equation then was used to project the recipiency rate in the 
postsample years 2008 to 2015. The residuals for the years 2000 to 2007 
and the projection errors for the years 2008 to 2015 were then averaged by 
four-year period (see Table 4.4 in the text). The underlying projections for the 
individual years were saved and are available, but the text presents four-year 
average residuals for simplicity. 
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Table 4A.1 State-Level Regressions of the Regular UI Recipiency Rate, 1967 to 2007
State Constant t TUR T TURlag T Adj. R2 Std. Err. D.W. Mean
Alabama 0.287 13.6 −0.496 1.7 0.002 0.2 0.025 0.046 0.98 0.255
Alaska 0.684 5.6 1.133 0.5 −2.541 1.2 −0.008 0.143 0.42 0.564
Arizona 0.208 9.0 1.915 4.1 −1.954 4.1 0.312 0.036 1.45 0.205
Arkansas 0.371 10.6 1.547 1.8 −2.816 3.2 0.210 0.049 0.49 0.289
California 0.435 25.8 1.092 3.3 −2.085 6.2 0.507 0.021 1.05 0.365
Colorado 0.104 5.1 1.679 2.8 −0.105 0.2 0.288 0.032 0.67 0.182
Connecticut 0.574 12.4 2.233 1.7 −4.311 3.4 0.230 0.092 0.52 0.468
Delaware 0.488 14.3 0.534 0.5 −2.391 2.1 0.180 0.069 0.86 0.390
Dist. of Col. 0.352 8.1 1.658 1.6 −1.405 1.3 0.010 0.069 1.38 0.370
Florida 0.183 8.7 1.008 1.9 −1.140 2.1 0.063 0.036 0.33 0.176
Georgia 0.138 4.6 4.230 5.1 −2.621 3.2 0.386 0.044 1.72 0.224
Hawaii 0.377 17.7 3.299 3.8 −3.553 4.1 0.271 0.043 1.42 0.364
Idaho 0.349 9.6 0.480 0.5 −0.960 0.9 −0.024 0.050 0.35 0.320
Illinois 0.380 14.5 2.314 3.0 −3.021 4.0 0.267 0.051 0.63 0.338
Indiana 0.274 12.9 2.201 3.4 −2.828 4.5 0.317 0.047 0.67 0.240
Iowa 0.383 18.7 2.554 2.3 −3.787 3.6 0.281 0.048 0.67 0.334
Kansas 0.269 9.1 5.758 5.5 −4.878 4.9 0.420 0.041 0.83 0.309
Kentucky 0.328 11.7 1.862 2.4 −2.644 3.4 0.212 0.050 0.88 0.280
Louisiana 0.210 5.2 2.382 2.3 −1.900 1.8 0.081 0.065 1.02 0.245
Maine 0.394 12.3 2.302 2.4 −2.722 2.9 0.143 0.056 0.79 0.371
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Maryland 0.304 14.3 2.993 4.1 −3.518 4.8 0.343 0.033 1.00 0.278
Massachusetts 0.676 28.3 0.764 1.1 −4.567 6.8 0.716 0.049 0.64 0.470
Michigan 0.428 27.8 1.992 5.8 −3.270 9.8 0.738 0.034 1.30 0.335
Minnesota 0.362 14.5 1.880 2.1 −2.306 2.6 0.111 0.041 1.14 0.344
Mississippi 0.199 10.5 2.473 4.5 −2.296 4.2 0.314 0.035 1.04 0.212
Missouri 0.417 16.3 2.195 2.7 −4.208 5.3 0.479 0.044 1.47 0.311
Montana 0.354 10.2 −1.305 1.2 0.292 0.3 0.045 0.045 0.55 0.294
Nebraska 0.241 11.5 1.525 1.7 −0.267 0.3 0.078 0.035 1.15 0.284
Nevada 0.410 10.7 1.729 1.8 −2.334 2.4 0.091 0.058 0.58 0.373
New Hampshire 0.257 6.3 4.984 3.2 −5.136 3.4 0.202 0.089 0.92 0.254
New Jersey 0.640 18.6 0.641 0.7 −3.397 3.6 0.405 0.062 0.44 0.477
New Mexico 0.275 10.7 1.076 1.7 −2.010 3.0 0.188 0.033 1.06 0.213
New York 0.534 13.8 1.432 1.4 −3.633 3.6 0.321 0.061 0.43 0.396
North Carolina 0.222 8.4 3.278 5.2 −2.326 3.7 0.386 0.044 0.93 0.271
North Dakota 0.213 4.4 1.732 0.9 0.586 0.3 0.050 0.060 0.35 0.308
Ohio 0.244 13.2 2.778 5.9 −2.580 5.6 0.463 0.037 0.92 0.258
Oklahoma 0.267 8.8 1.289 1.5 −2.333 2.8 0.138 0.049 0.92 0.215
Oregon 0.459 15.0 1.058 1.5 −2.369 3.5 0.266 0.046 0.77 0.369
Pennsylvania 0.480 16.5 2.645 3.0 −3.306 3.8 0.245 0.053 0.34 0.441
Rhode Island 0.665 16.2 −0.902 1.0 −1.755 1.9 0.261 0.081 0.48 0.510
South Carolina 0.213 6.6 3.309 4.7 −2.745 3.9 0.338 0.048 1.51 0.247
South Dakota 0.191 6.1 2.342 1.5 −2.874 1.9 0.036 0.043 0.40 0.173
(continued)
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Table 4A.1  (continued)
State Constant t TUR T TURlag T Adj. R2 Std. Err. D.W. Mean
Tennessee 0.367 15.9 2.169 3.3 −3.414 5.3 0.427 0.045 1.20 0.296
Texas 0.105 5.0 2.287 3.6 −1.046 1.6 0.295 0.031 0.64 0.175
Utah 0.164 5.4 2.367 2.7 −0.719 0.8 0.204 0.047 0.47 0.247
Vermont 0.484 22.6 1.320 1.8 −2.226 3.0 0.184 0.040 0.86 0.441
Virginia 0.152 5.1 2.875 2.6 −2.275 2.0 0.103 0.048 0.53 0.178
Washington 0.440 11.7 1.768 2.2 −2.655 3.2 0.186 0.058 0.57 0.377
West Virginia 0.336 12.5 1.495 2.3 −2.240 3.4 0.229 0.055 0.35 0.273
Wisconsin 0.482 14.2 1.509 1.4 −3.035 2.8 0.179 0.067 0.42 0.405
Wyoming 0.180 5.2 4.940 4.1 −3.445 2.8 0.285 0.060 0.53 0.250
U.S. average 0.344 12.1 1.967 2.6 −2.452 3.1 0.245 0.051 0.80 0.313
The regressions generally have low Durbin Watson statistics, indicating a high degree of positive serial correlation in the residuals. The final 
column shows the mean WKTU ratio for each state. The average recipiency rate was 0.313, but it varied widely across the 51 programs. Eight 
means exceed 0.400, and five fall below 0.200.
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Appendix Note
 1. State level estimates of unemployment rates are incomplete from 1967 
to 1975, particularly for 1967 to 1969. Estimates have more complete 
geographic coverage starting in 1970. For years prior to 1976, there are 
divisional estimates of unemployment, and these have been used to con-
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The federal-state unemployment insurance (UI) system was estab-
lished under provisions in the Social Security Act of 1935. The last 
set of comprehensive system reforms addressing both benefits and 
financing was enacted in 1976. The labor market has undergone dra-
matic changes in the intervening 40 years, and the UI system has 
not kept pace. There have been major declines in the shares of total 
employment in manufacturing, union members in the labor force, and 
full-time work as a share of all work, while there have been large 
increases in employment in the services, occupational licensing, 
and part-time and temporary work. Some federal UI statutory provi-
sions that worked in an earlier time have not aged well. This chapter 
reviews UI policy reforms suggested by research evidence in the con-
text of current labor market conditions. We examine the adequacy of 
benefit amounts, durations, and access for experienced workers who 
become unemployed through no fault of their own. We also consider 
the sufficiency of funding rules to support adequate income replace-
ment. In this context, it must be noted that the federal UI taxable wage 
base has not been increased from $7,000 since 1983, and tax rates 
have eroded with the declining effectiveness of the experience-rated 
tax rate system. This chapter takes a fresh look at the UI research and 
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policy issues covered in our earlier work, Unemployment Insurance 
in the United States: Analysis of Policy Issues (O’Leary and Wandner 
1997). 
The chapter starts with a research-informed review of policy 
issues, followed by a presentation of a comprehensive package of sug-
gested UI reforms. Our core proposals aim to renew the social insur-
ance principles upon which the UI system was based, programmatic 
incentives, and the financing structure underpinning UI so that it can 
serve workers and employers over the long term. We also recommend 
updating the program to accommodate the realities facing American 
workers in twenty-first century labor markets. An essential element 
of assuring long-term stability of the system involves balancing UI 
benefits and taxes over time, while also establishing a countercycli-
cal financing structure based on forward funding. Our recommenda-
tions reflect the principle of shared responsibilities of all partners in 
the system. In particular, we address benefit eligibility, regular and 
extended benefits, benefit financing, administrative financing, reem-
ployment services, and employment incentives. 
On the benefit payment side, adequate benefits should be paid to 
eligible workers who are unemployed through no fault of their own. 
Eligibility should be offered to bona fide labor force members invol-
untarily separated from work, who are engaged in an active search 
for reemployment. Benefits levels should provide socially adequate 
income replacement that does not introduce excessive disincentives 
for reemployment. Benefit durations should accommodate an ener-
getic and exhaustive search for new work with sufficient reemploy-
ment supports. 
Sufficient benefit standards will increase costs for regular UI ben-
efits in some states. As a balance, we propose that the federal gov-
ernment should partially offset increased state costs by taking full 
responsibility for financing an improved permanent Extended Benefit 
(EB) program. Reflecting the increased risk of long-term unemploy-
ment in the U.S. economy today, experience-rated employer financ-
ing should be limited to the regular benefit program, with the Federal 
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Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) levy covering the full cost of EB 
during high unemployment periods. It is appropriate that any future 
temporary emergency unemployment compensation continue to 
be funded from federal general revenues. We also discuss effective 
mechanisms for improved experience rating and forward funding of 
benefits together with a strengthened emphasis on reemployment of 
beneficiaries. We restrict the scope of our recommendations to the 
UI program and its extensions and do not consider any means-tested 
unemployment assistance programs of the type recently proposed 
(e.g., West et al. 2016).
BENEFIT PAYMENTS
Federal UI law leaves it to the states to make their own statu-
tory determination about eligibility, benefit levels, and duration of the 
basic “regular UI” program. Federal law is mostly silent about ben-
efit provisions. The federal government occasionally has responded, 
however, to perceived misuse of state UI programs, placing restric-
tions on benefit receipt by groups, such as professional athletes, 
school employees, and individuals collecting pensions. 
Eligibility
Monetary eligibility requirements are relatively modest in most 
states for experienced workers who work full time and full year. UI 
claimants generally have to have had minimum earnings in their “base 
period”—the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters—
before they became unemployed and have had earnings in more than 
one quarter. Prior earnings by UI applicants are considered evidence 
of labor force attachment, as well as an indication that tax contribu-
tions have been made to the system by prior employers to finance the 
benefit system. Most states consider only prior earnings for eligibility, 
but some states also consider prior hours worked. An eligibility rule 
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based on earnings is easiest to apply. Most states have a high quarter 
earnings requirement and an earnings dispersion requirement. That 
is, at least one quarter in the base period must have earnings above a 
minimum level, and a sufficient amount of earnings must be outside 
the high earnings calendar quarter. Some states require no more than 
about $1,000 in the high quarter of the base period and at least $500 
in the second highest quarter.
Monetary eligibility is harder to achieve by workers who are 
recent entrants to the labor force or who are low-wage or part-time 
workers. Recent entrants to the labor force may not have sufficient 
wages to qualify for UI because their base period lags, and they would 
qualify only if their most recent earnings were used to determine if 
they are monetarily eligible. A number of individual states dealt with 
this issue by introducing an alternate base period (ABP), which uses 
all earnings in the four most recently completed calendar quarters. 
As participation in the labor force has changed over time, more 
people work part time. States have generally required unemployed 
workers to search for full-time work to qualify for UI. This restriction 
particularly affects older workers.
In February 2009, Congress enacted the American Recovery and 
Reemployment Act (ARRA) that included UI Modernization provi-
sions that provided states with financial incentives to change provi-
sions of their state UI laws in ways that would increase participa-
tion in the UI program. A $7 billion incentive fund was established, 
with each state’s grant amount set in proportion to the state share of 
national unemployment. States were paid one-third of their allocation 
for having an ABP for monetary determination of UI eligibility that 
includes the most recently completed calendar quarter. States were 
paid the remaining two-thirds of their allocation for having two of 
the following four additional program features: 1) UI eligibility while 
seeking only part-time work, 2) UI eligibility after job separations 
due to harassment or compelling family reasons, 3) continuation of 
UI benefits for at least 26 additional weeks after exhaustion of regular 
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benefits while in approved training, and 4) dependents’ allowances of 
at least $15 per dependent up to $50 (O’Leary 2011). 
The UI Modernization effort was successful at more than dou-
bling the number of states with ABPs from 19 to 41 and increasing 
the number of states adopting part-time work provisions from 6 to 28. 
Because states did not commit to permanently maintaining their UI 
Modernization provisions, one state later rescinded its ABP provision, 
and two states removed their part-time work provisions (Table 5.1).
Nonmonetary eligibility conditions cover both job separation 
and continuing eligibility. Rules require that the job separation must 
be involuntary, that is, not resulting from a voluntary quit, discharge 
for misconduct, or other causes justifiable by an employer. A notable 
exception has been earlier state legislation and a federal option for 
states in the UI Modernization incentives section of the ARRA of 
2009. That exception resulted in a total of 21 states permitting ini-
tial nonmonetary eligibility when leaving a job for compelling family 
reasons.1 For benefit eligibility to continue for each weekly claim, 
the UI claimant must be able, available, and actively seeking full-
time work. Furthermore, to satisfy both the initial and continuing 
non-monetary eligibility rules, beneficiaries may not refuse an offer 
of suitable work, including any bona fide job offer resulting from an 
Employment Service (ES) job referral. 
Table 5.1  Unemployment Insurance Modernization: States with 
Provisions before and after ARRA
UI Modernization provisions
Number of states  
with provisions  
before ARRA
Number of states  
with provisions  
as of 7/1/2016
Alternative base period 19 40
Part-time work  6 26
Compelling family reasons  0 20
Dependents allowance  4  6
Training extension  0 13
SOURCE: www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#modern and updates 
from Suzanne Simonetta, USDOL, September 2016.
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High levels of state UI borrowing during the double-dip reces-
sion in the early 1980s led to tightening of eligibility requirements, 
and a falling share of unemployed persons who were insured receiv-
ing UI benefits (Burtless 1983).2 A common measure of UI recipiency 
is the ratio of the insured unemployment rate (IUR) to the total unem-
ployment rate (TUR). Figure 5.1 shows that this ratio declined from 
around 60 percent prior to 1980 to about 40 percent through the most 
recent recession. Since then, the recipiency rate has fallen to about 30 
percent nationwide, and several states now have recipiency rates far 
below 30 percent. A new dimension of the recent drop in recipiency 
results from reductions from the normal maximum potential dura-
tion of 26 weeks of regular UI benefits to shorter potential durations 
in eight states (see Chapter 4). Reasonable duration provisions are 
discussed below, but state eligibility rules and the fairness of their 
enforcement also are relevant. 
State policy and procedures have a substantial effect on UI receipt. 
It is possible that new automated systems for accepting UI applica-
tions and for qualifying continued claims are depressing recipiency 
rates. In fact, the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), Civil Rights 
Center, filed an initial determination supporting Florida complainants 
suing the Department of Economic Opportunity for discrimination 
because of the imposition of access and language barriers to the suc-
cessful filing of initial and continuing UI claims for benefits (USDOL 
2013). The 2015 IUR/TUR ratio in Florida was 0.148, one of the low-
est in the United States. Florida law requires Internet-only applications 
for benefits, its UI application call centers have been closed, and UI 
is no longer a required partner in local One-Stop employment centers. 
In 1976, the federal government enacted retirement income off-
set provisions, two decades before the surge in labor force participa-
tion by older workers in the mid-1990s. The legislation reflected the 
expectation that older workers were likely to retire and would not 
really be looking for new employment. Today, however, older work-
ers are the only U.S. demographic group with a continued increasing 
labor force participation rate, and public policymakers are looking for 
Unemployment Insurance Reform   137
ways to continue this upward trend. Although states have discretion 
in applying the federal retirement offset provisions, they continue to 
work at cross purposes to the policy of encouraging older workers to 
stay in the labor force (Agbayani et al. 2016).
Suitable work provisions in state laws generally allow UI claim-
ants to search for work in their customary occupation at their custom-
ary wage. With the increasing severity of worker dislocation and the 
upward trend in the duration of unemployment, however, the likeli-
hood of returning to a customary occupation at the prior wage has 
been decreasing. 
Recommendations
Eligibility provisions should encourage unemployed workers to 
remain in the labor force and increase future employment and earn-
ings in the economy. Six recommendations are discussed below.
Figure 5.1  Ratio of IUR to TUR (Recipiency Rate) in the United States 
and among Normal and Shorter Potential UI Duration 
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Initial eligibility. Initial eligibility requirements should require 
moderate earnings in more than one-quarter of UI claimants’ ben-
efit year. For example, some states require that earnings in the high 
quarter of the base period should be at least $1,000, and earnings in 
the second highest earning base period quarter must be at least $500. 
Alternative base period. Applicants for UI must demonstrate 
attachment to the labor force by demonstrating monetary eligibility, 
that is, evidence of sufficient recent earnings. The standard base pe-
riod  (SBP) for determining UI monetary eligibility is the first four of 
the previous five calendar quarters completed before application for 
benefits. For UI applicants who are not eligible based on the SBP, all 
states should apply a more recent ABP, which should be the four most 
recently completed calendar quarters. The ABP broadens eligibility to 
include a group of UI applicants who have earned sufficient UI earn-
ings but are excluded simply by the timing of their application. The 
UI Modernization provisions of the 2009 federal economic stimulus 
bill, the ARRA, provided financial incentives for states to adopt an 
ABP (Table 5.1; GAO 2007). The ABP has been estimated to have a 
relatively low cost, at about 1.2 percent of regular benefit payments 
(O’Leary 2011). 
Part-time work provisions. All states should allow workers to 
collect UI while seeking part-time work if their base period earnings 
were from part-time work. Similar to the ABP, adoption of a part-
time job search rule would broaden eligibility to a significant group of 
American workers who have earned entitlement through labor force 
participation and earnings. This provision is estimated to have a cost 
on par with that of the ABP, at about 1.2 percent of regular benefits 
(O’Leary 2011). It also should be noted that part-time workers often 
hold multiple jobs for which UI taxes may be payable on their full 
wage base for each job. As a result, it is possible that the tax contribu-
tions for these workers actually exceed those for full-time job holders 
with much higher wages and salaries. Without this reform, many part-
time workers will continue to shoulder a disproportionate share of 
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UI benefit financing without enjoying the benefits of income security 
available through the program. 
Retirement income offset. The UI benefit offset for retirement 
income should be repealed, given the great increase in the labor force 
participation rate of older workers. There should be no benefit re-
duction for receipt of payments from defined benefit pensions or for 
withdrawals from defined contribution pension accounts (e.g., 401k, 
403b, IRA, Roth, and Keogh plans) for beneficiaries age 59.5 years 
or older, regardless of who made the original deposits to the defined 
contribution plan. UI applicants who have been involuntarily sepa-
rated from their jobs through no fault of their own and are actively 
seeking return to work should not be denied benefits or have their 
benefit levels reduced because they are entitled to draw benefits from 
another source. Benefits from UI are an earned entitlement to be paid 
with regard to job separations, not a means-tested income transfer. 
Suitable work. Refusal of suitable work requirements in state UI 
statutes should specify a schedule for the acceptable wage by which 
the adequate replacement rate of prior earnings declines as the dura-
tion of unemployment rises. Unemployment caused by involuntary 
separations from employers is beyond the control of the worker. Un-
der UI benefit provisions, jobless workers are expected to seek return 
to alternate comparable employment as soon as possible. The wage 
rate on a particular job is normally determined by market forces in 
the occupation and individual factors associated with unique features 
associated with the employer, the job, and the workers. It is not unrea-
sonable to expect full wage replacement at the start of job search, but 
it is important to recognize that unique skills associated with a partic-
ular employer or job may be worth less in new employment settings. 
It is reasonable to lower wage demands below prior earning levels af-
ter an initial period of search that yields no offers at the old wage rate, 
because of the loss in value of firm-specific skills. Prolonged unem-
ployment could indicate a decline in job demand for the prior occupa-
tion. Naturally, vigorous in-person reemployment and job placement 
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services should be available to all UI beneficiaries from the time they 
first apply for benefits. The possibility of job training, particularly in 
incremental job skills that are in demand, also should be available. 
Nine states currently have nonmonetary eligibility rules that 
change the definition of suitable work during the benefit year.3 For 
example, in Montana, suitable work after 13 weeks of benefit receipt 
is a job that pays 75 percent of the prior wage. Of course, no unrea-
sonably low wage levels are acceptable under any circumstances, but 
the realities of the job market should inform reemployment efforts.
Employment service staffing levels. An active work search is 
expected of all UI beneficiaries, and efforts should be undertaken by 
the state agency to ensure this is the case. These include conducting 
the UI work test, the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
(WPRS) system procedures, and eligibility review procedures (ERPs) 
or reemployment and eligibility assessments (REAs). Based on past 
experimental evaluations, there are a combination of eligibility review 
procedures and reemployment services that should be used, for exam-
ple, as under the recently implemented Reemployment Services and 
Eligibility Assessment (RESEA) program. Key to undertaking these 
efforts is a vital and active public ES funded through the Wagner- 
Peyser Act by the FUTA tax. 
Improved job search technologies are available through the Inter-
net, but economies gained through these systems have not replaced 
the professional human resources lost by ES since the 1980s. A fully 
competent and professionally staffed ES is essential to providing 
effective reemployment services for all UI recipients, yet total staff-
ing levels in ES service delivery has declined steadily over the past 30 
years. One reflection of the decline in the availability of ES services 
is the decline in the number of local offices in which reemployment 
services are provided. As of May 2018, there were 1,478 full service 
One-Stop centers and 973 affiliate offices.4 ES should be a full part-
ner in every One-Stop center with staffing of at least four full-time 
persons.
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Funding for ES staffing should be restored to the real 1984 level. 
Funding was $740 million in 1984 and has fallen to only $644 million 
in 2016—or about 45 percent of the 1984 level in real terms. To reach 
full ES funding, the budget should have been $1.5 billion in 2017 or 
$856 million above the 2016 level (see Chapter 3 by Balducchi and 
O’Leary). Since ES is funded through Wagner-Peyser by the FUTA 
tax, reform of the FUTA wage base would support improved ES fund-
ing. The UI program should be restored as an on-site partner in One-
Stop centers, with ES administering an active UI work test and UI 
eligibility assessments. Furthermore, every state should have a central 
office administrative unit with at least 10 full-time staff for program 
administration, including program management and program evalu-
ation. This central office unit would support a number of functions, 
including monitoring work-test enforcement, supporting reemploy-
ment services, and WPRS development and management. To support 
these and other uses of FUTA tax revenue, the FUTA wage base and 
tax rate should be sufficient to accommodate ongoing financing of 
both 15,000 ES staff and UI administration. 
Regular Benefits: Levels and Durations
The setting of both levels and durations of UI benefits has been 
affected by the fact that UI beneficiaries respond in their labor sup-
ply behavior to the availability, level, and duration of UI benefits. 
Economists have made several efforts to measure the size of these 
“disincentive effects.” 
Public policy to change the UI program benefit structure should 
take disincentive effects into consideration. Decker notes, however, 
that even though researchers have found UI work disincentive effects, 
they have not reached consensus on the size and importance of these 
effects (Decker 1997, pp. 295–298). Woodbury and Rubin (1997, 
pp. 272–273) have a more definitive assessment in their review of the 
literature. They note that research on benefit adequacy and consump-
tion smoothing suggests that UI recipients are overcompensated in 
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the short run and undercompensated in the long run, pointing toward 
variable replacement rates as a possible improvement in the system. 
They also report on evidence that shows increasing the potential dura-
tion of UI benefits by one-week results in an increase in unemploy-
ment benefit duration of one day or less, and that this small response 
suggests that the average UI recipient is not abusing the system. 
Benefit levels
The U.S. UI system is based on a consensus that the program 
should replace approximately one-half of lost wages. This level was 
not determined empirically. Rather, it was set low enough to encour-
age workers to search for work quickly and by taking into consider-
ation that unemployed workers would not have expenses that they 
would incur when they were working. Nonetheless, USDOL spon-
sored a number of benefit adequacy studies in the 1950s. Early analy-
sis of benefit adequacy revealed that benefits would be adequate if 
they equaled half or more of wages, prevented “too much” hardship, 
kept beneficiaries from collecting welfare benefits, and would cover 
“non-deferrable expenditures” (Haber and Murray 1966).
More recently, economists have tried to determine how benefit 
rules for the UI program should be structured. One line of inquiry has 
aimed to determine the optimal level of benefits to balance program 
goals for income replacement against work disincentives. Economists 
have agreed that UI benefits should replace considerably less than all 
lost income, because of work disincentives and the fact that added 
leisure time is valuable. However, there still is no agreement on the 
optimum wage replacement rate. Estimates have ranged from 20 to 65 
percent, with rates depending on assumptions about adequate levels 
of precautionary savings and forced borrowing by workers (Nichol-
son and Needels 2006, pp. 55–58).
Practical considerations require that there be a maximum benefit 
level governed by social adequacy considerations. High wage work-
ers (e.g., earning $5,000 a week) are not going to get weekly benefit 
amounts of $2,500. States set the maximum benefit amount either as a 
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fixed amount that must be adjusted periodically by the state legislature 
or an amount that automatically increases over time, generally tied to 
the state average weekly wage (AWW) in UI-covered employment. 
The federal Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation rec-
ommended a benefit standard such that the maximum benefit level 
would be indexed to two-thirds of a state’s average weekly wage in 
UI-covered employment (ACUC 1996, p. 242). No such standard has 
been enacted, and most states would not meet the proposed standard.
Duration of benefits
When states first paid UI benefits under the Social Security Act in 
1938, weekly benefit amounts were small, and durations were short 
because the program was new and actuarial estimates were uncertain 
as the Great Depression continued. 
Fortunately, the actuarial estimates of the mid-1930s were overly 
pessimistic. The potential entitled duration of UI increased steadily 
among states from the program origins in the 1930s through the late 
1950s (O’Leary 2013). After World War II, states found that they 
could afford to pay more benefits, and by the mid-1970s, an “Ameri-
can consensus” had emerged (O’Leary and Wandner 1997). All states 
paid at least 26 weeks of regular UI benefits to experienced work-
ers who were unemployed through no fault of their own. Eligibil-
ity conditions varied by state, but states paid UI in the amount of 
approximately half of a worker’s prior wage up to a maximum benefit 
amount to workers who were actively seeking reemployment. Benefit 
payment provision generosity varied by state and by region. 
By 2010, all states had provided potential UI durations of at least 
26 weeks for more than 50 years.5 In response to the Great Reces-
sion, starting in December 2010, however, the American consensus 
broke down. A substantial minority of states have raised eligibility 
standards and lowered potential durations to less than 26 weeks. The 
eight states that cut maximum potential durations were primarily 
motivated by the heavy levels of UI debt that they had incurred during 
the Great Recession.6 The new state legislation was designed to cut 
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future UI costs, not because there was agreement that paying benefits 
for a shorter duration would be sufficient for workers to search for and 
find employment. 
During normal economic conditions, most transitions to new 
jobs, after involuntary job loss, occur within 13 weeks, and almost all 
transitions happen within 26 weeks. The high exhaustion rates of UI 
benefit entitlements during and after the long and deep Great Reces-
sion led to historically high average durations of benefit receipt and 
caused massive state borrowing to pay regular UI benefits. Thirty-six 
of 53 state UI programs needed loans to pay regular UI benefits dur-
ing the Great Recession. At the end of 2010, the system was $29 bil-
lion in debt. The federal unemployment trust fund reached a modest 
$2 billion net surplus at the end of 2013, but as of January 2016, 10 
states still had outstanding private market loans or bond debts, declin-
ing to 5 states by January 2018.7 The eight states that cut potential 
durations improved their reserve positions faster than they otherwise 
would have, but the reductions in potential durations in these states 
have eroded the fundamental intent of UI to provide temporary partial 
wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers. The shorter 
limits on potential durations could curtail productive job search and 
result in inferior job matches, resulting in lower productivity and 
states failing to fully benefit from the talents of their citizens. 
Recommendations
Benefit levels. Consistent with earlier proposals for benefit level 
standards, states should pay benefits that replace 50 percent of lost 
wages up to a maximum set at two-thirds of the state AWW in UI-
covered employment. Having a maximum of two-thirds of the AWW 
will ensure that approximately 80 percent of beneficiaries will receive 
at least one-half wage replacement while receiving regular UI bene-
fits. This standard was most recently endorsed by the Advisory Coun-
cil on Unemployment Compensation (1996). However, no standard 
for the weekly benefit amount has ever been set in federal statute as a 
state conformity requirement (Blaustein 1993, pp. 211–212, p. 241). 
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Several strands of research support the 50 percent wage replace-
ment standard as the proper balance of adequate wage replacement 
while avoiding excessive work disincentives. For example, literature 
on household expenditures, consumption smoothing, optimal UI, 
compensating wage differentials, and consumer choice theory all sup-
port 50 percent wage replacement (O’Leary 1998, pp. 65–75).8 
Duration. States should provide adequate regular weekly UI 
benefit payments for at least 26 weeks through employer financing. 
Eligibility provisions should accommodate modern workforce pat-
terns including increased part-time work and sharply increased rates 
of labor force participation by older workers. Benefit provisions also 
should accommodate labor market realities, particularly for persons 
in part-time, low wage, and low skill jobs.
Permanent Extended Benefits and Temporary  
Emergency Compensation
The basic 26-week regular UI program can be considered ade-
quate in periods of low unemployment. Starting in the 1950s, how-
ever, Congress found regular UI to be inadequate when unemployment 
rises and more workers exhaust their entitlement benefits. Congress 
reacted in 1958 and 1961 by enacting emergency EB programs to 
fill a temporary need for additional UI benefits during a recession. In 
1970, Congress enacted a permanent EB program designed to elimi-
nate the need for temporary extensions. The EB program set triggers 
for payments based on the level of unemployment, and the benefits 
were equally financed by the state and federal governments. Unfor-
tunately, the EB program has not actively functioned as originally 
intended for the past 40 years.
Originally, the EB program was a good example of federal-state 
cooperation.9 However, for many years, because of low UI recipiency 
rates, the triggers based on insured unemployment rarely activated 
EB as total unemployment rose (Nicholson and Needels 2006). Under 
the original 1970 law, EB could be activated by a national trigger 
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affecting all states or a state-level trigger affecting EB only in that 
particular state. In the early 1980s, cost-cutting federal legislation 
eliminated the national trigger, and the state trigger threshold was 
raised from 4.0 to 5.0 percent insured unemployment rate (Woodbury 
and Rubin 1997). Additionally, increasing eligibility requirements in 
some states resulted in low UI recipiency rates and low IURs that 
failed to trigger EB even when the TUR had risen quite high (Blank 
and Card 1991). In response to this failure in more than a few states 
during the early 1990s recession, Congress enacted legislation in July 
1992 allowing states to adopt an alternative trigger based on TUR as 
estimated by the Current Population Survey. 
In the 1990s and 2000s, emergency federal UI extensions were 
structured to be paid before any EB that might be available. The 
ARRA of 2009 provided temporary 100 percent federal reimburse-
ment of EB payments for states that adopted alternative EB trig-
gers based on the TUR. The 100 percent EB payment was continued 
through December 31, 2013, in states with conforming TUR triggers. 
During the Great Recession, EB became effective in all states that 
adopted TUR triggers, but a survey of states revealed that almost all 
TUR adopters said they would return to IUR triggers after the 100 
percent federal funding ended (Mastri et al. 2016). 
Despite the fact that EB is a permanent program with a statu-
tory basis, Congress has enacted additional emergency programs in 
response to all six economic recessions since 1971. These discretion-
ary emergency extensions were similar to Congressional actions in 
1958 and 1961 and were preferred by states over EB, because all were 
fully federally funded. Both the EB and the emergency extensions 
lengthened the potential duration of benefits, but until 2009 the total 
was never greater than 72 weeks and was frequently not greater than 
52 weeks. 
Just as the Great Recession was unprecedented in it severity, 
the extension durations also were unprecedented. During the Great 
Recession, the combination of the three UI programs yielded a maxi-
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mum potential duration of benefits that reached 99 weeks in some 
states from early 2009 through late 2012 (USDOL n. d.).
Research
Research evidence suggests that the EB system should be revised. 
IUR triggers operated effectively for a brief period in the early 1970s, 
but given the low UI recipiency rates nationwide, IUR triggers are 
no longer responsive to surges in unemployment. Even though Con-
gress enacted an optional TUR trigger, not all states have adopted or 
retained it because states pay for half the EB costs, thus increasing 
state UI expenditures.
Because maximum potential UI durations were raised to as high 
as 99 weeks during and after the Great Recession, some policy ana-
lysts and politicians have raised old concerns about the moral haz-
ard effect of UI benefits unnecessarily prolonging unemployment 
(Decker 1997). That is, UI benefits act as a disincentive to return to 
work. Although good estimates of the magnitude of this effect have 
been known for many years, concern about it was magnified by the 
unprecedented increase in the potential duration of UI benefits during 
the Great Recession.
Estimates of the labor supply disincentive effects suggest that 
reduced job search efforts by UI recipients may have contributed to an 
increase in the unemployment rate.10 The estimated effects of the UI 
expansions on the unemployment rate, however, are somewhat mod-
est, ranging from 0.3 percentage point of the 5.5 percentage-point 
recessionary increase in the unemployment rate (Rothstein 2012) to 
approximately 1 percentage point (Mazumder 2011). Another study 
(Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin 2010) essentially split the difference, sug-
gesting that the 2008 emergency unemployment benefits program 
increased the unemployment rate by approximately 0.7 percentage 
point.
It is important to distinguish between UI’s effect on the unem-
ployment rate and its effects on unemployment and economic activity. 
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For example, part of the rise in the unemployment rate is caused by 
the increased labor force participation of UI recipients. Without UI 
benefits, some jobless workers would have stopped looking for work 
and thus would not have been counted as unemployed. Katz (2010) 
cites a number of positive offsetting impacts of the UI program, 
including consumption smoothing effects for unemployed workers, 
spillover effects of shorter spells of unemployment for workers not 
receiving UI benefits, the macroeconomic stimulation of the econ-
omy from expenditures made with UI benefits, and long-term posi-
tive impacts of UI by keeping workers in the labor force rather than 
encouraging them to leave.
The UI program had a significant macroeconomic effect on the 
U.S. economy during the Great Recession. The increase in UI benefit 
payments during the recession represented a significant portion of the 
economic stimulus provided by the ARRA and other UI extensions. 
The Congressional Budget Office (2012) estimated that each dollar 
spent on extended UI benefits generated $1.90 in increased economic 
activity. Burtless and Gordon (2011) state that UI is a particularly 
effective form of targeting economic stimulus funds for both equity 
and practical reasons. The equity argument is that unemployed work-
ers suffer the biggest income loss, while the practical argument relates 
to effectiveness, since these individuals are more likely to spend and 
spend quickly. Burtless and Gordon also point out that even though 
potential UI benefit durations reached unprecedented levels during 
the recession, the United States normally is at the bottom of the list 
of industrial nations with respect to UI duration. Even at 99 weeks, 
the U.S. potential duration was approximately equal to that of Spain, 
Portugal, Norway, Finland, and France, and below Australia, New 
Zealand, and Belgium. 
Recommendations
During the Great Recession, the federal government agreed to 
pay the full cost of EB initiated and ended by a TUR trigger. This 
practice should be a permanent feature of the federal-state UI system, 
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but it should be conditional upon states providing adequate amounts 
and durations of regular UI benefits. Making the federal partner per-
manently responsible for the cost of EB should establish a quid pro 
quo with the states responsible for paying the full cost of up to 26 
weeks of regular UI benefits, that is, enacting federal UI benefit stan-
dards.11 The EB program would then be fully funded by the federal 
share of revenues from the FUTA tax. The EB program is currently 50 
percent financed by states, with the federal partner paying the other 
half with revenues from the federal share of FUTA taxes. The result 
of changing the EB program in this manner would be the provision of 
more adequate UI benefits in good and bad economic times, without 
unduly burdening state financial resources.
Permanent EB, with federal financing from FUTA, should pro-
vide benefits of up to an additional 52 weeks to provide adequate ben-
efits during periods of high unemployment. The maximum available 
duration should vary, depending on the severity of unemployment in 
a state. Under the current formula for a state to be EB eligible, there is 
both an IUR trigger level and a duration stipulation requiring unem-
ployment to be at least 120 percent of the level 12 months earlier, with 
an optional TUR trigger that has not been adopted by many states. 
Future state triggers should be based on a state’s TUR because the 
IUR triggers have proven ineffective. Under the 2009 ARRA, states 
had the option to switch from an IUR to a TUR trigger. We propose 
a simple TUR trigger with the following schedule of EB durations:
• 7 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 6.5 percent, 
• 13 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 7 percent,
• 26 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 8 percent,
• 39 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 9 percent, and
• 52 weeks EB are available when TUR reaches 10 percent.
States that have objected to a TUR trigger in the past when they 
have paid part of EB costs should have no objections to such a trigger 
mechanism once the costs are fully federally financed.
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Naturally, the creation of an improved EB program would not 
inhibit the right of Congress and the President to provide emergency 
extended unemployment compensation in times of severe labor mar-
ket surplus. However, in times of normal labor markets, 26 weeks 
of regular UI benefits, when accompanied by vigorous provision of 
ES reemployment services, will accommodate successful job search 
by the majority of UI beneficiaries. In times of high unemployment, 
the EB program will support extended job search, with the length 
of support increasing with the severity of labor market conditions. 
Finally, when economic conditions are extremely severe and wide-
spread, Congress and the President may act on an emergency basis to 
supplement the regular and EB programs. This approach would pro-
vide more timely provision of adequate durations of UI benefits when 
recessions occur, since the current system depends on Congressional 
action that often lags behind the deterioration of economic conditions. 
BENEFIT FINANCING
Most economic research on UI financing has concerned the effect 
of experience-rated UI tax rates on employment stability. Woodbury 
(2014) summarized research results that suggest experience rating 
encourages employment stability when tax rates are responsive to 
benefit charges. However, the evidence indicates that employers at 
tax rate maximums are not induced to avoid layoffs and instead have 
their benefit costs subsidized by employers with stable employment. 
Experience rating in setting UI tax rates is a feature unique to the 
American UI system; it was essential in establishing the system and 
is unlikely to be eliminated, but it can be improved. A more pressing 
issue in UI finance is the failure of the system to adequately forward 
fund benefit reserves in anticipation of recessions. This failure has 
compromised the fundamental mission of the system to provide ade-
quate income replacement to the involuntarily unemployed.
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The original intent of the UI financing provisions in the Social 
Security Act and FUTA was that state UI programs should be self-
financing in good times and bad. States were to forward fund ben-
efits by generating positive net system revenues in times of economic 
expansion to provide sufficient reserves for paying benefits in years 
of high unemployment. Forward funding is countercyclical, while 
the alternative of raising taxes to pay for benefits in the depth of a 
recession is pro-cyclical, driving the economy into a lower level of 
economic activity. 
Each state was expected to have a range of tax schedules from 
which they could select each year, depending on the reserve balance 
in the state unemployment trust fund account. A higher tax sched-
ule would be selected in years when system reserves were low rela-
tive to expected future needs. By experience rating, the tax rates in 
each schedule were to vary directly with each employer’s UI benefit 
charge experience—usually measured by either a reserve history ratio 
to payrolls or a benefit charge ratio to payrolls. The UI taxable wage 
bases (TWBs) in states and for the FUTA were to be sufficient to raise 
adequate resources for the states and federal UI accounts. Many of 
these expectations are currently not being met by existing state UI 
tax systems because of policy decisions at both the state and federal 
levels that affect both the TWB and the structure and application of 
tax rate schedule alternatives. 
Reserves generated by the FUTA tax are kept in federal Unem-
ployment Trust Fund (UTF) accounts at the U.S. Treasury to pay 
for state and federal UI program administration, loans to states that 
become insolvent paying regular benefits, extended benefits, and 
employment services through the Wagner-Peyser program. The FUTA 
tax rate is applied to the federal UI TWB to fund the federal unem-
ployment accounts. The FUTA tax base is also the minimum TWB 
that states can set to pay for regular state UI benefits. The UI TWB 
was originally set at the same level as that for the Social Security 
TWB for public pensions. The Social Security TWB became indexed 
in 1972 and has increased steadily to $128,400 in 2018, or about 18 
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times the size of the FUTA TWB, which is not indexed and has only 
increased three times, with the last increase effective in 1983. At only 
$7,000, the FUTA TWB is less than half the annualized federal mini-
mum wage, essentially making it a flat tax per employee. It is inad-
equate to generate sufficient revenues for federal and state use. States 
can set their TWB at any level at or above $7,000. Most states keep 
their tax bases relatively low—more than half have TWBs of less than 
double the FUTA level. Those with tax bases of more than double the 
FUTA level are much more likely to avoid debt problems in periods 
of high unemployment (Vroman 2016).
Low TWBs also might depress hiring in the low wage labor 
markets. In many states, employers face the same UI tax bill for one 
worker paid $10,000 in a year and another paid $90,000 in that same 
year. Whereas the latter might provide a living wage, the former 
worker might be a multiple job holder earning $10,000 at each of two 
jobs. Each employer pays UI taxes on the full TWB every year, and 
that amount is paid multiple times on behalf of multiple job holders.12 
This discourages adding low-wage workers against the alternative of 
expanding hours for higher wage workers.
Having adequate levels of UI reserves to weather recessions 
depends upon raising enough revenue over the business cycle. States 
have multiple tax schedules, and state laws usually specify movement 
to a higher tax schedule that raises more revenue when state reserve 
balances are low. However, state legislatures often override their UI 
statutes and do not allow higher schedules to go into effect because 
of employer resistance to higher UI taxes. In addition, some states 
have tax schedules with an insufficient range in rates to sufficiently 
translate employer unemployment experience into tax rates that ade-
quately distinguish experience. There are no federal requirements on 
the range of rates other than the residual statutory FUTA range from 
0.0 to 5.4 percent. Since the FUTA maximum is 6.0 percent with a 90 
percent reduction to employers in states with conforming UI systems, 
the FUTA tax is 0.6 percent and the lowest allowable state maximum 
rate is the difference, or 5.4 percent applied to a state tax base of 
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at least $7,000. Furthermore, some states have a small number of 
tax rates in their schedules and often include a zero rate, with many 
employers assigned the zero rate. The most extreme case is for states 
to have only two rates—a zero rate and a 5.4 percent rate, with large 
numbers of employers assessed the zero rate. In practice, such a sys-
tem is not truly experience-rated because the tax rate is unresponsive 
to benefit charges over large ranges.
To achieve adequate forward funding, the Advisory Council on 
Unemployment Compensation found that state accounts in the federal 
UTF should maintain balances “sufficient to pay at least one year of 
unemployment insurance benefits at levels comparable to its previous 
high cost” (ACUC 1996, p. 11). In 2010, this rule was established as 
a federal requirement for interest-free loans from the loan account 
in FUTA. The rule requires states to hold one year of reserves in the 
UTF based on the average of the three highest-cost rates experienced 
in the prior 20 years. This rate is known as the average high-cost rate 
(AHCR). The rule becomes fully effective in 2019; in 2014, it started 
to be phased in at a target rate of 50 percent of the AHCR, and it 
increases 10 percentage points each year until it will reach the AHCR 
in 2019.13
Recommendations
• State UI tax rate schedules should be sufficient to provide 
forward funding of reserves so that ongoing benefit charges 
can be paid while building reserves for future periods of high 
unemployment. Regular UI benefits must be financed by a tax 
system with rates that vary directly with an employer’s layoff 
experience. The degree of experience rating must be more than 
nominal, such that each tax schedule has a substantial number 
of rates—we recommend at least 10 rates in each schedule that 
vary from the maximum to the minimum by uniform amounts. 
The minimum should be a small positive value to maintain 
employer involvement in the system (such as 0.1 percent). 
Avoiding a zero minimum will help maintain a broad tax base 
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for funding UI benefit payments. The maximum can remain at 
5.4 percent, provided that the TWB levels are sufficient.
• As average weekly earnings or average annual wages (AAW) 
increase over time, UI benefits and taxes should increase in 
tandem to maintain long-term balance between system inflows 
and outflows. A key to financing is the definition of the TWB. 
With the weekly benefit amount (WBA) and maximum WBA 
definitions based on average wages in UI-covered employ-
ment, the TWB must be linked to the AAW in UI-covered 
employment to create a balanced system. A formula that has 
proven reliable is for the TWB to be two-thirds of the AAW in 
the prior year.14 Vroman (2016) reports that 19 states currently 
index the TWB, and he finds that an indexed TWB is essential 
for balance in financing if the maximum WBA is also indexed 
to the AAW. 
• An adequate FUTA TWB should be set at 26 times the nation-
al AWW in UI-covered employment. Alternatively, the TWB 
could be pegged at 33 percent of the Social Security TWB. 
This would index the UI wage base to change in step with the 
Social Security base and ensure that FUTA revenues increase 
in step with aggregate earnings, while setting the UI TWB at a 
modest but adequate level.
 A TWB that is too low sets up a tax that is essentially a flat per-
capita amount that creates all the inequities associated with a 
regressive tax system. The current excessively low TWB (the 
first $7,000 of each worker’s annual earnings) falls more heav-
ily on employers of low wage workers for whom the UI tax is 
often a significantly larger proportion of the wage bill. FUTA 
revenues must be sufficient to support UI administration, the 
permanent EB program, necessary loans to states, and admin-
istration of a well-staffed and effective ES to enforce the work 
test and promote reemployment of UI beneficiaries and other 
ES-registered job seekers. 
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• Financial incentives should be created to encourage forward 
funding of benefits. This goal can be encouraged by paying 
graduated interest rates on trust fund balances. That is, higher 
rates of interest would be paid to state accounts with higher 
reserve balances. At the same time, the rates of interest charges 
to states that must borrow to pay benefits should be closer to 
the private sector alternatives many states have used recently. 
Under no circumstances should the federal interest charges 
exceed market rates for short-term U.S. Treasury debt.
• To address the exemption of government and nonprofit 
employers from FUTA taxation, a 3 percent premium should 
be assessed on reimbursements of benefit charges to state and 
local government employers and nonprofit firms that choose to 
operate as reimbursing employers. This FUTA payment would 
contribute to financing UI administrative costs and ES reem-
ployment services available to job seekers formerly employed 
by those employers.
• Maintaining a UI system that pays adequate benefits to expe-
rienced workers who become unemployed through no fault of 
their own has met resistance both at the state and federal levels 
from employers who directly pay the full cost of UI taxes. 
This resistance is not likely to fade in the future. However, 
economic studies show that the UI tax burden also falls indi-
rectly on workers, and public finance studies have shown that 
employees directly pay a considerable amount for UI cover-
age (Anderson and Meyer 2006). 
We suggest that half or more of the UI payroll taxes to finance 
benefits be directly paid by employees. Workers paying tax contribu-
tions would be in a much stronger position to advocate for UI benefits 
with adequate amounts and durations. Employee contributions would 
improve benefit financing by broadening the tax base. Furthermore, 
benefit recipiency would most likely be higher with employee UI 
taxes, as has been the experience in other countries (Card and Riddell 
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1993). Even a low tax rate for workers would increase tax revenues 
because average UI tax rates on employers are also low—less than 
two-thirds of one percent (USDOL 2016).
ADMINISTRATIVE FINANCING
The administration of the UI, ES, and other federal-state labor 
market programs is funded by the FUTA tax. Administrative fund-
ing is divided among three accounts: Employment Security Admin-
istrative Account (ESAA), Extended Unemployment Compensation 
Account (EUCA), and Federal Unemployment Account (FUA). 
ESSA funds UI and ES administrative costs and the cost of some 
labor market information programs. USDOL provides these funds to 
the states based on Congressional approval of a formula involving 
state employment and unemployment data. In recent years, the ESAA 
has received 80 percent of FUTA funds. Of the other accounts, EUCA 
normally pays for half of the costs of the permanent EB program. 
FUA is the loan account from which states can borrow if their state 
UI trust fund accounts are insufficient to pay regular state UI benefits.
States have had severe problems in the administration of their UI, 
ES, and related labor market programs. Funding has been inadequate 
for UI computer systems automation and staffing of ES service deliv-
ery, and this problem has become more severe over time. The balances 
in the accounts have been inadequate. Moreover, Congress has appro-
priated a declining percentage of the tax revenues that are deposited 
into the ESAA. These low appropriations from the federal unemploy-
ment accounts to the states have been a long-term phenomenon. 
At the beginning of the UI program, employer FUTA tax pay-
ments were recorded as general revenues of the U.S. government, and 
UI administrative expenses were paid for out of general revenues.15 
By the early 1950s, it was estimated that FUTA revenues exceeded 
appropriated UI administrative grants to states by between $500 mil-
lion and $1 billion annually. The Employment Security Administra-
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tive Financing Act of 1954 requires that any excess amount of FUTA 
revenues over UI administrative grants to states be deposited into the 
UTF in FUA to make loans to states when their reserves were insuf-
ficient to pay UI benefits. This act, commonly known as the Reed 
Act, set a limit on the level of reserves in the loan account and pro-
vided that reserves above that ceiling level be distributed to states for 
payment of regular benefits, program administration, or ES delivery. 
Motivated by the desire to control annual deficits in the unified fed-
eral budget, Congress raised the Reed Act ceiling from 0.33 percent 
of total payrolls in UI-covered employment in 1982 to 1.02 percent 
of covered payrolls today. Consequently, the incentive supplied by 
the Reed Act for Congress to adequately appropriate money from 
the UTF for UI administration has diminished. Increased revenues 
from the FUTA tax and new rules for Congressional appropriation of 
funds to the states could improve UI administration and funding of ES 
reemployment services. 
Recommendations
Although payment of UI benefits is an entitlement and does not 
require appropriations from Congress, payment of administrative 
funds to the state agencies for UI and Wagner-Peyser Act programs 
is discretionary and must be appropriated. UI administrative funding 
includes a formula for additional (contingency) funding when unem-
ployment increases above anticipated levels, but the Wagner-Peyser 
Act program has been underfunded for decades, and reemployment 
services are no longer directly funded, including for mandated reem-
ployment services provided under the WPRS initiative. 
Unemployment Insurance administration 
Congress should annually appropriate adequate funds for UI 
administration from the ESAA in the UTF. Beyond funding for 
benefit payment administration and tax collection, separate fund-
ing should be appropriated for integrity efforts, including benefit 
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payment control and reemployment services and eligibility assess-
ments. Although benefit payment control can pay for itself by collect-
ing overpayments, the formal eligibility review and reemployment 
process—recently renamed Reemployment Services and Eligibility 
Assessments (RESEA)—can also pay for itself by helping to reduce 
the duration of UI compensated unemployment.
It is important that administrative funding be sufficient to sup-
port the UI administrative process, especially during periods of high 
unemployment. Consideration should be given to making UI admin-
istration funding an entitlement, so that it can rise and fall to support 
the UI program in periods of high and low unemployment. An auto-
matic funding formula could be developed and distributed based on 
each state’s share of FUTA contributions.
Employment Service administration 
FUTA/ESAA should fully pay for the following Wagner-Peyser 
Act functions: 1) UI work test enforcement, 2) provision of labor 
exchange services to all ES applicants, and 3) provision of reemploy-
ment services for permanently separated UI claimants. Each of these 
functions is statutorily assigned to ES by the Wagner-Peyser Act. In 
addition, these functions have been evaluated and found to be cost 
effective (Jacobson et al. 2004).
Wagner-Peyser Act program funding under ESAA should be 
restored to a more robust level (e.g., the 1984 level in real terms) and 
then indexed to grow at the rate of the Social Security TWB (O’Leary 
and Eberts 2009).
Alternatively, given that the UI work test and the provision of 
reemployment services require mediated/in-person services, ESAA 
should provide funding for an adequate number of Wagner-Peyser 
positions, and then index funding to the Social Security TWB.
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EMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT SERVICES
Background
In its early history, the UI program focused heavily on temporary, 
cyclical unemployment. It mainly paid unemployment benefits until 
demand for workers picked up in the firms for which they had previ-
ously worked, and they were called back to their prior jobs. However, 
during the 1970s the incidence of permanent worker layoffs greatly 
increased, and that trend has continued and expanded. Permanent 
layoffs spread from blue collar jobs to white collar jobs and became 
a larger share of total unemployment. Temporary layoff rates have 
declined and become less sensitive to the business cycle (Groshen 
and Potter 2003). During the Great Recession, permanent layoffs 
reached an all-time high at more than 55 percent of the unemployed 
(O’Leary 2010). Current Population Survey data reveal an upward 
trend in unemployment duration, with more workers unemployed for 
27 weeks or longer. The UI program burden increased as compen-
sated durations and exhaustion rates increased, and UI beneficiaries 
correspondingly needed increased assistance in finding new jobs. 
USDOL responded to the growing worker dislocation problem 
by conducting demonstration projects in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 
1990s to test methods of assisting dislocated workers to return to work. 
Federal UI legislation responded to the growing worker dislocation 
problem in the early 1990s. Permanent work-sharing legislation was 
enacted in 1992, permitting states to establish work-sharing programs 
as part of their state UI laws. In 1993, similar permissive legislation 
was enacted allowing states to pay self-employment allowances in 
lieu of UI benefits for workers who work full time to establish a small 
business (Wandner 2010).
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Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services 
Most significantly, WPRS was enacted in 1993, requiring that all 
states establish early job search assistance referral programs for UI 
beneficiaries most likely to exhaust benefits as part of their state UI 
programs. States developed methods to target services to dislocated 
workers using WPRS models. They then began referring selected UI 
claimants to employment services that often included orientation to 
the job seeker resource room, job referral, assessment and counsel-
ing, job search workshops, and occasionally referral to job training 
or Self-Employment Assistance (SEA) programs. The WPRS system 
represents the formal recognition of the adverse effect of worker dis-
location on UI claimants and the need to supplement referrals to jobs 
with a major initiative to train workers to search for their own jobs.
The UI, ES, and the public job training system adapted to these 
1990s employment and reemployment provisions in federal and 
state UI laws.16 At the national level, the Employment and Training 
Administration of USDOL provided extensive guidance to states 
about WPRS, developing a systems approach for state UI, ES, and 
Workforce Investment Act (WIA; now called the Workforce Innova-
tion and Opportunities Act [WIOA]) programs to work together to 
provide reemployment and training services. The national UI pro-
gram has provided model state legislation and continuing technical 
assistance regarding WPRS methods (Wandner 2010). Ongoing tech-
nical assistance and guidance was provided throughout the 1990s and 
has been renewed recently as part of the RESEA initiative. The ES 
and WIA provided early guidance for these innovations, but funding 
was not stable or sufficient to support increased reemployment rates.
Work sharing 
The national UI program provided model state legislation and 
guidance for the 1982 temporary work-sharing program, but not for 
the 1992 permanent work-sharing program because of concerns about 
possible technical flaws in that legislation. A new round of technical 
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assistance followed clarification of the rules and incentives for work 
sharing in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012. 
In a boost to labor demand similar to that of work sharing, model 
legislation and guidance were provided to states in 1994 to support 
establishment of state SEA programs (Wandner 2010).
UI, ES, and reemployment services
In the mid-1990s, the UI program updated its mission and func-
tion statement to take responsibility for supporting workers’ efforts 
to return to work, as well as for properly paying UI benefits and col-
lecting UI taxes. Similarly, the national ES program responded to 
the WPRS system’s referral of UI claimants to Wagner-Peyser Act 
programs for the provision of reemployment services. Starting in the 
mid-1990s, state ES programs provided a substantial increase in the 
number of “reportable services” to UI recipients, assisting them to 
search for and find work (Wandner 2010).
As a result, both the UI and ES programs have become respon-
sible for helping workers return to work, and both programs should 
continue to speed the return to work and raise reemployment rates. 
The WIA/WIOA Adult and Dislocated Worker programs participate 
in WPRS by receiving about one-third of their training referrals from 
workers receiving reemployment services in the WPRS system. Since 
UI claims taking has increasingly occurred outside the One-Stop 
career centers, state UI programs have little ability to directly provide 
UI eligibility reviews or referral to job openings or reemployment 
services. In response, ES has been providing most of these services. 
Research and Recommendations
Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessments (RESEA) 
Research. Since the 1970s, many studies have shown the effec-
tiveness of UI eligibility reviews, including the Charleston Claimant 
Placement and Work Experiment, the Washington State Alternative 
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Work Experiment, and the Maryland UI Work Search Demonstration 
(Corson, Long, and Nicholson 1985; Johnson and Klepinger 1991, 
1994; Klepinger et al. 1998). The Charleston Experiment also found 
that providing reemployment services as well as eligibility reviews 
can further shorten durations of UI compensated unemployment. 
The original UI eligibility review program (ERP) of the 1970s 
was allowed to wither until the early 2000s with the establishment of 
Reemployment and Eligibility Assessments (REAs). The REA initia-
tive combines one-on-one in-person UI eligibility reviews, labor mar-
ket information, and referral to reemployment services. A series of 
REA evaluations in four states found evidence that the REA programs 
were effective in reducing UI duration and generating savings for the 
UI Trust Fund (Benus et al. 2008; Poe-Yamagata et al. 2011). Because 
the Nevada program generated substantially larger impacts than the 
other study states’ programs, the Nevada REA program study was 
extended to confirm those findings. The results confirmed the ear-
lier results—the Nevada REA program was very effective in assisting 
claimants to exit the UI program sooner than they would have in the 
absence of the program (Michaelides et al. 2012). Based on these 
results, the study concluded that the combination of REA and reem-
ployment services is a highly effective model for reducing UI dura-
tion and assisting UI claimants to return to productive employment. 
In 2015, USDOL changed the name of the REA program to 
RESEA to make clear that reemployment services were expected 
to be provided as well as UI eligibility reviews. Based on positive 
results from the Nevada evaluation of REA, the Obama administra-
tion proposed significant increases in program funding as part of its 
FY 2017 budget request. An additional increase in RESEA funding 
was placed in the President’s FY 2018 budget proposal (White House 
2017). However, the proposed increase was at the expense of ES 
funding, which is a counterproductive plan because RESEA requires 
adequate ES staffing to be effective.
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Recommendations. REAs should be established and monitored 
in all states. The eligibility review process is an essential compo-
nent of the UI work test process, so it is critical to assure that the UI 
program operates as an insurance program, reducing concern about 
moral hazard that can occur in the absence of incentives to encourage 
UI claimants to actively search for work. ERPs also speed the return 
to work.
Eligibility reviews also should be conducted in conjunction with 
the provision of reemployment services for unemployed workers in 
need of these services. As a result, ERPs should be fully funded so 
they can be provided in person whenever possible, rather than through 
a voice response or computer claims process.
The RESEA program emphasizes the equal importance of reem-
ployment services and eligibility assessments. Funding for RESEA, 
however, was to be through the UI program. The provision of reem-
ployment services has been done by ES, and funding should be pro-
vided directly to ES for the WPRS initiative, which remains a part of 
federal law.
Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services (WPRS) 
Research. While there have been a number of studies of the ef-
fectiveness of reemployment services since the 1970s, the WPRS 
initiative was enacted based on evaluation findings regarding job 
search assistance treatment in the final report of the New Jersey UI 
Reemployment Demonstration Project (Corson et al. 1989). The find-
ings were strengthened by a five-year follow-up study (Corson and 
Haimson 1996) that found positive second year effects from the job 
search assistance treatment. A Job Search Assistance Demonstration 
supported the New Jersey results (Decker et al. 2000), and random 
trials in Kentucky provided further evidence in support of targeting 
attention to those most likely to exhaust their UI entitlements (Black 
et al. 2003). Early implementation of WPRS was rigorously evaluated 
(Dickinson et al. 1999).
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Recommendations. WPRS should be fully funded through 
FUTA, including regular financial support to states for updating 
WPRS statistical selection models. Specifically, sufficient funding 
should be provided to maintain timely systems for selection and re-
ferral of claimants most likely to exhaust UI, and have ES conduct 
in-person/mediated reemployment services to at least a substantial 
percentage of workers who would benefit from these services. 
Under the WPRS system, nearly all UI beneficiaries without a 
definite employer recall date are profiled, and 10 to 15 percent of 
these workers are referred to services. This referral rate appears to 
reasonably reflect the capacity of the workforce system to provide 
reemployment services. However, the reemployment services cur-
rently provided to participants are limited in quantity and quality. 
WPRS funding should be increased by about $300 million per year, 
which should be provided through Wagner-Peyser Act ES programs 
(Wandner 2010).
In addition, ES is underfunded throughout the country. Its fund-
ing level has remained almost constant in nominal terms, but declined 
dramatically in real terms, over the past 25 years. For example, Min-
nesota received $14 million per year in Wagner-Peyser grants in 1984 
and employed 485 workers. In 2017, its annual grant was still $14 
million, but that amount only funded 120 workers. The overall fund-
ing for ES should be increased to about $1.5 billion per year to restore 
its funding in real terms to its early 1980s levels.17 Without improved 
funding, the states will continue to reduce mediated/in-person ser-
vices and replace them with automated services (Wandner 2013a).
The above recommendations are consistent with a 1999 report by 
a WPRS work group composed of national, regional, and state experts 
that reviewed the system based on early operational experience. The 
work group made seven recommendations to improve the WPRS 
system, including that state agencies should provide more extensive 
reemployment services to participating UI claimants and that USDOL 
should separately fund these reemployment services (Wandner and 
Messenger 1999).
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Work sharing/short-time compensation 
Research. California enacted the first work-sharing program in 
the United States. The federal government enacted temporary work-
sharing legislation in 1982 and then permanent legislation in 1992 
and 2012. As a result, California conducted an early evaluation of its 
program (Employment Development Department 1982), and USDOL 
followed, conducting two national evaluations of the work-sharing 
program, one in the 1980s and another in the 1990s (Kerachsky et al. 
1986; Walsh et al. 1997). Other industrialized countries have evalu-
ated their work-sharing programs, analyzing program operation as 
well as effectiveness and efficiency. For example, Canada has con-
ducted several evaluations (Ekos Research Associates 1993; HRSDC 
2005), as has Germany (Crimmann, Wiessner, and Bell 2010) and 
other European countries (Vroman and Brusentsev 2009). Although 
none of these studies has been as rigorous as the experimental evalu-
ations of other reemployment services, a consensus has developed 
among researchers and policy analysts that work sharing helps pre-
vent unemployment and does so at a modest cost, because in the 
absence of the program, an equivalent expenditure would be made to 
pay UI benefits to workers who become totally unemployed.
The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 
(MCTRJCA) was enacted into law on February 22, 2012. The act’s 
work-sharing subtitle D describes the Short-Time Compensation 
(STC) program and required the Secretary of Labor to report to Con-
gress and the president on the implementation of the STC provisions 
by February 2016. It expanded and clarified the definition of STC, 
and that definition has been adopted by all states with a conforming 
STC program. MCTRJCA provided the Secretary of Labor with suffi-
cient flexibility to guide states through the interpretation of their laws 
and assist them in bringing their state laws into conformity with the 
new federal definition. 
To implement the provisions of the act, USDOL initiated two 
work-sharing studies, a survey of employers and a study of the imple-
mentation of the 2012 act. The employer survey was conducted in 
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four states for both participating and nonparticipating employers: 
Kansas, Minnesota, Rhode Island, and Washington (Balducchi et al. 
2015). The survey findings include:
• Work-sharing employers overwhelmingly were very satisfied 
with their state’s program, with many employers believing 
it was instrumental in allowing them to retain highly skilled 
workers. 
• Awareness of the work-sharing program is limited.
• Usage was greatest among manufacturing employers, larger 
employers, employers who had been in business for longer 
periods than nonparticipating employers, and employers with 
more skilled workers.
• From 43 to 65 percent of the work-sharing employers were 
repeat users.
• From 16 to 21 percent of the work-sharing employers eventu-
ally laid off some participating employees because of lack of 
work.
• From 60 to 70 percent of participating employers found that 
work sharing imposed an increased administrative burden 
compared to the regular UI program. The burden was pri-
marily associated with the continued claim process, because 
the great majority of employers found it easy to apply for the 
program.
The second MCTRJCA study (Bennicci and Wandner 2015) 
reported that states found enacting conforming work-sharing legis-
lation to be easy because most of the changes were minor. In addi-
tion, USDOL facilitated the process by reviewing each state’s law and 
communicated directly with the states about the necessary changes 
to their state laws to achieve conformity. For states enacting legisla-
tion to implement a new or revised work-sharing program, USDOL 
provided model legislation and guidance, including reviewing drafts 
of legislation. In enacting new STC legislation, most study states 
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faced little public opposition to the legislation, although the effort 
to achieve enactment was lengthy and contentious in some states. 
For study states with existing STC laws, implementing changes to 
their programs for conformity to the MCTRJCA was not a significant 
challenge. The changes were primarily focused on revisions to the 
STC application, state STC policies and procedures, and educating 
employers about the changes. One major administrative challenge for 
state agencies was getting ready to scale up the program during the 
next recession. A few states were better prepared than others because 
they had automated systems for applications and claims filing. 
In February 2016, Secretary of Labor Perez transmitted a report 
to Congress based on the findings of Bennicci and Wandner (2015) 
and Balducchi et al. (2015). USDOL also supported a field experi-
ment to evaluate ways to inform employers about the availability of 
the work-sharing program as an alternative to layoffs. 
Recommendations. A number of changes to the work-sharing 
program should be considered:
• Work sharing should be extended to all states, and program 
use should be expanded within states during recession peri-
ods. USDOL should encourage states to adopt work-sharing 
legislation and make use of the program. 
• States enacting new work-sharing legislation should be pro-
vided with funding to implement and initially market the 
program. 
• USDOL should increase administrative funding for work-
sharing program administration because the program requires 
more staff time than the regular UI program. 
• Congress should consider legislation to relieve employers 
from paying for the costs of work sharing, instead paying for 
the program from FUTA or federal general revenue—not state 
trust fund accounts. Congress should also consider having 
STC benefits not reduce participants’ future potential duration 
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for regular UI benefits. These reforms would greatly encour-
age employers, workers, and states to participate in the STC 
program.
 Self-Employment Assistance (SEA)
Research. SEA is a small but effective program in several states. 
It has been actively used in Maine, New Jersey, New York, and 
Oregon. SEA is also a statutory option in Delaware, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania. Although similar programs serve considerably more 
workers in other major industrial nations, it is not clear that the SEA 
in its present form will expand to other states in the United States. 
The program is not likely to be adopted by other states unless suffi-
cient funding for entrepreneurial counseling and training is provided 
to unemployed workers participating in the program. States with SEA 
programs frequently have no steady source of funding for training in 
the basic management, accounting, and marketing skills needed to 
run a successful business.
Before enacting a federal SEA statute, USDOL conducted two 
self-employment allowance experiments in Washington and Massa-
chusetts (Benus et al. 1995). The Washington experiment involved 
a one-time lump-sum payment, while the Massachusetts experiment 
involved weekly payments like regular UI. The Massachusetts dem-
onstration project was found to be cost effective, whereas the Wash-
ington program was not. The Massachusetts experiment estimated 
that the program reduced participants’ spells of unemployment and 
increased their total time in employment. Participation also had a pos-
itive impact on participants’ earnings. When placed in a benefit-cost 
framework, the Massachusetts experiment provided net benefits to 
participants, society, and the government sector. This meant that the 
cost of the program was exceeded by the benefits to the government, 
especially in the form of increased tax payments, since participants 
were found to earn a great deal more than nonparticipants. 
The Massachusetts experimental program with weekly payments 
was chosen as the design for the federal SEA program. On the basis 
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of an interim evaluation report (Benus et al. 1991), Congress enacted 
a temporary program in late 1993 with a five-year sunset provision 
as part of the North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). The final 
evaluation (Benus et al. 1995) provided strong findings of cost effec-
tiveness and was the basis for making the federal SEA program per-
manent in 1998. 
Because of dissatisfaction with the small size of the SEA pro-
gram, proposals were developed to make administrative and legis-
lative changes to it, including the provision of administrative funds 
and federal technical assistance. Under the MCTRJCA, new SEA 
provisions were adopted to encourage state adoption and expansion 
of SEA. However, no new states adopted the program, even though 
USDOL provided guidance and model legislation to the state work-
force agencies in 2012 (Employment and Training Administration 
2012). Even states that were interested in adopting the SEA program 
did not do so because they were overburdened with operating their 
own UI programs during a period of continued high unemployment 
after the Great Recession.
Although the SEA program has been open to adoption to all states 
since it was included as a displaced worker alternative in NAFTA, 
few states have chosen to establish and use SEA programs. Even in 
the seven states with SEA programs, participation is limited because 
only a small percentage of the UI claimants want to set up their own 
businesses. Moreover, few of the workers who are ready to participate 
are actually given a chance, largely because of difficulty in securing 
funds for entrepreneurial training. Participation was low before the 
Great Recession, and program use increased somewhat after its onset 
in Maine, New Jersey, New York, and Oregon. 
Recommendations. SEA should be made available to unem-
ployed workers in all states. The program should become a part of all 
state UI laws. Eligibility for SEA should continue to be limited to UI 
claimants who are permanently separated from their jobs and have a 
high probability of exhausting their UI benefits as indicated by their 
WPRS profiling score.
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The principal impediment to offering SEA participation in states 
with SEA programs has been a lack of funding for entrepreneurial 
training that prepares unemployed workers to establish their own 
businesses. The state SEA programs should partner with state WIOA 
and Small Business Development Centers to have them fund and/or 
provide such entrepreneurial training. The federal government also 
should encourage and fund these partnering arrangements.
Reemployment bonuses 
Research. Between 1984 and 1989, four reemployment bonus 
experiments were conducted in the states of Illinois, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington. All four experiments involved pro-
viding lump-sum payments to permanently separated workers who 
took new, full-time jobs within 6 to 12 weeks after becoming unem-
ployed and held those jobs for at least three to four months. These 
experiments were conducted to find a strategy to overcome the work 
disincentive effect of cash UI payments to unemployed workers. The 
reemployment bonus design was intended to speed the return to work 
of dislocated workers in a way that would benefit employees and be 
cost effective. The concept behind these experiments was that UI 
claimants would be better off if they went back to work sooner and 
took jobs similar to the jobs they would have taken in the absence of 
their bonus offers. Bonus offers were tested to see if they would be 
cost effective to the government sector, that is, if the cost of offer-
ing bonuses was offset by a decrease in UI payments to unemployed 
workers and an increase in tax receipts during their longer period of 
employment. 
An analysis simulating profiling reemployment bonuses was 
conducted with data from the Pennsylvania and Washington state 
experiments, the two experiments that appeared to have the greatest 
policy relevance (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 2005). This analysis 
was conducted for two reasons. First, reemployment bonuses seemed 
to be policy appropriate only for permanently separated dislocated 
workers, a conclusion that had already been recognized by a 1994 
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Clinton administration proposal to implement targeted reemployment 
bonuses.18 Second, the Pennsylvania and Washington state results 
were rather small across the 10 treatments tested, with five of the 
treatments in those two states found to be cost effective to society and 
to the government sector, but only two treatments were cost effec-
tive for the UI system (Corson et al. 1992; O’Leary, Spiegelman, and 
Kline 1995). In the absence of profiling, no optimum reemployment 
bonus design emerged from the experimental results.
Analysis of the profiled reemployment bonus data suggested 
that profiling improved the cost effectiveness from the perspective 
of the UI program. In all treatments in both states, impact estimates 
with profiling generally were stronger than those without it. Offering 
bonuses to the top 50 percent of the profiled distribution—that is, the 
half identified as most likely to exhaust UI benefits—was more cost 
effective than setting the threshold at either 25 percent or 75 percent. 
The results comparing bonus amounts (high and low in Pennsylvania 
and high, medium, and low in Washington) and eligibility periods 
(short and long in both states) suggested that a low bonus amount 
combined with a long eligibility period was most cost effective. These 
estimates “suggest that such a targeted bonus offer would yield appre-
ciable net benefits to the UI trust funds if implemented as a perma-
nent program” (O’Leary, Decker, and Wandner 2005, p. 279). Their 
recommendation was for a bonus amount of about three times the 
weekly benefit and a qualification period of about 12 weeks offered to 
the 50 percent of profiled UI beneficiaries most likely to exhaust their 
UI entitlements. Using the national average weekly benefit amount 
for the 12 months ending in February 2018, the bonus would aver-
age $1,057. Even though the reemployment bonus experiments were 
completed in the early 1990s, reemployment bonuses have not yet 
been implemented as part of U.S. labor market policy. 
Recommendations. Reemployment bonuses speed the return to 
work of dislocated workers by increasing their work search efforts. 
Bonuses do not have an adverse economic effect on workers because, 
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as research shows, workers do not take jobs that pay less than those 
that they would have taken (later) in the absence of a reemployment 
bonus offer. Reemployment bonuses tend to be cost effective if they 
are offered to dislocated workers with a high probability of exhaust-
ing their UI benefit entitlements as measured by their WPRS profil-
ing score. Reemployment bonuses should be enacted into federal law 
using the language of the proposed Reemployment Act of 1994. The 
result would be a permissive program that states could adopt, offering 
modest reemployment bonuses to targeted UI beneficiaries who have 
been permanently separated from their prior jobs.
Education and training 
The UI program has declined in its ability to provide benefits 
to experienced, covered workers who become unemployed through 
no fault of their own. Declining benefit adequacy has resulted from 
insufficient forward funding of the system. Nonetheless, there have 
been numerous proposals to fund education and training programs 
from state and federal UI funds. Despite prohibitions on the use of 
UI funds for anything other than the payment of UI benefits and the 
administration of UI and related programs, the substantial size of the 
program makes it a target for attempts to use UI funds for non-UI pur-
poses. Specifically, the existence of the large (but dedicated) UI Trust 
Fund makes the UI program a target for funding other programs. The 
public finance literature shows that dedicated trust funds frequently 
have been targets of budgetary raiders. 
Recommendations. The integrity of the UI system must be 
maintained. To that end, FUTA reserves should be limited to sup-
porting UI and ES administration and services. While FUTA fund-
ing should support the provision of more and better reemployment 
services, FUTA funds should continue to be limited to funding UI and 
ES administration. Specifically, education and training for the long-
term unemployed should not be funded from either FUTA reserves or 
state accounts in the UTF. Congress should consider funding training 
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from U.S. Department of Education grants and loans because WIOA 
grants to states are not adequate to provide even the amount of job 
training currently needed. 
CONCLUSION
The recommendations presented in this chapter are part of our 
attempt to develop a comprehensive UI reform proposal that would 
create a program that would be adequately funded and would help 
speed the return to work for all UI recipients.
In Appendix 5A, our recommendations are compared to three 
other sets of recommendations: the recommendations in the 2017 
budget request by President Obama (WHO); a proposal by the 
authors from the Center for Law and Social Policy, Georgetown 
University, and the National Employment Law Project (CGN); and 
recommendations from the 2018 budget request by President Trump 
(WHT). A detailed summary of the elements of the proposals is given 
in Appendix 5B. Our recommendations are the most comprehensive 
with respect to the reform of UI as a social insurance program across 
the full range of issues that relate to the UI program. By contrast, 
although the WHO proposals try to enhance the basic role of UI as a 
social insurance program, they are incomplete and would not create 
an adequate, balanced, and effective UI system. Similarly, the CGN is 
not comprehensive and fails to respect social insurance principles and 
financing challenges. The WHT proposal is the most limited approach 
to UI reform of the three programs compared.
Comprehensive UI reform is urgently needed. The UI program is 
out of balance today, and it is not prepared or preparing for the next 
recession. Despite the urgent need for reform, it is difficult to believe 
that comprehensive reform is likely to occur at the state or national 
level, given widespread employer opposition to expanding the unem-
ployment benefit system and raising taxes to fund these benefits. 
We suggest that the most likely route to comprehensive UI reform 
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involves reducing or eliminating employer taxes by instead having 
employees directly fund much or all of the UI program.
Notes
We thank David Balducchi and Wayne Vroman for constructive comments on 
an earlier version of this chapter. 
 1. The three main separation reasons covered by the ARRA concern: 1) 
domestic violence, 2) illness or disability of an immediate family mem-
ber, and 3) moving to accompany a spouse who relocates to a distance 
impractical for commuting to the job. 
 2. Gary Burtless (1983) also described how the lower recipiency ratio 
weakened the countercyclical strength of the UI system to dampen eco-
nomic downturns. 
 3. The states are Florida, Iowa, Idaho, Georgia, Maine, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, Montana, and North Dakota.
 4. There has been a sharp downward trend in the number of local offices 
from nearly 3,600 in 2003 and 2004 to 2,451 in May 2018. (A tempo-
rary increase in the number of offices occurred in 2009 and 2010 with 
funding from the ARRA.)  Most of the decline has occurred in the affili-
ate offices, which has disproportionately affected ES (compared to the 
WIA) and reduced public workforce services in less densely populated 
parts of the United States.
 5. Two states offer slightly longer potential durations; Massachusetts pro-
vides up to 30 weeks while Montana offers up to 28 (USDOL 2016).
 6. The states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, 
North Carolina, and South Carolina. In Kansas, the potential duration 
is 26 weeks if state unemployment is 6 percent or higher, but 20 weeks 
when the unemployment rate averaged over the prior 3 months is below 
6 percent at the time of UI benefit application.
 7. In 2013, four UI programs (California, Connecticut, Ohio, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands) were still paying on loans from the U.S. Treasury, while 
six other states (Colorado, Illinois, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, 
and Texas) were still repaying other loans or bond debts from UI benefit 
payments (O’Leary and Kline 2016, p. 1).
 8. Note, however, that applicants qualifying for the minimum weekly ben-
efit amount usually receive higher than 50 percent wage replacement per 
week. 
 9. This discussion is drawn from O’Leary and Barnow (2016).  In January 
2018, California and the Virgin Islands were still repaying loans to the 
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Treasury, and Michigan, Nevada and Pennsylvania were still repaying 
other loans or bond debts (USDOL 2018).
 10.  The rest of this section draws on Wandner (2012).
 11.  Suggestions for federal benefit standards are fully described below.
 12. Despite having multiple employers make tax payments on their behalf, 
multiple job holders have difficulty accessing UI in many states when 
they lose one of their jobs because work search rules require availability 
for full-time work. As we assert above, eligibility rules should permit 
seeking part-time work if employment has customarily been part time. 
 13. This paragraph draws on O’Leary and Barnow (2016, pp. 21–22). 
 14. Among the 19 states with indexed TWBs, the average rate is 72 percent 
of the average annual wage in UI-covered employment. 
 15. This paragraph is drawn from O’Leary and Barnow (2016). 
 16. When WPRS started operations in 1994, job training was delivered 
under the Job Training Partnership Act (1982), which later was reor-
ganized as the Workforce Investment Act (1998), and now is the Work-
force Innovation and Opportunity Act (2014).  In areas where funding 
was sufficient, ES provided WPRS services; elsewhere the training part-
ners helped starting with JTPA.  The WIA program established one-stop 
centers where all services were available under one roof, and WIOA 
continued the one-stop model.
 17. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 by Balducchi and 
O’Leary. 
 18. The proposed Reemployment Act of 1994 was never enacted into law.

Unemployment Insurance Reform   177
Appendix 5A
Comparison of UI Reform Proposals
This Appendix considers UI system reforms that should be addressed 
before the next recession. Three comprehensive UI system reform proposals 
are reviewed. We start with our own (O’Leary and Wandner or OW), based 
on the principles and research reviewed in this chapter. We then describe 
the main elements of two other proposals from governmental and nongov-
ernmental sources: the Obama Administration FY 2017 Presidential Budget 
Request (White House-Obama or WHO) and a consortium led by the Center 
for American Progress and including Georgetown University and the National 
Employment Law Project (CGN).1 Table 5A.1 provides an overview of the 
areas where each of the groups proposes reforms. An expanded version of this 
summary is given in Appendix 5B, which includes details of each proposal. 
We also discuss a list of proposals for reforming four UI features made 
by the Trump administration.
COMPARATIVE SUMMARIES OF PROPOSALS
The three recent UI reform proposals differ in many of their details, but 
they all propose reasonably comprehensive system-wide reform—with the 
WHO proposal being the least comprehensive of the three—while placing a 
different emphasis on some issues, including the commitment to maintaining 
the social insurance character of the UI program and the use of federal stan-
dards versus financial incentives for state action. In this section, the programs 
are compared with a focus on the topic areas listed in Table 5A.1.
O’Leary-Wandner (OW) Proposal 
The following is a summary of the UI reform proposals we believe 
should be set as federal conformity requirements for state UI programs. 
Initial eligibility: Requires states to have an alternate base period (ABP). 
Permits suitable work to be limited to part-time work if that was customary, 
and lets the minimum acceptable wage for suitable work decline with the 
duration of benefit receipt. Sets a low minimum monetary eligibility require-
ment such as having one base period quarter with earnings of at least $1,000 
and a second base period quarter with at least $500.
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Table 5A.1  Comparison of Unemployment Insurance (UI) Reforms Proposed by O’Leary and Wandner (OW), the 
Obama White House (WHO), and the Center for American Progress/Georgetown University/National 
Employment Law Project (CGN) 
Proposals by UI feature OW WHO CGN
Initial eligibility (number of states) Dollars and HQ Dollars and HQ Weeks and HQ
Alternate base period (40) Yes Yes Yes
Seeking part-time work (26) Yes Yes Yes
Good cause quits–family (20) Yes Yes
Definition of suitable work Declining wage
Extended base period Yes
Continuing eligibility
Work search and employment services Yes RESEA
High quality reemployment services Yes
Benefit standards 50%, max 2/3 AWW 50%, max 2/3 AWW 50%, max 2/3 AWW
Duration of regular benefits 26 earnings related 26 uniform 26 uniform
Partial UI benefits Yes
Retirement income offset Eliminate
Training allowance (13) Yes
Dependents allowance (6)
Disaster unemployment assistance Expand
Stipends in OJT and apprenticeships Add
Extended benefits—reform EB system TUR triggers fed-state TUR triggers fed-state TUR triggers fed-state
Emergency extended compensation Federal discretion
   179
Financing features
Minimum tax rates Yes Yes Yes
Number of rates Yes
Range of rates Yes
Taxable wage base (FUTA) reforms Yes Yes Yes
Forward funding standards Yes Yes Yes
Payroll tax year end rebates Yes Yes
Funding EB and EUC Yes Yes
Fund ES and UI administration Yes Yes
Special programs
Work sharing/STC All states All states All states
Self-employment assistance All states All states All states
Reemployment bonuses Proposed-targeted
Wage insurance Research Proposed Proposed
Relocation allowances Proposed
Supportive services Proposed
Direct job creation Proposed
Unemployment assistance Proposed
UI program policy research Proposed Proposed
NOTES: A more detailed comparison is given in Appendix 5B. OJT: on-the-job training; HQ: high-quarter earnings; AWW: average weekly 
wage; TUR: total unemployment rate; EB: Extended Benefits; FUTA: Federal Unemployment Tax Act; STC: Short-Time Compensation.
SOURCE: O’Leary and Wandner (this paper), the White House (2017), and West et al. (2016). 
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Continuing eligibility: Requires continuous active work search monitor-
ing and federally fund quality reemployment services for all UI beneficiaries.
Benefit standards: Sets a maximum potential duration of at least 26 
weeks, with actual duration increasing with base period earnings. Makes the 
wage replacement rate at least 50 percent of the maximum weekly benefit 
amount (WBA), and sets the state maximum WBA at two-thirds of the state 
average weekly wage (AWW) in UI covered employment.
Extended benefits: Each state should have a schedule of benefit dura-
tions for state extended benefits (EB) based on total unemployment rate (TUR) 
triggers, paid from federal funds. Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
(EUC) would be provided during high unemployment periods by the federal 
government at the discretion of Congress, paid from general revenue.
Financing features: The taxable wage base (TWB) should be equal to 
one-third of the Social Security base and be indexed to increase in proportion 
to the Social Security TWB. State tax schedules would not include a zero tax 
rate and must have at least 10 different rates in each tax schedule, resulting 
in all employers supporting UI system costs. Both employers and employees 
should pay UI taxes, with employees paying at least half of the total tax con-
tributions to increase political support and assure full engagement with the UI 
program. Annual UI tax schedule waivers may not be granted; that is, states 
should adhere to the appropriate tax schedule under state law, without any 
legislative deferral for movement to higher schedules. States with insufficient 
forward funding would be subject to loss of UI offset credits. The tax sched-
ule would be selected annually based on the adequacy of system reserves. 
USDOL would set required standards for reserve adequacy. 
Special programs: All states would have programs for work-sharing 
and self-employment assistance. USDOL would permit states to establish 
targeted reemployment bonus programs and sponsor several different state 
random trials to evaluate wage insurance. 
Administrative financing: Provides adequate federal funding for 
administration and Reemployment Services and Eligibility Assessment 
(RESEA). 
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White House Obama (WHO) Proposal: Differences from the OW Proposal
Initial eligibility: Requires all ARRA UI modernization features, includ-
ing family reasons for good-cause quit, does not specify base period earnings 
requirements, and recommends a high quarter earnings rule, but does not 
reduce the value of suitable wage with duration of unemployment. 
Continuing eligibility: Requires RESEA during EB receipt.
Benefit standards: Sets a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks with 
the same wage replacement rate and same maximum weekly benefit amount 
formula as OW. Calls for TUR triggers for state EB and offers an EB program 
that makes use of a TUR schedule. EB is funded from EUCA or general 
federal revenues, and there is no mention of a discretionary EUC program.
Financing features: TWB is raised to $40,000 and indexed, and the 
FUTA tax rate is reduced to be revenue neutral. State tax schedules are not 
addressed. The forward funding criterion is a 0.5 Average High Cost Multiple 
(AHCM) subject to a reduction in UI offset credits. The tax schedule would 
be selected annually based on the adequacy of system reserves. USDOL 
should set required standards for reserve adequacy. 
Special programs: Requires that work sharing be available and pro-
vides wage insurance. 
Administrative financing: Not addressed.
CGN: Differences from the OW Proposal
Initial eligibility: Permits compelling family reasons for good-cause 
quits. Specifies base period earnings as 300 times state minimum hourly 
wage and requires hours worked in at least two calendar quarters. Recom-
mends a move toward hours-based eligibility. State UI agency notifies poten-
tially eligible unemployed workers. Sets standards for automated monetary 
eligibility procedures. Does not reduce the value of suitable wage with dura-
tion of unemployment. 
Continuing eligibility: Requires providing RESEA to UI recipients dur-
ing EB receipt.
Benefit standards: Requires a uniform potential duration of 26 weeks. 
Federal government pays 25 percent of the cost for benefits between 27 and 
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39 weeks. Calls for TUR triggers for state EB, similar to the OW EB-TUR 
schedule. EB is funded from FUTA or general federal revenues. Provides a 
26-week job stipend during classroom job training, on-the-job training, or 
apprenticeship. Does not mention discretionary EUC.
Financing features: TWB raised to one-half the Social Security TWB 
and then indexed. Require a minimum UI tax rate greater than zero for states. 
Standardize experience rating across states. Year-end rebates for multiple job 
holders.
Special programs: Requires that work sharing be available and pro-
vides wage insurance. 
Administrative financing: Proposes adequate federal funding for 
administration and RESEA. 
MAJOR DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROPOSALS
The U.S. labor market has changed dramatically since the inception of 
the UI program in 1935. Nonetheless, there has been no systematic updating 
of coverage and eligibility provisions at the state level. Some needed changes 
have been made by individual state initiatives and others were encouraged 
by the 2009 UI Modernization program. However, the weakness of UI Mod-
ernization is revealed by the fact that five of the states that received incen-
tive payments for introducing elements of UI Modernization have already 
repealed the new features. The following contrasts the three main reform pro-
posals on the important policy areas. 
The OW proposals are based on the assertion that the current UI program 
is broken. The regular UI benefit system and the benefit financing system 
does not support a self-sustaining program that pays adequate benefits for 
sufficient durations to support reemployment. Similarly, the aim of the WHO 
proposal is to introduce balance between the basic benefit and financing pro-
visions of the regular UI program, such that the regular program provides 
adequate UI benefits that are fully funded over the business cycle. The CGN 
program contains several elements in the OW and WHO proposals, but the 
CGN presses many dimensions of proposed UI reforms beyond social insur-
ance principles and toward social welfare aims. 
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Eligibility and Benefits
In contrast to WHO and CGN, the OW proposal recommends fewer 
changes to be mandated by federal law, with states free to choose among 
reform options. The OW proposed changes would: 
• require states to provide for an Alternative Benefit Period,
• permit part-time workers to search for part-time work,
• remove retirement income offset, and
• permit states to reduce suitable reemployment wage rates as the dura-
tion of unemployment increases.
The WHO and CGN proposals require states to allow voluntary quits for 
compelling family reasons. CGN includes all the above plus some changes 
that would go beyond social insurance principles to add elements of social 
welfare to UI, with benefits based on means or household composition. For 
example, it proposes means-tested benefits for very long-term unemployed 
persons no longer eligible for regular UI. 
Extended Benefits
The OW proposal would introduce a schedule for EB potential durations 
tied to the state or federal TUR level and would require 100 percent federal 
financing of EB. The WHO and CGN proposals are similar to those of OW, 
and all three require EB to be fully paid by the federal government from the 
UTF, with any necessary supplements from general revenues. 
All three EB proposals presume that states provide potential durations 
of at least 26 weeks of regular UI benefits regardless of the TUR level. The 
OW proposal also recognizes that Congress, in times of deep recessions, may 
exercise discretion to provide emergency EB to supplement state regular UI 
and EB programs. 
Benefit Financing 
The OW proposal aims to restore the UI program as an automatic stabi-
lizer for the macro-economy––injecting spending during high unemployment 
and withdrawing tax contributions during economic recoveries. The financ-
ing system is countercyclical if benefits are paid through a forward fund-
ing mechanism, that is, by having adequate state trust fund reserves at the 
beginning of recessions. Spending is injected immediately, but tax rates rise 
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only after experience-rating systems factor in increased benefit charges. The 
OW proposal incentivizes forward funding of benefits by paying increasingly 
higher rates of interest on reserves as balances increase, and by increasing the 
credit offset penalties as negative balances increase. 
The main WHO incentive to accomplish forward funding is paying 
states higher interest rates when their trust fund accounts reach higher AHCM 
levels. This goes beyond the existing USDOL policy of offering zero-interest 
short-term loans when AHCMs reach specified levels. The WHO proposal 
would apply a FUTA credit reduction to states with an AHCM of less than 
0.5. A FUTA credit reduction is the way states currently pay back borrowed 
funds when they prefer not to adjust state tax rates or TWBs or to issue bonds. 
The CGN proposal requires states to achieve a 1.0 AHCM within 5 years 
and also requires USDOL to establish minimum rates below which states’ tax 
revenues cannot fall. The plan would pay differentially high interest rates to 
states with balances greater than the target AHCM.
The CGN and WHO proposals would probably achieve sound counter-
cyclical financing. However, the outcome of the CGN’s setting of the AHCM 
target is uncertain because it depends on annual discretionary administrative 
action.
Reemployment
The OW proposals argue that a strong ES is necessary to implement 
the UI work test to ensure that UI recipients are able, available, and actively 
searching for work. ES needs to refer UI recipients to jobs and provide labor 
market information. Additionally, OW proposals cite evidence that job search 
assistance and other reemployment services (RES) have been shown to be 
highly cost effective in promoting return to work and shortening durations 
of UI benefit receipt. Nonetheless, UI claimants currently receive inadequate 
reemployment services both because of general underfunding of ES and 
because of inadequate funding of UI reemployment services (Wandner 2015). 
The OW proposal is to fund both from FUTA. This could be accomplished by 
increasing and indexing the FUTA TWB. At a minimum, ES funding should 
be returned to the 1984 level in real terms.
WHO also recommends expansion of other complementary reemploy-
ment and unemployment prevention services, including STC, SEA, and tar-
geted reemployment bonuses. A new federal law would be required to make 
reemployment bonuses a legally permissible use of UTF reserves.
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WHO and CGN also recognize the need for enhanced ES and reem-
ployment services funding, but they deal with this issue in different ways. 
The WHO proposal leaves this entire issue to a new UI Modernization pro-
gram with no additional federal funding, which would most likely result in 
inadequate implementation. WHO proposes a financial incentive to states for 
adopting and implementing STC. It also proposes a new wage insurance pro-
gram outside the UI program and recommends a field experiment to evalu-
ate the possible cost effectiveness and take-up rate under this type of pro-
gram. Wage insurance has been a little-used feature of the Alternative Trade 
Adjustment Assistance program for older displaced workers (age 50 or more) 
(Wandner 2013b). 
CGN recommends increased funding for ES and RES. They would 
require state implementation of STC and SEA programs. They also propose 
providing relocation allowances, apprenticeship stipends, referral to national 
service jobs, and SEA services, all funded from a portion (up to 10 percent) 
of an enhanced ES budget.
The WHO proposal recognizes statutory funding for ES through the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. The proposal would 1) not yield adequate funding for ES 
or for UI RES, 2) add potentially expensive and unproven wage insurance, 
and 3) not address SEA or reemployment bonuses. The CGN proposal for ES/
RES is sound, but the proposed use of enhanced ES funding (up to 10 percent 
of a new fund) is an unprecedented funding source for these initiatives. CGN 
does not propose reemployment bonuses.
Special Programs
All three proposals recommend that all states have statutory authori-
zation to permit employers to provide work-sharing payments through the 
UI system and that self-employment assistance be available for targeted UI 
beneficiaries. 
The CGN proposal for a Job Seekers’ Allowance, which would program-
matically be a form of unemployment assistance, is not social insurance but 
rather a means-tested benefit. Indeed, several CGN proposals for expanding 
the UI system go beyond the social insurance approach and, in some cases, 
look more like public assistance than social insurance.
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TRUMP WHITE HOUSE PROPOSALS
The following set of four UI reform legislative recommendations were 
presented in the Trump administration’s FY 2018 Budget (USDOL 2017b, 
p. 4): 
1) A proposal to establish a federal-state paid parental leave benefit pro-
gram within the UI program that provides six weeks of benefits for 
mothers, fathers, and adoptive parents to help families recover from 
childbirth and to bond with their new children.
2) A proposal to reduce improper payments in the UI program with a 
package of reforms that would allow states to target more tools and 
resources toward the problem. 
3) An expansion of RESEA. This proposal would provide mandatory 
funding for states to provide RESEA to one-half of eligible UI claim-
ants, as well as all ex-military service members.
4) A minimum solvency standard that would apply the FUTA credit 
reduction rules to states that have an AHCM of less than 0.5 on Janu-
ary 1 of two consecutive years (rather than the current zero trust 
fund balance). This proposal would strengthen states’ ability to ade-
quately fund their UI systems.
Because these proposals were briefly described in a budget document, 
have not been fleshed out, and were presented without analysis by the Trump 
administration, we have considered them separately from the other more 
developed recent UI reform proposals. 
Parental Leave Proposal 
Most OECD countries offer parental leave benefits, and they have been 
found to be an effective policy to increase fertility (Lalive and Zweimuller 
2009). The proposal for parental leave therefore might be very good social 
policy, but paying benefits from the UTF for parental leave is currently not an 
allowable use of UI program funds. To protect the integrity of the UTF, state 
trust fund account reserves are paid by employer taxes on payrolls and may 
only be used to pay UI benefits. During periods of recession, state reserves 
are often not even sufficient to pay regular benefits to eligible UI applicants. 
Parental leave benefits would be a new entitlement with simple eligibility 
conditions, but for a parental benefit to be sustainable, a new tax would be 
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required. Furthermore, either the UTF withdrawal rules would have to be 
statutorily revised, or a separate fund would have to be established with a 
new tax and a dedicated revenue stream. Actuarial computations of revenue 
adequacy for such a fund would require new behavioral analysis. Rough esti-
mates suggest that parental leave payments would have increased fund pay-
ments by at least 25 percent, or about $8 billion dollars, if it had been in place 
in 2017.2 
Improper Payment Proposal 
Improper UI payments are a serious problem, but they are inherent in 
any social insurance system and impossible to eliminate entirely. In a recent 
12-month period, 11.2 percent of all regular UI payments involved errors, 
and 10.6 percent of payments were incorrectly high (Gilbert 2011). However, 
even if all overpayments were eliminated, the savings would not be enough 
to pay for the proposed parental leave program.3 Overpayment errors have 
become a structural component of the UI system because of the federal rules 
relating to the initial eligibility of applicants. These rules are based on a 1970 
California state Supreme Court decision that ordered payment of benefits 
during appeal periods. USDOL has complied with this decision by apply-
ing it nationwide, such that administrative performance targets for timeliness 
require UI benefit payments to be made when due and not delayed (O’Leary 
and Barnow 2016). 
The biggest cause of overpayment errors on continuing claims is the 
failure to fully comply with the UI work test (Burgess and Kingston 1987; 
Clarkwest et al. 2012). Expanded ES funding by USDOL to provide one-on-
one eligibility reviews to UI beneficiaries should reduce work test overpay-
ments through the RESEA program, but since the Trump proposal would only 
provide RESEA to half of the WPRS group, RESEA still would not entirely 
eliminate overpayments. 
RESEA Proposal 
USDOL increased funding for the RESEA program in 2017 and pro-
vided grants to all states starting that year. The White House 2018 proposal 
aims to provide RESEA to the top 50 percent of WPRS-eligible UI benefi-
ciaries—that is, those neither awaiting employer recall nor union hiring hall 
members. Earlier research suggested that shorter UI durations from WPRS 
result from the unwelcome prospect of having to participate in services rather 
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than the actual content of those services (Black et al. 2003), but a more recent 
evaluation of the RESEA predecessor, REA, estimated significantly shorter 
UI durations resulting from the RES component of REA (Michaelides et al. 
2012). RESEA offers the prospect of reducing, but not eliminating, overpay-
ments on continuing UI claims. About half of UI recipients are subject to 
referral to WPRS services, and only about half of these will get RESEA. 
Furthermore, most state WPRS profiling systems have not been updated in 
many years, so the top half of the profiling distribution does not necessarily 
include those most likely to exhaust UI. 
Minimum Solvency Standard 
The Trump proposal would institute a federal rule that would reduce a 
state’s FUTA credit if the state’s AHCM for its reserves in the UTF is lower 
than 0.5 on two consecutive January firsts, which would nudge states toward 
forward funding of regular UI benefits. However, this would be only a par-
tial and probably an inadequate solution. The accepted standard for forward 
funding is an AHCM of 1.0. Relying on the FUTA credit reduction would 
be a slow mechanism to restore reserves. For example, after borrowing to 
pay benefits during the recent recession, 25 states experienced FUTA credit 
reductions in one or more year since 2009. In fact, 13 states had credit reduc-
tions in three or more consecutive years, with negative reserve balances on 
January first.4 It is reasonable to conclude that these states consciously chose 
to let the FUTA credit reduction mechanism improve reserves instead of 
reforming their state benefit financing mechanisms. Credit reduction is a slow 
way to improve reserves because the FUTA TWB is only $7,000, and the 
statewide annual increment in the federal tax rate is only 0.3 percentage point. 
In fact, since 2011, two states have had FUTA credit reductions in place for 
seven consecutive years. The proposed USDOL solvency mechanism would 
be more effective if the FUTA TWB were increased. This also would improve 
benefit financing in states with TWBs below any new higher required federal 
level. A 0.5 AHCM is an inadequate forward funding standard and could pro-
long reliance on the federal credit reduction mechanism by some states. 
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Appendix 5B
Detailed Comparison of Unemployment Insurance Reform 
Proposals by O’Leary and Wandner (OW), the White 
House-Obama (WHO), and the Center for American 
Progress–Georgetown University–National Employment 
Law (CGN) 
Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Initial eligibility 
(number of states 
with this provi-
sion, if applicable)
Monetary criteria Dollars and high-
quarter earnings 
(HQ)
Dollars and HQ Weeks and HQ
Federal require-
ment that workers 
are eligible if they 
earn at least 300 
times the state’s 
hourly minimum 
wage during 
base period and 
worked in at least 
2 quarters. In the 
long run, require 






Require states to 
have an ABP
Require states to 
have an ABP
Require states to 
have an ABP
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 




























part time to collect 
benefits as long as 
they are earning 
less than 150% of 
their weekly bene-




equal to 50% of 
the WBA (p. 63).
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Proposals by UI 









Require states to 
adopt for workers 
leaving jobs for 
compelling per-




selves or family 
member during 
illness or injury, 
providing child 
care when no al-
ternative arrange-
ment is available, 
and following 
spouse, partner, or 
co-parent. Federal 
government pays 
for these benefits 
and employers are 
not charged (pp. 
52, 77).
Require states to 
expand definition 




ratic job schedules 
or cut in hours and 
pay.
Require all states 
to eliminate eligi-
bility restrictions 
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Proposals by UI 








tinued claims for 
short-term layoffs 
and business shut-
downs, as well as 
work sharing (pp. 
67, 70).
Require states to 
notify all employ-
ees of potential 
UI eligibility fol-
lowing separation 













wage level during 
regular UI benefit 
period as duration 





to adopt an 
extended base 
period for workers 
with qualifying 
conditions, e.g., 
illness or injury. 
Also require an 
18-month base 
period for workers 
with an erratic 
work schedule.
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Proposals by UI 
















ment Services and 
Eligibility Assess-
ment (RESEA)
All EB recipients 
required to partici-
pate in RESEA




and sufficiency of 
ES staffing
FUTA should 
fund ES at 1984 
levels in real 
terms. Supplemen-
tary funding for 
RESEA and other 
initiatives should 
be provided to all 
states.
Benefit standards
Benefit standards Require all states 
to replace 50% of 
lost wages, with 
maximum WBA 




to adopt federal 
benefit standard 
using a new 
UI Moderniza-
tion program. 
$5 billion in 
grants for 1) 
benefit expansion 
and 2) “pro-work 
reforms.” Benefit 
expansions: 1) UI 
payments while 
in training and 2) 
maximum WBA of 
at least 2/3 AWW; 
improve eligibil-
ity for temporary 
workers.
Encourage states 
to adopt a 50% 
wage replace-
ment standard, 
with an indexed 
WBA equal to 
two-thirds of the 





25% of regular du-
ration greater than 
26 weeks up to 39 
weeks (p. 61).
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 




tion of waiting 
week (p. 61).
Require lump-sum 
payments of UI 
benefits for “quali-









tion of at least 26 
weeks of benefits
Require states to 
have a maximum 
duration of at least 
26 weeks
Require all states 
to have uniform 
maximum duration 
(p. 60)
Partial UI benefits Allow claimants 
working part time 
to collect benefits 
as long as they 
are earning less 
than 150% of their 
WBA, disregard-
ing from this cal-
culation part-time 
wages equal to 










Fund up to 26 
weeks of addi-
tional UI benefits 
for workers in 
training
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Proposals by UI 






gible, continue to 
receive UI benefits 
while in OJT, 







7 weeks when 
6.5% TUR
13 weeks when 
7% TUR
26 weeks when 
8% TUR
39 weeks when 
9% TUR




13 weeks when 
6.5% TUR
26 weeks when 
7.5% TUR
39 weeks when 
8.5% TUR




13 weeks when 
6.5% TUR
26 weeks when 
7.5% TUR
39 weeks when 
8.5% TUR
52 weeks when 
9.5% TUR
Additional 6 
weeks of EB 
would be payable 
in states for each 
added one percent-
age point of TUR 
after 9.5.
Also a national 
TUR EB trigger 
should be enacted:
13 weeks when 
7% TUR
26 weeks when 
8% TUR
39 weeks when 
9% TUR
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Financing features
Minimum tax rates Encourage states 
to have a non-zero 
minimum rate 
Impose a mini-
mum tax per em-
ployee of 0.175%
Require a mini-
mum tax rate for 
all states (p. 78)
Number of rates Encourage states 
to have at least 10 






Range of rates Encourage states 
not to override 
triggers moving to 
higher schedules 
in response to 




Taxable wage base 
(TWB) 
Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act 
(FUTA) reforms
Congress should 
enact a FUTA 
TWB equal to 
33% of the Social 
Security TWB and 
then tie it to the 
Social Security 
index 
Effective 2018, the 
TWB would be 
$40K and there-
after indexed to in-
flation; federal tax 
reduced to 0.167% 
to be cost neutral 
in 2018
Over 6 years, 
raise UI TWB 
to one-half the 
SS TWB and 
thereafter growing 
at the rate of the 
SS TWB; federal 
tax reduced, while 
raising sufficient 
revenue to support 
an expanded role 






depending on state 
reserve balance 
in their trust fund 
accounts, increas-
ing the rate above 
the 10-year T-bill 
rate as the state 





reduction rules to 
states with average 
HCM < 0.5 in two 
consecutive years
HCM of 1.0 
required of all 




rate below which 
states’ tax revenue 
cannot fall (p. 76). 
Pay differentially 
higher interest 
rate payments to 
states that exceed 
the target average 
HCM (p. 78).
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Proposals by UI 





to calendar year 
wages to employ-
ers of multiple job 
holders
At end of year, 
reconcile tax pay-
ments for workers 
who have held 
more than one job 















Full funding of EB 
by federal govern-
ment




funding for UI 
administration, 
including all 
components of the 
program, includ-




ments in all states.
FUTA funds ES in 
real terms at the 
1984 level, then 
indexed at the rate 










Fully fund UI 
administra-
tive funding by 
increasing by $600 
million over the 
next 3 years. After 
3 years, implement 
updated admin-
istrative formula 








one-time grants of 
$300 million for 




oversight of UI 
IT systems and 
institute federal 
UI IT audits (pp. 
69–71).
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN





funding should be 
about $400–500 
million, then 
indexed at the rate 
of increase of the 
Social Security 
TWB. Funding 
as part of WPRS 
from FUTA pro-
vided to ES.
Appropriate a total 
of $1.68 billion 
(an additional $1 
billion) for ES for 
FY 2017 (p. 21).
Appropriate 
$650 million (an 
additional $535 
million) for RE-






All states should 
be encouraged 
to adopt and 
make use of STC 
programs. New 







funding for STC 
and consider 
relieving employ-
ers of the cost of 
STC.
Incentives to adopt 
or expand for 2 







While on EB, 
50–50 split of 
costs between 
federal and state 
and non-charge of 
the federal share
Require all states 
to create an STC 
program. Provide 
federal grants for 
implementation 
and marketing for 
new states. 100% 
federal funding 
for at least 1 year 
when states are 
on EB. Federal 
STC automation 
grants. States 
encouraged not to 




to adopt best 
practices.
Full funding of 
STC by federal 
government when-
ever EB trigger 
is on, whether 
state or nationally 
triggered. States 
should not experi-
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feature OW WHO CGN
Self-employment 
assistance (SEA)
All states should 
be encouraged to 




Act and Small 
Business Admin-
istration should 
be required to 
provide entrepre-
neurial training to 
SEA participants.
All states should 
establish SEA 
programs.
All states should 








claim up to half 
of their remaining 
UI entitlement up-






ment Act of 1994 
should permit 





Wage insurance USDOL should 
conduct a wage 
insurance dem-
onstration project 
for this untested 
initiative.
For workers with 
3 years of tenure, 
earning less than 
$50,000. Pay half 
of wage reduction 




Use ES funding 
to fund relocation 
allowances, as a 
lump sum up to 3 
times the average 
WBA, capped at 
a maximum of 
$2,000 per year.
(continued)
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Proposals by UI 
feature OW WHO CGN
Supportive 














services could be 
funded with up to 









tent workers with 
limited resources.
UI program policy 
research
USDOL should 
support field tests 
of policy innova-
tions, establish a 
repository for state 
administrative 
data to support 
program policy 
research, and es-
tablish 6 regional 
research hubs for 
research including 
biennial revisions 
of state WPRS 
models.
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation; White House (2017); West et al. (2016).
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Appendix Notes
 1. The White House-Obama (WHO) proposal was published in White 
House (2017), and the Center for American Progress (CAP) proposal 
was published in West et al. (2016). 
 2. There were just under 4 million live births in the United States in 2015, 
the average UI weekly benefit amount was $347 in the 12 months pre-
ceding April 1, 2017, and assuming every child had one parent collect 6 
weeks of parental leave benefits, the payments would total $8.3 billion 
per year. Total UI payments in the year prior to April 1, 2017, were 
$31.2 billion. Parental leave payments would be higher if more than 
one parent draws benefits, and payments would be lower if the duration 
of parental leave were less than six weeks or if the take-up rate were 
less than 100 percent (as it is for regular UI payments). Our computa-
tions are based on figures from cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/births.htm and ows 
.doleta.gov/unemploy/content/data.asp (accessed April 26, 2018).
 3. For 2016, overpayments were estimated to total $3.4 billion (USDOL 
2017a).
 4. See the Table of States with FUTA Reductions, 2009–2017 at: https://
oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/futa_credit.asp (accessed April 26, 2018).
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Needed Reforms
Stephen A. Wandner
 W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
and The Urban Institute
This book has carefully examined the Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) system and reviewed a number of recent proposals for UI reform. 
All of these proposals find that the UI program requires substantial 
reform. The reform proposals cover a wide range of needed changes, 
and they suggest alternative approaches for resolving some issues. 
Thus, a number of approaches should be taken into consideration to 
implement the key reforms discussed below, and many options for 
change have been discussed in the earlier chapters.
The main thrust of this book is the need for comprehensive reform 
that creates a robust, self-sustaining UI program that restores the 
ability of the system to reliably provide temporary adequate income 
replacement during the search for reemployment. Reforms should put 
the UI system in balance so that benefits and taxes are in equilibrium 
both in the long term and over the business cycle. The UI benefit 
system must be adequate and reflect current labor force behavior and 
current economic conditions. In addition, UI taxes need to be able to 
pay for a robust program of UI benefits and be distributed equitably. 
Finally, the objective of UI is not just to provide income support to 
unemployed workers, but to help them return to work, so reemploy-
ment services are required for all permanently separated workers.
KEY REFORMS
Below is a list of key needed UI reforms. The list is a broad sum-
mary of reforms and is not as comprehensive as some of the proposals 
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discussed in the previous chapters, but it outlines a framework for a 
sustainable, adequate, and equitable UI system to provide adequate 
benefits for experienced, unemployed workers.
Bring Benefits and Taxes in Balance
Today, the UI system is out of balance. The federal tax base is 
inadequate, and many state taxable wage bases are also inadequate. 
Tax rates are not necessarily adjusted to accommodate adequate ben-
efit payment levels, and benefit levels and maximums are adjusted 
upward over time in some states but not others.
Strategic balancing of UI revenues and benefits has been neglected 
throughout the program’s history at both the state and federal levels. 
By contrast, Social Security has dealt with this issue repeatedly and 
has assured that both benefit levels and the taxable wage base keep up 
with the cost of living. The same should be done with UI.
Regular UI Benefits
The basic regular 26-week UI system should be changed. It needs 
to have adequate benefit levels and benefit durations as well as rea-
sonable eligibility conditions for workers with past attachment to the 
labor force before they become unemployed. And the benefit provi-
sions should be adapted to the substantial changes that have occurred 
in the United States in recent decades. 
Adequate benefit levels 
Given the wide discretion of states to shape their state UI pro-
grams, UI benefit provisions vary greatly across the country, and they 
are likely to continue to do so in the future. This variation is signifi-
cant enough that it creates substantial equity problems, with unem-
ployed workers receiving widely different duration levels, even after 
adjusting for state differences in average weekly wages.
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Proponents have argued for a benefit amount standard for seven 
decades. They have reached a consensus that the original proposal is 
the most reasonable—to set the maximum weekly benefit amount at 
two-thirds of each state’s average weekly wage.
Adequate benefit duration
There should be a minimum of 26 weeks of potential duration. It 
was not previously necessary to advocate for this in the past because 
all states had a minimum potential duration of 26 weeks from the 
mid-1970s until 2010. The spread of lower potential durations in the 
past few years shows that such a standard is needed.
Eligibility conditions
A small number of states have significantly narrowed benefit 
eligibility and harshened benefit administration. States should be 
encouraged to avoid punitive eligibility conditions that reduce benefit 
recipiency below reasonable levels.
On the other hand, as a social insurance program, unemployed 
workers should not be eligible for UI benefits unless they have exhib-
ited recent attachment to the labor force. To achieve this goal, O’Leary 
and Wandner (Chapter 5) recommend setting eligibility for minimum 
benefit amounts with high quarter earnings of at least $1,000 and sec-
ond highest quarter earnings of at least $500.
Adjust other benefit provisions to the changing American 
labor force 
The American labor force has changed significantly in the 
decades since UI was enacted in 1935. The biggest changes over the 
past two decades have been more multiple earners within households, 
a long-term increase in the participation of women, and the increased 
participation of older workers over the past two decades. The pro-
gram should adjust to this modern labor force by implementing the 
following changes:
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• For two-worker families, UI should pay benefits when one 
spouse follows the other to a new job in a new location.
• The participation of women and older workers has resulted 
in a sharp increase in part-time work. The UI program should 
allow part-time workers to collect UI while searching for part-
time work.
• Older workers often have to change career jobs or move to 
jobs that “bridge” their transition to full retirement. These 
transitions require job search methods that are different from 
traditional job searches for similar employment. They often re-
sult in older workers taking bridge jobs that involve a decline 
in wages, a change in industry and occupation, or a change 
from full-time to part-time work, so older workers should be 
provided with special reemployment services to help with the 
search for bridge jobs and new careers.
• Because many older workers are continuing to work after 
leaving their long-term career jobs, the federal pension offset 
provision should be removed.
UI Finance
Adequate, equitable funding
Today, low wage employers pay a disproportionate share of UI 
taxes. They may pay UI taxes on all or nearly all of their wages paid, 
while high wage employers may pay taxes on only a small portion of 
their wage bill.
• A higher taxable wage base is needed to spread the burden 
among low and high wage employers, as well as to raise ad-
equate revenue. 
• The UI taxable wage base must be increased considerably, 
such that it equals between one-third and one-half of the So-
cial Security taxable wage base. It should also be indexed each 
year to increase at the same percentage rate as the Social Se-
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curity taxable wage base. Alternatively, the UI taxable wage 
could be tied to the average wage in covered UI employment 
rather than to the Social Security wage base.
• To have a sound  UI tax system, state tax schedules should be 
set such that no state is permitted to include a zero rate in any 
tax schedule so that all employers support UI system operat-
ing costs and each tax schedule includes at least 10 rates so 
that all employers pay UI taxes closely reflecting their unem-
ployment experience.
• Employers tend to oppose increases in UI benefits and taxes 
because they pay the entire tax. UI research, however, indi-
cates that the incidence of the UI tax falls, in part, on workers 
through reductions in their total compensation, that is, wages 
plus benefits. The UI tax should change from an employer tax 
to a joint employer-employee tax, with employees paying half 
or more of the tax so that employees have increased owner-
ship in the UI program.
Countercyclical funding
• To have a countercyclical financing system, forward fund-
ing is needed. The Unemployment Trust Fund should have 
adequate reserves before a recession. UI taxes should not be 
increased at the beginning of a recession. State accounts in the 
Unemployment Trust Fund should be restored after a reces-
sion is over and before the next recession begins.
• States need to adhere to the appropriate tax schedule under 
their state law, without any legislative deferral of movement 
to higher schedules, subject to loss of UI offset credits. State 
tax schedules need to be selected annually based on maintain-
ing or achieving adequate state system reserves. 
• U.S. Department of Labor reserve requirements should guide 
states in attaining reserve adequacy. 
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• Building an adequate trust fund can be facilitated by either 
requiring states to reach an adequate level of reserves or by 
providing states with a financial incentive for building their 
reserves to a specified level. Both approaches have been rec-
ommended by UI reform proposals, and both would improve 
system solvency. 
Administrative financing
The administration of the UI, Employment Service (ES), and 
other federal-state labor market programs is funded from the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act portion of the UI tax. Federal funding pays 
for program administration, extended benefits, and loans to states—
each with its own account. For many years, states have faced severe 
funding problems in the administration of these programs, and it has 
become more severe over time. The balances in the federal accounts 
have been inadequate, and Congress has appropriated a declining per-
centage of the tax revenues that are deposited into the administrative 
account.  
Whereas the payment of UI benefits is an entitlement and does 
not require appropriations from Congress, the payment of admin-
istrative funds to the state agencies for UI and Wagner-Peyser Act 
programs is discretionary and must be appropriated. Congress should 
fully fund UI and ES administration. Appropriation levels for UI 
should fully reflect benefit payment, benefit integrity, and tax collec-
tion costs. Appropriations for ES should be greatly increased, bring-
ing appropriations back to the 1984 level in real terms—a time when 
ES funding was more adequate. 
Extended Benefits
• Although Congress will always want to have the final say 
about benefit duration extensions during recessions, it often 
is slow to take action. The United States needs an automatic 
system of benefit extensions that works in a timely fashion.
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• Extended benefits (EB) are not insurable. They should not 
be treated like the regular 26-week program and should be 
funded from general federal revenues. 
• Existing EB triggers don’t work. They should be replaced with 
a new trigger mechanism that uses the total unemployment 
rate rather than the insured unemployment rate. The number 
of weeks of EB should vary with the unemployment rate, so 
that EB is sensitive to the severity of recessions.
• More specifically, recent EB program proposals reviewed in 
this book propose to improve the EB trigger mechanism by 
making use of the total unemployment rate and having mul-
tiple levels of EB durations from 7 to 54 weeks. EB should be 
paid 100 percent by the federal government, either from the 
Unemployment Trust Fund or from general revenue.
Reemployment Services and the Work Test
The work test is crucial for having the UI program remain as a 
social insurance program. The ES provides the work test under fed-
eral law, ensuring that UI recipients are able, available, and actively 
searching for work. The service also refers UI recipients to jobs and 
provides them with labor market information. 
• Reemployment services are critical in a world with few tem-
porary layoffs and many permanently displaced unemployed 
workers. The UI and ES programs need sufficient funding 
to provide displaced workers with intensive, in-person job 
search assistance.
• Job search assistance and other reemployment services have 
been shown to be highly cost effective in promoting return to 
work and shortening durations of UI benefit receipt. Nonethe-
less, UI claimants receive inadequate reemployment services 
both because of general underfunding of ES and because of in-
adequate and declining funding of UI reemployment services. 
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O’Leary and Wandner (Chapter 5) recommend restoring ES 
funding to its 1984 level in real terms.
• Other reemployment and unemployment prevention services 
can speed the return to work of UI recipients by expanding 
their use in short-time compensation and self-employment 
assistance programs, and by enacting a program of targeted 
reemployment bonuses. New federal legislation would be 
needed to make reemployment bonuses a legal use of Unem-
ployment Trust Fund reserves.
CONCLUSION
Public policy toward the UI program has been neglectful for 
many decades. Much of the program is broken and requires major 
reform now. Both states and the federal government should adopt 
policies and legislation that can restore the program to be consistent 
with its original intent. Otherwise, the system will be inadequate in 
the future, particularly when it is needed during the next recession.
This book has reviewed a number of recent comprehensive UI 
reform proposals. The proposals present alternative approaches for 
improving the program. Policymakers should conduct a comprehen-
sive review of the UI program and options for change, including the 
various proposals considered in this book.
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